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This dissertation develops and tests a theory of how technology entrepreneurs 
shape their business opportunity and the organizing practices that facilitate that process. I 
begin by suggesting that entrepreneurial opportunities are not predetermined phenomena 
to be discovered by vigilant individuals (as is assumed by most previous research), but 
rather are emergent and dynamic, created by founders as they respond to and manage the 
uncertainties of the entrepreneurial process. Thus, if we are to understand how 
entrepreneurial opportunities come to exist, we need to explicate this generally 
unexplored creation process. Study 1 is a qualitative, case-based analysis of technology 
ventures. The findings of this study suggest that opportunities emerge as founders shape 
their ventures to match their evolving knowledge and changing environmental realities. 
This is a change process, occurring in real time and based on experience. As founders 
learn from experience, receive feedback and advice and respond to unexpected events, 
they make changes to the venture. Through these changes, the opportunity takes form, but 
because change can be disruptive and time-consuming, the process can be very costly to 
the venture.  Based on the findings of this study and building on research on the 
management of uncertainty and innovation, I develop a theoretical framework of 
organizational practices that facilitate the shaping process by reducing the disruptive 
effects of change. I suggest that because the shaping process occurs in a dynamic and 
uncertain context, ventures that develop a vigilant awareness of changing conditions, 
through performance monitoring and environmental scanning, may be more able to catch 
the need for change early before problems can escalate. In addition, ventures that develop 




experiential learning strategies) are more able to rapidly reduce equivocality and build 
knowledge about the venture. As a result of this rapid learning, change efforts tend to be 
smaller, more incremental and based on more accurate information resulting in less 
disruption for the venture. I test my hypotheses in Study 2 using an online survey of 
technology entrepreneurs. The findings suggest that performance monitoring reduces the 
overall change experienced by ventures and environmental scanning is associated with 
higher levels of perceived performance. Experiential learning strategies reduce the 
disruptiveness of change efforts and are associated with higher levels of perceived 
performance. Mediation tests suggest that experiential learning strategies reduce 
disruption and improve performance in part because they allow entrepreneurs to build 
certainty about the venture‘s internal and external environment.  
This dissertation contributes to the entrepreneurship and innovation literatures by 
providing a window into the micro-level processes through which new opportunities are 
created, managed and shaped. Beyond that, however, this dissertation represents an 
instance of a more fundamental human challenge – managing dynamic uncertainties. By 
addressing the real-time organizing practices that allow entrepreneurs to manage their 
emerging opportunity, this research also contributes to literatures on managing 





CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Entrepreneurship is viewed as critical to economic vitality and growth globally 
(Timmons, 2008). While governments, educational institutions and businesses seek ways 
to facilitate the development of entrepreneurial opportunities, the unfortunate reality is 
most new ventures fail (Shane, 2008). For every Google or Yahoo there are a thousand 
opportunities that never see the light of day. Scholars have had mixed success explaining 
this failure rate, in part because we still know very little about what entrepreneurs 
actually do.  
Previous studies have tended to focus on associating the characteristics of new 
ventures and their founders with outcomes (Reynolds, 2007a). For example, many studies 
have explored the personal characteristics that may typify a good entrepreneur or 
entrepreneurial team (Baron, 1998; Baum & Locke, 2004; Busenitz & Barney, 1997; 
Ensley & Pearce, 2001; Forbes, 2005; Hayward, Shepherd, & Griffin, 2006). Other 
studies have considered the extent to which different firm-level characteristics may be 
associated with venture performance and success (Brush, Manolova, & Edelman, 2008; 
Davila, Foster, & Gupta, 2003; Reynolds, 2007a; Shane, 2008). However, there are two 
drawbacks to these approaches. First, by focusing on the association between particular 
economic, venture or personal characteristics with new opportunities, we get very little 
insight into the process by which these opportunities emerge. Second, because 
opportunities are viewed as objective, economic phenomenon arising from imperfections 
in the market, they are treated as a static phenomenon to be discovered (Casson, 1982; 




role of human action in shaping entrepreneurial opportunities over time  (Alvarez & 
Barney, 2007a).  
More recently, theorists have begun to explore entrepreneurship as an agentic 
process, arising from the actions and interactions of entrepreneurial founders and other 
stakeholders (e.g., Alvarez & Barney, 2007a; Baker & Nelson, 2005; Baron & Ensley, 
2006; Sarasvathy, 2001). However, while these literatures have shifted the focus from 
economic forces to individual action, our understanding of what entrepreneurs actually do 
to create their ventures is still in its infancy. In particular, we lack a clear understanding 
of the process by which founders‘ proactive behaviors shape and even create different 
opportunities (Alvarez & Barney, 2007a).  
To address this gap, I have designed my dissertation around two research 
questions: ―What is the process by which entrepreneurs shape their emerging 
opportunities?‖ and ―What organizing practices facilitate that process?‖ I address these 
questions through two studies. In the first, theory-building study, I use qualitative 
interviews to develop a set of case histories of entrepreneurial opportunities, describing 
the processes by which founders came to define, explore and exploit them. Within this 
study I analyze the kinds of changes that opportunities often undergo and the types of 
experiences and events that trigger or lead to those changes. Based on the findings of this 
study, I propose a model suggesting that opportunities emerge as founders shape their 
ventures to match their evolving knowledge and changing environmental realities. 
Fundamentally, this is a process of continual change. However, while change is necessary 
in order for firms to adapt and adjust to dynamic conditions, at the same time, change can 




threatening the survival of the firm. Based on the findings of this study and drawing on 
innovation, new product development and managing uncertainty literatures, I develop a 
theory of the practices that may facilitate the shaping process by managing the effects of 
change.  I then elaborate, test and refine this model in the second, quantitative study using 
survey data from entrepreneurs and their investors.  
Theoretically, my findings will contribute to the entrepreneurship and innovation 
literatures by providing a window into the processes by which new opportunities are 
created, managed and shaped. Beyond that, however, this dissertation represents an 
instance of a more fundamental human challenge – managing dynamic uncertainties. It is 
part of a broader exploration into how people organize to manage uncertain and 
equivocal events in real time, as they are unfolding. By specifically addressing the real-
time organizing practices that allow entrepreneurs to manage their emerging opportunity, 
this research will also contribute to literatures of adaptation, learning and organizational 
change. Practically, my findings will identify behaviors that enable innovators and others 
involved in dynamic and uncertain situations to maintain a vigilant awareness of real-
time experience and to learn effectively from and in the moment.  
 In Chapter 2, I define entrepreneurial opportunities and provide an overview of 
the literatures that explore them, distinguishing between the more traditional ―discovery‖ 
models and the more recent ―creation‖ models. I then frame the boundaries of my 
theorizing and identify the gaps that I wish to fill. Chapter 3 presents Study 1, a 
qualitative study of 24 startups exploring the process by which opportunities emerged and 
changed over time and the various effects of that change process. In Chapter 4, I theorize 




change. Chapter 5 presents Study 2 which tests the hypotheses developed in Chapter 4.  
In Chapter 6, I discuss the implications and contributions of my findings as well as 





CHAPTER 2. REVIEW OF LITERATURE ON ENTREPRENEURIAL 
OPPORTUNITIES 
 
In this chapter, I start by defining entrepreneurial opportunities and framing the 
boundaries of this research, in particular distinguishing innovative opportunities from 
other kinds of entrepreneurship and from the study of new firm creation. I then present an 
overview of the current literature exploring entrepreneurial opportunities from a variety 
of perspectives. Finally, I situate my research in an emerging new perspective on 
opportunity creation, identify gaps in this literature and define my research questions.  
WHAT ARE ENTREPRENEURIAL OPPORTUNITIES? 
Very few theorists define an entrepreneurial opportunity, which has resulted in 
some confusion around what is or is not ‗entrepreneurial‘. In general terms 
entrepreneurial opportunities are the potential for new economic value arising from 
competitive imperfections in the market (Alvarez & Barney, 2007b; Kirzner, 1997; 
Schumpeter, 1934). Schumpeter outlines five forms of entrepreneurial opportunities: the 
introduction of new goods (or improvement in quality of existing goods), the introduction 
of a new method of production, the opening of a new market, the control of a new source 
of raw materials or half-manufactured goods, or the creation of a new type of industrial 
organization (Casson, 1982; Schumpeter, 1934). Based on these, Eckhardt and Shane 
(2003) offer a slightly more specific definition of entrepreneurial opportunities as ―those 
situations in which new goods, services, raw materials and organizing methods can be 
introduced through the formation of new means, ends or means-ends relationships‖ (p. 




goods, services, etc., it distinguishes innovative entrepreneurial opportunities from other 
forms of entrepreneurship. 
 One of the significant problems facing entrepreneurial scholarship is the lack of 
consistent definitions of entrepreneurship. For example, entrepreneurship may include 
franchises (Azoulay & Shane, 2001), self-employment (Davidsson & Honig, 2003; 
Parker, 2006), venture capital-backed firms (Beckman, Burton, & O'Reilly, 2007; Dubini, 
1989) and even corporate venturing (Barringer & Bluedorn, 1999; Corbett, Neck, & 
DeTienne, 2007; David, 1994). Similarly, studies are conducted in many different 
industries, from low to high tech.  All of these studies profess to be about 
entrepreneurship but to group them as such risks over generalizing the findings of any 
one study. For example, some studies conflate self-employment (e.g., opening a franchise 
or individual proprietorship) and innovative entrepreneurship (e.g., starting new 
technology firm) (Shane, 2008). Yet different kinds of entrepreneurial endeavors appear 
to require different types of resources, involve different processes and incorporate 
different types and levels of risk (Reynolds, 2007a).   
This dissertation focuses only on innovative entrepreneurship. Clearly 
―innovativeness‖ exists along a spectrum yet we know that start-up processes, levels of 
uncertainty and many other factors differ significantly between ends of this spectrum 
(Reynolds, 2007a). Innovation tends to be a very uncertain process often occurring in 
very dynamic and uncertain industries (Andrew, Sirkin, Haanaes, & Michael, 2007; 
Brown & Eisenhardt, 1995; Cheng & VandeVen, 1996; Christensen, Suarez, & 
Utterback, 1998) . It is likely, therefore, that the processes and behaviors that lead to new 




necessary for opening a new hair salon. In any case, I would not wish to assume they 
were the same. The Eckhardt and Shane (2003) definition of entrepreneurial opportunities 
is helpful in that it specifies that opportunities involve the creation of something new.  
Therefore, at least for the purposes of this research, franchising or opening a new location 
of an existing business would not be considered entrepreneurial. Similarly, self-
employment (e.g., opening a dry-cleaning business) is not sufficient to qualify as an 
entrepreneurial opportunity since the opportunity must be new to the market, not just to 
the founder. Thus, for the remainder of this dissertation, when I refer to ―entrepreneurial 
opportunities‖ I am referring to innovative opportunities. 
Entrepreneurial opportunities vs. firm creation 
The study of entrepreneurial opportunities is not the same as the study of firm 
creation (Shane & Venkataraman, 2000). The difference lies in the level and focus of 
study. The study of firm formation arose primarily out of ecological and evolutionary  
traditions (Aldrich & Kenworthy, 1999; Hannan & Freeman, 1977) where the unit of 
analysis is the firm or population of firms. As a result, this line of research examines 
macro level trends such as founding or survival rates (Aldrich, Rosen, & Woodward, 
1987; Singh & Lumsden, 1990) with an emphasis on firm structure, performance and 
survival (Aldrich & Pfeffer, 1976; Hannan & Freeman, 1984a; Stinchcombe, 1965). In 
contrast the study of entrepreneurial opportunities tends to view the business idea or 
proposition as the unit of analysis (Corbett, 2007; McMullen & Shepherd, 2006; Shane, 
2000). Scholars studying entrepreneurial opportunities look at such factors as how 
business opportunities are discovered (Eckhardt & Shane, 2003) or created (Alvarez & 




factors that facilitate or hinder that process (Dew, Velamuri, & Venkataraman, 2004; 
Gruber & Henkel, 2006). This study, then, focuses on entrepreneurial opportunities. In 
most cases, these opportunities arise in the context of an emerging organization. 
However, I am interested not in the creation of the firm per se, but rather in the creation 
of the business opportunity around which the firm is organized.  
PREVIOUS MODELS OF ENTREPRENEURIAL OPPORTUNITIES 
Several streams of research have explored entrepreneurial opportunities. The earliest 
research emerged from economic models attempting to explain how and why new types 
of business were formed. Later scholars began to explore who formed these businesses 
and how entrepreneurs differed from other types of managers, initially focusing on 
personality differences but more recently exploring differences in cognitive style and 
processes. Much more recently the development of several large, longitudinal data bases 
has allowed scholars to follow ventures over time, tracking such things as demographic 
characteristics and start-up practices to determine what factors are associated with longer 
term performance and survival. Below, I briefly review each of these traditions and then, 
in the next section, highlight some gaps in these literatures and how my research is 
designed to fill those gaps.  
Economic models 
Schumpeter suggested that new opportunities arise when an exogenous shock to 
the current economic market (e.g., new technologies) makes it more efficient to 
recombine existing production goods in some new way (Schumpeter, 1942). He pointed 
out that the technological shocks driving new opportunities usually arise from within 




the very structures from which they arose. In this way, entrepreneurial opportunities serve 
to both drive and shape economic markets, in an evolutionary process he called ―the gales 
of creative destruction‖ (Schumpeter, 1942). Different individuals have different beliefs 
about the value of certain resources or combinations of resources (Kirzner, 1997). These 
different beliefs represent market imperfections which can be exploited. When an 
individual believes that a set of resources are not put to its best use, and conceive of some 
alternative use, they ―discover‖ an opportunity in the market (Shane & Venkataraman, 
2000, p.176). For example, with the discovery of silicon, it became more efficient to use 
sand for silicon wafers than for hourglasses. Opportunities, therefore, arise from market 
imperfections (Casson, 1982; Schumpeter, 1934). Furthermore, insofar as market 
imperfections exist as objective economic phenomena, it is assumed that opportunities 
also exist whether or not they are discovered and exploited (Shane & Venkataraman, 
2000). However, while this line of exploration has led to important insight into the 
economic conditions that drive market imperfections (e.g., Gruber & Henkel, 2006; 
Kihlstrom & Laffont, 1979; Kirzner, 1997), it says little if anything about how 
entrepreneurs turn those imperfections into realized opportunities.  
Person-based models 
Another major stream of research considers who is likely to discover or recognize 
an entrepreneurial opportunity. Researchers within this stream have had mixed success at 
best in explaining discovery on the basis of founder characteristics. Personality-based 
explanations, though representing the oldest and most robust stream of research, have had 
the least success. For example, while some scholars argue that entrepreneurs differ from 




(Cooper, Woo, & Dunkelberg, 1988), others have found no differences (Brockhaus, 
1980; Palich & Bagby, 1995). Similarly, while demographic studies suggest some trends 
(e.g., white males are the predominant demographic group) they provide little predictive 
value (e.g., being a white male does not make you likely to become an entrepreneur) 
(Shane, 2008).  Social structural explanations have found more success in predicting the 
discovery of opportunities. For example, individuals are more likely to discover 
opportunities if they have prior access to relevant information (Kaish & Gilad, 1987; 
Shane, 2000) or are a member of a business network  (Davidsson & Honig, 2003). 
Finally, one other important stream of research arising from person-based models is the 
burgeoning field of entrepreneurial cognition. Much of this work considers how the 
cognitive processes of entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs differ. For example, 
Sarasvathy and colleagues (1998) suggest that entrepreneurs are more likely to frame 
situations as opportunities rather than risks. Other scholars are trying to understand the 
cognitive processes underlying opportunity recognition (Grégoire, Barr, & Shepherd, 
forthcoming, 2009). Thus, while some individual characteristics appear to play a role in 
determining the likelihood that an individual will recognize, believe in and act upon an 
entrepreneurial opportunity, most are not good predictors. Moreover, the mechanisms 
through which these factors influence outcomes are frequently left unexplored.  
Venture characteristics models 
A very recent stream of research has attempted to uncover the venture 
characteristics that are associated with successful start ups. This research is founded on a 
few large panel studies that have collected data from nascent entrepreneurs over several 




taken some steps towards founding a new firm (e.g., registered an LLC), these studies 
determined particular factors associated with the successful start of a new venture. For 
example, higher household income, diverse business experience and more business 
experience are all positively associated with the likelihood of successfully starting a new 
business (Reynolds, 2007b)
1
. However, there is great variation in success even among 
ventures with these attributes, and, the fact remains that the majority still fail (Shane, 
2008). These studies, while of great importance to the field, do not attempt to explain why 
certain attributes are associated with the rise of an opportunity, nor the process by which 
this occurs.   
GAPS IN THE CURRENT LITERATURE 
Most of the research described so far draws on what is sometimes referred to as 
the ―discovery‖ model of entrepreneurship. That is, opportunities are seen as pre-existing, 
objective economic phenomena. The research emphasis therefore is on when, why and by 
whom these opportunities are discovered. There are two shortcomings to this approach. 
First, by focusing on the association between particular economic, venture, or personal 
characteristics with new opportunities, we get very little insight into the process by which 
these opportunities emerge. In fact, most models don‘t see them as emerging at all, but 
rather treat opportunities as static and unchanging (Kirzner, 1997). However, the reality 
is that most new ventures diverge from their initial plans (Shane, 2008). Yet we know 
very little about this emergent process.  Second, most of this research underestimates or 
entirely fails to examine the role of human action in shaping and creating entrepreneurial 
                                                     
1
 These statistics refer only to whether or not individuals successfully launched a business, not whether that 
business itself was successful. Also the panel studies use ―self-employment‖ as the definition of 




opportunities over time. A new stream of research, within which I situate my dissertation, 
is beginning to address both these shortcomings.  
Opportunity creation perspective 
Recently, some scholars have argued that opportunities may not exist until 
entrepreneurs act to create them (e.g., Alvarez & Barney, 2007a; Baker & Nelson, 2005). 
Drawing upon enactment theories (e.g., Weick, 1979), this research suggests that 
opportunities do not result from search and discovery (or recognition) alone, but rather 
emerge from action. For example, Sarasvathy (2001) theorizes that opportunities emerge 
from entrepreneurs‘ choices and decisions with respect to a given set of resources, rather 
than through the explicit implementation of a preplanned path.  Furthermore, Baker and 
colleagues have demonstrated that resources themselves are not a given, but are often 
created by entrepreneurs through bricolage and improvisation (Baker, Miner, & Eesley, 
2003; Baker & Nelson, 2005). While this work has put the spotlight firmly on the 
entrepreneurs themselves as agentic actors in an emergent process of opportunity 
creation, the specifics of that process remain unknown. To address this gap, I have 
designed this dissertation to address two research questions: 
• What is the process by which opportunities are created?  
• What organizing practices facilitate or inhibit this process? 
My dissertation begins with an exploratory question concerning a phenomenon that is 
both complex and under-theorized. Therefore, I employ both qualitative and quantitative 
methods to derive a rich and detailed understanding of the entrepreneurial process 
(Denzin, 1970; Jick, 1979).  As mentioned previously, I begin with a qualitative study 




to develop a model of the opportunity creation process. Based on that model, I theorize 
the practices that may facilitate the process. Finally, using quantitative data from a survey 




CHAPTER 3. AN INDUCTIVE STUDY OF THE ENTREPRENEURIAL 
PROCESS (STUDY 1) 
 
The purpose of the first study was to address the question, what is the process by 
which opportunities are created?  Previous research has emphasized the outcomes of 
entrepreneurial efforts to the exclusion of understanding the process by which those 
efforts lead to new opportunities. This has occurred, in part because entrepreneurial 
opportunities themselves (―those situations in which new goods, services, raw materials 
and organizing methods can be introduced through the formation of new means, ends or 
means-ends relationships‖ (Eckhardt & Shane, 2003: 333)) are generally viewed as static 
and pre-existing phenomena that are discovered by vigilant individuals (Kirzner, 1997). 
As such, opportunities are either discovered or not. That opportunities might be affected 
by the process, even changed by it, has not been explored empirically. If, however, we 
take as our starting point, that opportunities may be created rather than discovered 
(Alvarez & Barney, 2007a) – that they emerge from the actions and beliefs of their 
founders – an entirely new set of research questions are highlighted. This perspective 
shifts the focus of inquiry to the process of emergence and the agentic actors who choose 
to behave in ways that may facilitate or inhibit this process.  
Towards that end, this study was designed to dive more deeply into the process by 
which opportunities are created, to uncover how they emerge over time and to explicate 
the forces that shape that emergence. A secondary goal of this study was to better 
understand what types of entrepreneurial practices may influence the efficacy of the 
process.  However, given the exploratory nature of this study, it was not my intention to 




design of the second, quantitative study, which focuses more explicitly on those 
practices.  
METHODS 
Given my goal to develop theory about the process by which opportunities 
emerge, it was appropriate to use an inductive, qualitative approach to data collection. 
Inductive, qualitative approaches may be particularly useful for exploratory studies in 
which the goal is to gather ―thick, detailed descriptions‖ (Gephart, 2004: 455) for the 
purpose of building, rather than testing, theory (Glaser & Strauss, 1967).  Furthermore, 
qualitative methods are appropriate ―for addressing ―how‖ questions—rather than ―how 
many‖; for understanding the world from the perspective of those studied (i.e., 
informants); and for examining and articulating processes‖ (Pratt, 2009). In particular, I 
utilized a case study approach to data collection and analysis. A case study is an 
―empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life 
context‖ (Yin, 1994: 23). Case studies are generalizable to theory rather than to 
populations but are particularly useful for explicating processes (Eisenhardt, 1989b; Yin, 
1994). To create the cases for my study, I recruited and interviewed individuals whose 
experiences were likely to provide insight into the research question (Eisenhardt, 1989b; 
Glaser & Strauss, 1967) and interviewed them about their specific experiences with an 
entrepreneurial opportunity (see Data Collection below).  
Data collection 
The sample. After receiving IRB approval for the study, I built the sample using 
multiple sources. I recruited some respondents through personal contacts. I also worked 




in Arizona) and an investor associated with the Zell Lurie Institute at the Ross School of 
Business, University of Michigan. These individuals helped me recruit investors and 
entrepreneurs from around the country to participate in this study by providing 
introductions via email to me and to my research (See Appendix A for a sample 
recruiting email).  
Since the purpose of this study was to build rather than test theory, I did not select 
individuals to be representative of the population, but rather selected respondents using a 
purposeful sampling approach (Singleton & Straits, 1999). However, following principles 
of purposive sampling, I identified likely sources of variation in the population and 
attempted to maximize representation across them. The main sources of variation 
included geography, industry, funding source (i.e., external vs. internal), and experience 
of entrepreneur (novice vs. serial entrepreneur).  
My sample consisted of 23 entrepreneurs and 6 investors (venture capitalists and 
angel investors) involved in technology-based startups. The interviews with the 6 
investors were instrumental in developing the interview protocol and, to some extent, the 
emerging theory (see Analysis below), but were not included in the data analysis per se. 
The 23 entrepreneurs represented 24 startups but two of the respondents provided 
information on the same two start-ups (they were co-founders of both) and one provided 
information on two distinct startups. Since my primary interest was in the entrepreneurial 
process rather than outcomes, I focused on respondents who were involved in ongoing 
ventures. However, I also included four respondents who were involved in ventures that 




involved with ventures that were experiencing varying rates of performance…from the 
brink of failure to flourishing.  
The respondents were all founding members of the ventures. As with many other 
studies, I assume that founders are primarily responsible for the exploitation of 
entrepreneurial opportunities. Thus, they are in a position to describe and explain these 
opportunities. Founders are often used as informants for their teams and their actions are 
likely to strongly influence the team structure and performance (Ensley, Carland, & 
Carland, 2000). Therefore, it is reasonable to rely on founders as informants, not only to 
describe the creation of entrepreneurial opportunities, but to describe team structures such 
as communication and organizing patterns, since generally they are the ones who put 
those structures in place.  
The startups ranged in age between less than one year and 10 years and 
represented many different technology industries including software development, bio-
technology, and medical devices.
2
 Four respondents were women and 19 were men. As 
was mentioned earlier, all but 4 ventures had not yet exited. Table 3.1 provides basic 
information about the respondents and startups. The interviews lasted between 1 – 2 
hours. One interview was conducted in person and the remainder were conducted by 
telephone. All but one were taped and transcribed verbatim. One interviewee requested 
not to be taped so data for that interview consisted of copious notes taken during the 
                                                     
2
 For this study, I calculated age of the firm based on the date of incorporation. While this is a widely used 
and relatively objective measure of age, it has some limitations for research, particularly in high tech. Many 
technology firms incorporate when they decide to commercialize a nascent technology. It may be years, 
however, before they start to organize as a firm. For example, two firms in my sample incorporated in 
2000. However, the firms consisted only of scientists for the next 4-5 years. It was not until 2004/5 that 
they hired a CEO and began to really focus on commercialization. Thus, subjectively, they were more like 




interview.  The interviews resulted in over 41 hours of tapes and over 920 pages of 
transcribed data.   
Table 3.1 Qualitative study sample 






















MI VC Intact 9 years female no 
Web-based 
apparel service 




MI Friends & 
Family 




MI VC Intact 4 years female no 
Biotech MI VC Intact 9 years male yes 
Medical 
diagnostics 






MI VC Intact 2 years male yes 
Medical 
devices  

























Table 3.1 continued 
























MI Angel Intact 4 years 
3
male yes 
Oil & Gas CO Angel Converted 
to LLC but 
still intact 
















AZ No Intact 2 years female no 
Medical 
device 
AZ Angel  Intact 5 years  male yes 
Medical 
device 
AZ Angel Intact 1 year male 
 
no 
Web services NJ VC IPO 8 years male no 
Medical 
device 
MA Angel Intact 7 years male 
 
yes 
Web services MA Funding 
from LBO 
firm 












MA VC Intact 9 years 1 male yes 
 
Interview protocol development. As with much qualitative research, data 
analysis and collection overlapped to some degree (Eisenhardt, 1989), in particular 
                                                     
3
 This and the next respondent is the same individual. 
4




during the early stages as I refined my interview protocol. To create the protocol, I started 
by interviewing four investors and three entrepreneurs. My questions focused on two 
aspects of venture creation. First, I asked respondents to describe to me the venture 
creation process in their experience (for investors, I asked them to describe their typical 
experience). During this discussion, I asked questions about typical stages of 
development, evaluation and funding. My purpose was to frame the overarching process 
of new venture formation and to identify some of the key practices and steps in the 
process. Following this discussion, I asked respondents if they had ever had an 
experience in which the venture opportunity changed mid-course and if so, to provide a 
description of that experience. Often these experiences came up during the first part of 
the interview, in which case I directed the respondents to go back and describe that 
experience in more detail. During this part of the interview, I focused on collecting as 
much detail as possible about the change experience and also solicited the respondent‘s 
opinions about what led to the change, what resulted from it and what practices or 
entrepreneurial characteristics seemed instrumental in the management of the change.  
These early interviews influenced the design of the final interview protocol in two 
ways. First, they provided insight into the major steps of a new venture creation process 
(e.g., team formation, formal incorporation, development of technology, development of 
operational strategy, recruiting investment, etc.) which helped me frame the interview 
protocol to touch on the entire process
5
. Second, I realized that respondents struggled to 
identify ―a change‖ in their venture since the process appeared to be one of continual 
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 These steps did not always occur in the same order, but most teams went through all of them. Therefore, 
in designing the protocol, I made sure to include ‗probes‘ about each of the steps in the event that 




small changes, occasionally interspersed with major shifts. Therefore, some respondents 
struggled to identify which change to focus on. Also, for some respondents, large shifts or 
changes in the venture appeared, in retrospect, to be a natural progression in the venture 
or happened so smoothly that they did not view them as a big change. It was only when 
respondents were systematically reporting their experiences in a linear fashion (―then we 
did x‖), that these changes became apparent, often accompanied by comments like ―come 
to think of it, that was a really big change for us.‖  
Based on these interviews, I designed my final protocol as a loosely structured 
inquiry into the timeline of their venture and how founders came to exploit their 
particular entrepreneurial opportunity. My purpose was to lead them through a time line 
of their activities, using a ―then-what‖ approach. This approach allowed respondents to 
think about their specific behaviors rather than their espoused behaviors. Furthermore, by 
asking for them to relate, step-by-step, their actions, the resulting data was rich in 
behavioral information about process rather than only attitudinal (Ajzen & Fishbein, 
1977). During the interview, I allowed change events to emerge naturally rather than 
asking entrepreneurs to select changes. Then, as respondents mentioned changes, I 
probed for additional detail around these events. The interview protocol is attached in 
Appendix B.  
Building case studies.  I next created a case study for each venture using 
primarily the transcribed interview narratives, but also information from venture websites 
or other publically available data. Building the case studies involved creating a linear 
case description of each venture‘s development. As much as possible, I retained the exact 




the venture out of order and occasionally filling in information from other sources. This 
resulted in 23 cases. The case approach allowed me to focus my efforts on conceptually 
useful stories (those describing the creation of opportunities) while still retaining 
theoretical flexibility around the elements that make up that process (Eisenhardt, 1989b).   
Analysis 
I began the analysis following a grounded theory approach (Glaser & Strauss, 
1967), iterating between collecting and analyzing data (from the first four investors and 
three entrepreneurs). By traveling back and forth between the data and my emerging 
theory, I looked for cross-case patterns as well as outliers and differences (Eisenhardt, 
1989b) which then informed my sampling strategy. For example, after reading through 
the early interviews, I noticed that both investors and entrepreneurs reported that 
opportunities tended to change, at least to some degree, in the early stages of the process. 
As respondents described the typical process (investors) or their own specific experience 
(entrepreneurs), they included descriptions of changes to the product or service, the team, 
the strategy, and so on. This led me to focus on change events in the course of the 
venture‘s history as indicators of the emergent process. In other words, if opportunities 
emerge over time (rather than pre-exist) then it is through these change events that they 
likely take shape. Furthermore, because change events were recurrent and relatively 
identifiable, they were ―codable moments‖ (Boyatzis, 1998). Thus, in the remaining 
stages of analysis, I focused on coding the change events in each case. 
Coding – type of change. In the first round of coding, I identified any instance in 
which respondents discussed a change in the venture. These ranged from small changes 




different market). For each change event, I noted the terms (i.e., open codes) individuals 
used to describe the nature of the change. Based on these terms, I developed a set of 
analytical codes representing broad patterns abstracted from those data (e.g., ―new 
market‖ ―personnel changes‖ ―product changes‖).  Many change events included multiple 
codes. For example, ―change to product‖ often occurred in conjunction with ―change in 
market.‖   
There are many ways to categorize change events. I considered several existing 
typologies of change that might help distinguish between changes to the opportunity itself vs. 
more tactical adjustments to the venture‘s operations. For example, changes could be considered 
―radical vs. incremental‖ (Tushman & OReilly, 1996) or ―architectural‖ vs. ―modular‖ 
(Henderson & Clark, 1990). However, these definitions tend to focus on changes to the 
technology itself, often relative to existing products and technologies. In contrast, I was 
concerned with changes to the opportunity (which includes both technology and market elements) 
and distinguishing this from changes to operations.  Another possibility was to categorize change 
as ―strategic‖ vs. ―tactical.‖ However, these also tend to bridge across changes to opportunities 
vs. other changes. For example, a strategic change might include developing a totally new 
offering or approaching a different market, but could also include creating new approaches to 
capturing the same market. Thus, including strategic changes as a category would not allow me to 
distinguish whether or not ventures changed their opportunity. Since my purpose was not to fully 
dimensionalize the types of change that ventures experience, but rather to demonstrate that 
ventures often make changes not only to operations but to the very opportunity itself, I used my 
own typology: Opportunity Changes and Operational Changes.   
In a sense, this categorization was a rough dichotomy between changes to opportunity vs. 




purpose or definition of the business and was operationalized to include any change to the 
fundamental purpose of the offering (e.g., from an internet advertisement service to an 
intranet emergency contact service) or to the target market (e.g., from high-end 
components manufacturers to tool & die providers). Operational Changes included any 
change in the approach to achieving a particular opportunity, for example a new 
partnership, approach to development (e.g., bringing manufacturing in-house), or funding 
strategy (e.g., seeking external investors rather than self-funding).  
Based on these definitions, opportunity changes may be akin to ―transformational 
change‖ in that they represent a change that is ―radical and fundamentally alters the organization 
at its core‖ (Newman, 2000: 604). However, I chose not to use the transformational vs. 
transitional typology because while all opportunity changes were transformational, not all 
transformational changes represent a change to the opportunity. For example, an organization 
might completely change its structure (e.g., outsourcing all development) which could be 
considered a transformational change, but at the same time, this may have no effect on the 
opportunity itself. 
The opportunity vs. operational dichotomy is, of course, a fairly rough categorization and 
changes varied considerably even within these categories (as can be seen in the different 
analytical codes described above).  Furthermore, changes to opportunity often involved a change 
in operations. However, the opposite was not always true. That is, there were many events that 
were only a change in operations. Thus, events were categorized as a change to opportunity as 
long as they met that definition regardless of whether or not operational changes were also 
included.  
Coding – trigger of change. In the next stage of coding, for each change event, I 




open codes (e.g., ―hospitals wouldn‘t buy the product‖ or ―our partner was acquired by a 
firm that did not want to work with us‖) and from these developed analytical codes 
including, ―learned from deliberate experiment‖ ―learned from trial-and-error‖  ―learned 
from research‖ ―sought feedback or advice‖ ―unexpected event - technical failure‖ 
―unexpected event - market change‖ ―unexpected event – partnership failure‖ and 
―unexpected opportunity.‖ Finally, I grouped these into three types of triggers for change, 
―learning from experience,‖ ―feedback and advice‖ and ―unexpected events‖ which I 
discuss further below.  
Coding – effects of change. In the last stage of coding, I reviewed each change 
event and gathered information about the extent to which the change was disruptive, 
difficult or time-consuming.  Since many changes occurred over a period of time, I 
captured information not just about the outcome of the change but also about the effects 
of the change process as it was occurring. Process effects of change refer to the ―costs 
associated with redirecting resources‖ such as learning new routines, building new 
relationships and redirecting operations (Haveman, Russo, & Meyer, 2001: 253). In the 
data, change effects included such things as delays in product development or release, 
termination of relationships, or lost capital as well as increases in funding, market 
opportunity or development capabilities. These were much harder to disentangle from 
change itself (e.g., the decision to cancel a product‘s development might necessitate 
firing a developer which is, itself, a change in operations as well as an effect of change). 
Therefore, for this last stage of analysis, I varied my approach somewhat. Rather than 
coding change effects into different types, I searched the data for dimensions along which 




how long changes took or to what extent they caused delays) and disruptiveness to 
operations (i.e., the extent to which resources were gained, lost or had to be reassigned). 
Then, for each change event, I noted any available information on timing effects (e.g., ―it 
took 6 months‖) and resources disrupted (e.g., ―we fired 3 people‖ ―it cost $1M‖).  
When coding was complete, for each venture I had a list of change events, each of 
which was categorized as either an opportunity change or an operational change. For each 
change event, I noted the trigger or triggers involved and the extent to which the change 
process was disruptive or time-consuming. See Appendix C for a sample of the coded 
data. Throughout this process, I also kept notes regarding any practices that seemed to 
facilitate or inhibit the change process. 
FINDINGS 
The data suggest that ventures are shaped as founders make two kinds of changes: 
changes to the operations (e.g., new development approach or new sales distribution 
strategy) and changes to the opportunity itself (e.g., different product/service offering or 
different target market). These changes come about because entrepreneurs are continually 
learning from their experiences, gaining new information from feedback and advice and 
responding to unexpected events. However, the process of change varies a great deal 
across and within ventures and changes can be extremely disruptive, time-consuming and 
even detrimental to the organization‘s success. In the following sections, I discuss the 
findings with respect to each of these aspects of the opportunity creation process. Then, 
in the Discussion section, I propose a model of the opportunity creation process that 
arises from these findings.  




The data indicate that ventures undergo two kinds of change: operational changes 
and opportunity changes. All 24 ventures in my sample experienced multiple instances of 
operational change. These included personnel changes, for example one respondent 
recalled hiring additional programmers so that he could offer clients customized versions 
of his product but later had to fire them when the expected revenues were not realized. 
Another respondent brought on and later fired an entire sales team. Operational changes 
also included changes in product development approaches. On several occasions 
entrepreneurs discovered that what they had hoped to buy off the shelf or contract with 
others to develop, they would have to do themselves. For example, one respondent 
recalled,  
―The company had planned to use off the shelf technology for that [component], 
but we concluded during the process of developing the [product] that the off the 
shelf technology wouldn‘t work … we couldn‘t achieve the technical performance 
levels we needed … we‘d have to develop our own.‖  
 
 Many of the ventures experienced changes in funding resources when investors or 
co-developers pulled out. Operational changes also included changes in approaches to 
distribution, sales or manufacturing. For example, one respondent described the switch 
from using distributors to a direct sales force: 
―We went down the path of starting to try and put those [distributors] in place and 
it became obvious that we weren‘t going to get the kind of mindshare of the sale 
force that we needed… and you didn‘t save that much by using distributors given 
how much mindshare you could get and how much control you didn‘t have… and 
ultimately we decided that was not a good plan.‖ 
 
Operational changes, therefore, were very common. Given that most 
entrepreneurial ventures are uncertain, not only in terms of outcome, but also in the 




this finding is somewhat predictable. If founders are not certain how to achieve their 
goals, it is likely that they will have to try more than one approach.  
More interesting, however, is the fact that 21 out of the 24 cases included changes 
to the opportunity itself. In other words, founders not only adjusted their approach 
(Operational Change), but also adjusted the fundamental direction or definition of the 
business (Opportunity Change). For example, one firm started as a web-based system for 
pushing ads from online newspapers to their readers. Early customers were very positive 
about their service but as the ―.com bubble‖ burst, advertising sales proved to be 
increasingly elusive and they could not develop a sustainable business model. So, the 
founders reframed the organization to focus on developing an enterprise version of their 
technology for use by financial services providers. The service would allow providers to 
send out real-time financial information to their internal constituents such as analysts and 
bankers.  Unfortunately, just as they were getting that technology up and running, the 
financial services industry went into a steep decline and their market dried up. However, 
once again the organization was able to adjust by building on their newly acquired 
expertise in enterprise system software. Using what they had learned from the financial 
product, they reconfigured the technology for use by large organizations as a system to 
reach employees during emergencies. Their new target market was the homeland security 
and defense industries. This was the opportunity that they were able to implement and 
sustain and the company is now enjoying relative stability and growth. Of course, the 
degree of change varied to some extent depending on how many dimensions of a venture 




changes to both product and market. In other cases, opportunity changes included only 
one or the other.  
These findings indicate the existence of a dynamic process of emergence. In other 
words, change is an important part of the opportunity creation process. The business idea 
is just a starting point (Timmons, 1999) but rather than following a linear, design-then-
execution model (Shane & Venkataraman, 2000; Stevenson & Jarillo, 1990), these data 
suggest that entrepreneurs adjust and adapt both the design (i.e. Opportunity Changes) 
and their execution (i.e., Operational Changes) throughout the opportunity creation 
process.  
Triggers of change 
The data indicate that change is a normal and pervasive component of the 
opportunity creation process. But to understand this as a process, it is critical to uncover 
the mechanisms behind change (Hedstrom & Swedberg, 1998). In other words, it is not 
enough to know that opportunities do change, but we must also explicate what drives that 
change. To better understand this process, for each change event in my sample, I 
considered what led to or triggered the change.  
There were many experiences that led entrepreneurs to make changes to their 
operations or opportunities, but they fell into three categories. Entrepreneurs made 
changes as a result of learning from their experiences, responding to feedback and advice 
and responding to unexpected events. I discuss each of these below.  
Learning from experience. Because opportunity creation involves novelty (e.g., 
―new goods, services, raw materials and organizing methods‖ (Eckhardt & Shane, 2003: 




must engage in a great deal of experiential learning (Parker, 2006; Ravasi & Turati, 2005; 
Sexton, Upton, Wacholtz, & McDougall, 1997). Learning, however, does not just build 
knowledge. The data indicate that it frequently triggers change. That is, entrepreneurs 
learn from action – from attempting to implement a plan or action, noting its success or 
failure – and then make adjustments.  
It is important to note that when using the term ―learning‖ I am referring to a set 
of behaviors in which organizational actors take action, reflect on that action, develop 
theories about their observations and take new action. This process of action and 
reflection is generally considered to constitute ―learning behaviors‖ (Crossan, Lane, & 
White, 1999; Edmondson, 2002; Kolb, 1984).  Thus, learning in this context, is a set of 
activities in which ―knowledge is created through the transformation of experience‖ 
(Kolb, 1984: 38). However, as with many empirical studies of learning, it is impossible to 
say whether this knowledge is objectively correct. In other words, I observe actors 
participating in learning behaviors. The knowledge that emerges represents 
entrepreneurs‘ theories-in-use (Argyris & Schön, 1978) which may or may not be 
objectively correct. Key to this analysis was whether or not entrepreneurs engaged in 
learning behaviors and to what extent these behaviors were associated with change 
events.  
For example, one organization in my sample had been founded to build a type of 
life sciences research tool which normally sold for about $125K. The team had a 
technology that, they believed, would allow them to develop and sell this kind of tool for 




funding, developed the technology and built a prototype. They began beta testing, fully 
convinced that they were ready to go to market. The founder recalls: 
When we went into some of our first beta tests we almost lost our VC 
funding… we kept thinking there would be a price performance tradeoff where 
people would be willing to accept slightly degraded performance for a much 
lower cost…that‘s one of those things you learn in business school…and in our 
case it didn‘t prove to be true.‖ 
 
 So rather than ramping up manufacturing to go to market, this team had to go 
back to the drawing board and reassess not only their product but their underlying 
assumptions about the business model which ultimately led to a redesign of the product 
and their target market.  
Learning from experience appeared to vary along a spectrum from very proactive 
and systematic approaches to learning, such as conducting tests and experiments to more 
reactive approaches, analogous to ―adaptive learning,‖ that occurred when entrepreneurs 
realized, after the fact, that a particular approach was working or not (Cyert & March, 
1963; Van de Ven & Polley, 1992). Proactive learning occurred most often in the context 
of product development. In these cases, entrepreneurs literally designed and implemented 
an experience from which they could learn. For example, one respondent described how 
he set up experiments (literally in his back yard) to determine which combination of 
elements would provide the chemical reaction he needed.  
―The approach we took, and this is kind of my approach in manufacturing and 
everything, is test it to its extremes, and if it stands up to that, then we can refine 
it down.  So it was a very simple approach.  We just would dunk it into a strong 
solution of acid.  If it fell apart, we just moved on to the next variation …‖ 
 
Eventually, the respondent determined the correct variation and developed his technology 
accordingly. While proactive learning was more prevalent during product development, 




example, one respondent, the founder of an online advertising agency, described 
experimenting with a novel marketing tool which allowed potential customers to ―try 
out‖ their advertising services during a summer weekend experience. They piloted the 
tool with existing customers first.  
―And it turned out to be an unbelievable new business tool for us, because it‘s an 
easy way for brands to work for us in a way that‘s not a big obligation, and they 
try us.  And then they like us, and then we end up being their agency‖ 
 
Based on this initial success, they created an organizational structure around the tool, 
employing a full-time staff member and later expanding their business around their novel 
and experiential approach to marketing. What started as a small experiment with a few 
customers became a central strategy for their business. Other entrepreneurs used pilot 
programs, engaging in limited or short-term relationships with customers or distributors, 
as a means of deliberately learning how to best launch their offering, and then made 
adjustments accordingly.    
 Overall, however, much of the experiential learning was far less 
deliberately designed and tended towards the adaptive end of the spectrum.  Adaptive 
learning is a process whereby organizational actors evaluate the impact of previous 
behaviors and adapt routines and beliefs incrementally in response to feedback on those 
outcomes (Cyert & March, 1963 [1992]; Levitt & March, 1988). Importantly, however, 
adaptive learning is retrospective and does not assume that individuals purposefully 
design and test hypotheses. For example, one respondent recalled the learning experience 
that led to a significant change in the way he framed his opportunity: 
―So I figured, okay, we got a great product --the majority of surgeons that are 
trying it want to use it…  We've got a great sales team … let's go out and sell this 
thing.  And we spent, oh, probably three million dollars on trying to sell that 




tremendous sales reps would go to these hospitals and … doctors say, "Yeah, I 
love the [products].  Order them."  Well, there were probably another 12 doors 
that had to be opened before that purchase order was signed.  And so that sales 
rep would spend 90% of their time trying to get that order locked up and that was 
time that they weren't spending going out to other accounts and opening other 
accounts.  So our sales came in to be about a 10
th
 of what we thought they would 
be.  And we eventually realized that we just were not going to be able to sell this 
product through our own independent sales force…‖ 
 
Furthermore, in trying to sell the product, he learned: 
 ―… it was not a compelling product to buy.  It was not a product that the surgeon 
had to have and, and really wanted to fight for.  It was not a product that made the 
hospital money.  In fact, it was a product that they'd actually spend a little bit 
more money on.  So the drivers for adoption were just not there…‖ 
 
As a result of this experience, the entrepreneur had to fire his sales force and find an 
external distributor for his products. In addition, he realized that his targeted market 
didn‘t perceive the product as necessary and so he also adjusted the target market, 
focusing instead on a more specialized niche market in which his product would provide 
more value. There was no question that he learned and adapted as a result of his 
experience, but the learning arose from trial-and-error, not deliberate design. In another 
example of adaptive learning, one respondent recalls his after-the-fact realization that he 
was not equipped to expand his business to include product customization.  
―So I ended up hiring three programmers and we started taking on all these 
modifications.  And it was a disaster, because…  If you have people like that you 
absolutely have to have very strong management over them.  Well for me to take 
on that role of being the manager of the programmers and running the company 
and doing everything else, it just didn‘t work.  I couldn‘t spend enough time with 
them, so the result of it was that the modification that was supposed to take five 
hours … would take 30 hours.  And it would introduce bugs into the system…the 
salaries of these programmers was outweighing the amount of money they were 
bringing in… they weren‘t getting done as much as they should be getting done 
and that was one of the things that then led to the decision to get rid of all three of 





 Again, this respondent appeared to learn from his experience and adapted, but the 
learning experience was happenstance, not deliberate. Overall, learning from experience, 
whether proactive and deliberate or reactive and adaptive, was a primary trigger for 
change. As entrepreneurs‘ built their knowledge (or theories-in-use) out of experience, 
they hypothesized what would work and what wouldn‘t and adjusted accordingly.   
Responding to feedback and advice. Many changes also occurred when 
entrepreneurs responded to feedback and advice from stakeholders or constituents. Some 
of the most influential stakeholders, not surprisingly, were investors. Venture capitalists 
and angel investors frequently persuaded entrepreneurs to frame their opportunity 
differently than originally planned. For example, one respondent had invented a new 
process for extruding composite fibers in such a way as to create a kind of complex pump 
for fluids. He had founded several companies before (some had succeeded and some had 
failed) but all had involved manufacturing a product of some sort and he never wanted to 
do it again. Instead, he wanted to build a business around licensing this new technology. 
He had tremendous interest from several potential customers. But in order to further 
develop the technology, he needed external funding.  However, when he presented his 
business plan to investors, they felt that the licensing model was too ambiguous. It was 
not clear enough to them what exactly he would be selling and to whom and so they 
convinced him to use the technology to manufacture a specific product instead. 
―Originally, we had structured [the venture] to be a IP holding company 
and no investor liked that... They wanted it manufacturing and I was adamantly 
against it…until we got up there and they said no one is even going to give you 
the time of day…They wanted it solid, something tangible.  As soon as we 





The entrepreneur followed their advice and reframed his value proposition around 
developing the technology and manufacturing it for use as a medical device.  In another 
instance, an entrepreneur had been struggling to get into a high-end niche market with 
little success when several different venture capitalists pushed him to explore a lower-
end, but larger market. He recalls that it took him awhile to realize that he was hearing 
the same thing from multiple sources but ultimately, he took their advice.   
―That's what got me thinking about this machine tool [market]… so it just took a 
long time listening and, and a couple of smart people trying to say the same 
thing.‖ 
 
Another source of feedback that motivated change was distributors, customers 
and others with close ties to the market. One respondent was particularly proactive about 
seeking advice from potential customers and explicitly sought development partnerships 
as a means of determining product direction.  
―I'm never gonna know more about the semiconductor industry and its needs than 
Intel or Samsung or the people at Semitech, which is a consortium of 
semiconductor manufacturing companies.  So I'm not going to presume to be 
smarter than them, but if they're willing to put a couple million dollars into 
developing technology for their next generation product that's, in my experience, 
a much better endorsement than all the marketing research studies money will 
buy…and so we're cultivating customers and let's call it research sponsors in these 
different applications to help fund the development.  And so whoever pays for it's 
going to get first access and we'll develop the distribution channels around that.‖ 
 
As a result of this approach, this respondent‘s opportunity was truly emergent, 
changing and adjusting over time to match the needs of whatever customers were willing 
to support its development. Customer feedback also led to changes in more tactical 
aspects of the venture. One respondent recalled that he went into his business planning to 




he realized that hospitals, his direct customers, had an entirely different way of valuing 
the device. 
―I started out the company with the idea of building the [device] for under $10…it 
would be fantastic if we could build a [device] for $10, sell it for $20 or $30 or even $100 
and everyone would be happy.  Well, the first thing [the hospitals] said was, ‗Forget the 
$10.  Don‘t even mention it to us again.  We‘re getting reimbursed at $300 and $500 and 
that‘s all we ever want to hear from you…‘ So…you have your ideology and … you have 
to be realistic, too.‖ 
 
Finally, many entrepreneurs made changes to their operations as a result of advice 
from industry experts, often other entrepreneurs. For example, one respondent recalls 
how she had been trying to get federal and state money through lobbyists. However, 
realizing her firm couldn‘t afford that approach, she turned to a network of other 
entrepreneurs for advice. Friends in her network suggested that she go directly to senators 
and congressmen instead. She recalls how this advice changed the way her company 
operated:  
―We started figuring out how to go to the senate and the congressmen and lobby 
for money which was hysterical because we called somebody that‘s a lobbyist at 
…some big firm and said…go get us money from our senators.… And they said, 
okay, yeah you pay us ten thousand dollars a month. And at that point I think I 
threw up a little and then said, okay, how else can we get this done? So I started 
asking and there‘s this amazing network of women business owners and they all 
really help each other through all these crazy things. So I go talk to a couple of 
my friends… And they said, okay, well, you know, you got to request paperwork. 
You got to go in. You got to talk to [the Senator‘s] office and talk to their staff. 
And here‘s their phone number. So that was really cool…and you make your 
appointment and you just sit down in front of some kid that‘s half your age and 
tell them you want money. .. it‘s hugely valuable because otherwise you can‘t get 
products all the way through DOD funding. So that‘s how the mark up started 
happening.‖ 
 
Entrepreneurs varied with respect to how much advice they proactively sought. 
For some, touching base with advisors, customers, investors and even competitors was a 




change, of course. Sometimes advice merely confirmed the current approach
6
. However, 
when changes were made, they were often made because of knowledge gained from 
feedback and advice.   
Responding to unexpected events. The third trigger for change that appeared in 
the data was unexpected events. Unexpected events are jolts or sudden surprises in the 
ongoing flow of action and can include situations in which an expected event doesn‘t 
happen, an unexpected event does happen or an unthought-of event happens (Weick & 
Sutcliffe, 2007). Importantly, responding to an unexpected event with existing processes and 
procedures is often inappropriate or ineffective (Gersick & Hackman, 1990; Weick, 2004). When 
established routines don‘t work, organizations have to adjust, abandoning or otherwise changing 
existing routines in favor of a novel response (LePine, 2005). In other words, unexpected 
events generally require change.  
The data suggest that unexpected events triggered change most often by creating 
new constraints and hurdles. Occasionally, however, an unexpected event created new 
options that founders chose to pursue. For example, one founder recalled how his 
business shifted from developing one kind of software product to an entirely different 
offering, because of an unexpected request from an existing customer. 
―[An existing customer] called a meeting and said, ‗Look, I really like what you 
did with [software product]…I have this [other] problem…‘ and so we somewhat 
blindly started creating a process that could help.‖ 
 
In another example, one founder recalled that her venture had been stuck in a 
research mode, perfecting their technology but producing little in the way of products. 
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 It is also highly likely that some advice did not result in change because it was ignored. However, 
respondents generally did not mention the advice they didn‘t take. Therefore, while I can deduce that much 




Then, with the unexpected loss of a key scientist, they were able hire a manufacturing 
position and the venture transitioned into an entirely new, product oriented operation. The 
founder recalls: 
―[The venture] was primarily still science and technology, meaning I had a great 
science fair experiment going on… and we couldn‘t figure out how to get beyond 
that. And …during 2006 one of our key scientists left … he was one of the first 
hires that we had. And we were devastated… I thought, oh my g** he knows so 
much about our [technology]. How are we ever going to make [this technology]? 
And you feel so held hostage…everybody still had a very great subspecialty that 
only they could do. And that was actually huge for our company to lose him …we 
replaced him not with another scientist but with a guy that knew manufacturing. 
And that was huge because rather than have the scientist in the white lab coat 
constantly tweaking everything now I had a manufacturing guy focus on making 
the same thing more than once. And so it was a huge transition for our company 
to get our manufacturing guy in there, and start producing the same thing.‖ 
 
In these examples, unexpected events provided the venture with new options. 
More often, however, unexpected events created new constraints or hurdles that made 
previous approaches less effective and thus forced change. Often the source of change 
was external, for example, shifting economic conditions. This was the case with the 
security company described earlier.  In 2001 they had been poised to launch their first 
enterprise system to financial services providers when their key customer pulled out. 
―[A financial services client] had spent with us months on piloting, testing …At 
that point, we were negotiating a multi-million dollar deal…in August and 
September [2001].  And after September 11, they froze everything and they 
literally dismantled their entire organization.‖  
 
The aftermath of September 11 not only disrupted their key customer but their 
target market in general and they responded by redesigning the technology and 
organization to focus on corporate security. In a similar situation, a respondent recalled 




developed a software product for homeowners and planned to distribute it through 
realtors. When the market fell, he was forced to look for other markets for his product.  
 Unexpected events also occurred internally, frequently in the form of technology 
failures. Several ventures had to adjust their product offering, target market or both when 
technologies did not perform as expected. In one of the most extreme examples, a 
founder recalled his desperate, but ultimately successful, attempt to build a new product 
after his initial product idea failed just days before a board meeting.  
―I came up with …a pretty cool catheter, and I tried it out on the bench using 
some meat that I'd gotten from the supermarket and, boy, did it work unbelievably 
well.  I told the board of directors, ‗I got a product and, and we've got a great 
market opportunity and we need to have a board meeting to see how we want to 
finance this.‘ And then …the weekend before the board meeting … I tried the 
catheter out on an animal heart and it didn't work at all…it was working on the 
supermarket meat … but it wasn't working on the actual heart.  And I said, ‗Well, 
I can't go to the board and say, I just don't have anything.  I gotta get something.‘  
So I took a Sear's Quick Clamp and glued a couple wires to it and insulated 'em 
and hooked 'em up to a bipolar generator and said, ‗Look, okay, if I clamp both 
sides of the tissue I can monitor the voltage and current and I can calculate the 
resistance and I can determine when the lesion's gone all the way through the 
tissue,‘ which is pretty cool.  It's not a catheter [but] that became … [our] main 
product.‖ 
 
Other examples of technology failures included a venture whose medical device 
unexpectedly failed to meet manufacturing specifications with the result that they lost a 
key distribution deal and had to fire over 50 employees. In another example a 
pharmaceutical company spent over a year evaluating a biological marker for a particular 
disease only to discover that the marker was useless as an indicator. They responded to 
this unexpected set back by reframing their business to develop diagnostic tests for the 
disease instead.  
 Finally, another common type of unexpected event leading to change was failed 




means of acquiring resources for entrepreneurs (Katila, Rosenberger, & Eisenhardt, 2008; 
Maurer & Ebers, 2006; McGee & Dowling, 1994). When these fail, therefore, those 
resources are often lost and others must be reassigned. In other words, change is 
inevitable. For example, one founder recalled that when a key distributor of their product 
was bought by another firm, the acquiring firm refused to honor the original distribution 
contract and they had to seek alternative means of distributing their product. There were 
several cases in which a venture partnered with an outside developer to help build the 
product, only to have the partnership dissolve when the developer backed out or had to be 
let go for failing to meet agreed upon goals.  
Overall, unexpected events were common in the data and in fact, the respondents 
themselves seemed to view them as a normal part of the new venture process. As one 
entrepreneur put it:  
―There‘s always new things that come up. New challenges. You think you‘ve got 
everything lined up and then a curve ball comes.  You‘ve got to be able to correct 
your swing and hit it.‖ 
 
Or, as a very experienced venture capitalist said:  
―It is certainly rare that everything goes according to plan. … the typical case is 
that things don‘t go according to plan.‖ 
 
However, the data indicate that unexpected events are not just problems to be overcome. 
Unexpected events play an important role in shaping the opportunity by allowing, or more often, 
forcing, entrepreneurs to reframe their business opportunity and operational approaches.  
Throughout these cases, entrepreneurs were continually adjusting and adapting their 
opportunity and their operations. While there were many specific experiences that led to change, 
they generally fell into the three categories discussed above: learning from experience, 
responding to feedback & advice, and responding to unexpected events. All of these triggers were 




The costs of change 
It is clear from the data that change is integral to the opportunity creation process. 
However, as I continued my analysis, it became clear that this process can be very costly 
and difficult. In particular, changes often affect venture‘s timelines and/or disrupt 
operations (including funding).  
Timeliness and disruptions to operations are particularly costly in the 
entrepreneurial process since entrepreneurs tend to be severely resource constrained 
(Baker & Nelson, 2005; Choi & Shepherd, 2004). Time is literally money in that funding 
is usually contingent upon achieving certain milestones as scheduled (Eckhardt, Shane, & 
Delmar, 2006). Furthermore, given the competitive environment of many ventures, 
timeliness is critical to achieving market dominance (Armstrong & Levesque, 2002; 
Mullins & Forlani, 2005). Therefore, when change efforts take a long time or cause 
delays in development or operating schedules, the cost to a venture is high. Similarly, any 
change that disrupts ongoing operations is costly because valuable resources are used up 
in managing the disruption. Moreover, the data suggest that timeliness and disruption 
generally go hand in hand. That is, when change events caused delays or took a long time 
to occur, operations tended to get disrupted. Similarly, disruptions in operations, such as 
loosing key personnel or failed partnerships tended to cause delays in operations.   
The data suggest that change events were most often associated with disruption 
and delays when the changes were unexpected, occurred too late in the process or took a 
long time to accomplish. Also, although I did not explicitly code for the quality of the 
change decisions (i.e., the extent to which a change was the ―right‖ thing to do) given the 




often made because of erroneous information or assumptions. In contrast, proactive 
changes and those made quickly or early in the venturing process, tended to be less 
problematic. I will discuss each of these findings below. 
Big surprises = big costs. Changes that were triggered by unexpected events 
were often particularly disruptive and time-consuming (i.e., costly) because they 
generally required a redistribution of resources. For example, one respondent recalled 
that when a key distributor suddenly and unexpectedly pulled out of the relationship, the 
respondent was forced to delay manufacturing and lay off over 50 employees. Similarly, 
when another respondent realized that their technology had failed in testing, the team was 
forced to start over with development.  
Time is money. Other changes were costly because they took so long to 
implement that operations were disrupted and resources were lost in the course of making 
the change. For example, one respondent recalled that his company took a very long time 
to redirect operations after realizing that their primary market was collapsing. 
Interestingly, he recognized the needed change in direction and saw it as a positive and 
necessary change. But he took too long to make the change and therefore used up many 
valuable resources.  
―And so … I started changing my views.  I said, listen, we‘re not going to do this 
anymore.  We‘re getting out of the real estate market.  We‘re going to start 
designing this product for the insurance market…unfortunately I‘d spent all my 
money going into the real estate market. ‖ 
 
In another instance, a respondent recalled the change process to internalize 
manufacturing.  The external manufacturing company was proving inadequate, inflexible 
and too costly so he decided to stop outsourcing manufacturing. However, the process of 




struggling to work with the external manufacturers, he spent more than 6 additional 
months making the change to internal manufacturing.  
―We went round and round and round, and after about six months of not getting 
anywhere, we started trying to force them into [producing]…It took us about 
another six to eight months to …get them out of there.‖ 
 
In these cases, the changes themselves were not the problem. It was the process of 
accomplishing them that caused disruption and delay and ultimately, cost, to the venture.  
Unfounded assumptions lead to risky changes. If entrepreneurs make the 
wrong change or a ‗bad‘ change, by definition, this is problematic for the organization. I 
did not try to explicitly code for this dimension of change because it is extremely 
subjective. There is a great deal of hindsight bias involved in assessing the extent to 
which a change was good or bad (Bukszar & Connolly, 1988; Fiske & Taylor, 1991). In 
addition, respondents tended to view most voluntary changes as positive and involuntary 
changes as necessary. So I chose to focus on the more objective effects of change and the 
change process, such as delays in timelines and disruptions to operations (e.g., lay-offs, 
loss of funding). However, I did note when entrepreneurs specifically called out a change 
as having been the wrong one. In each of those cases, respondents implied that they made 
the ‗wrong‘ decision because they lacked critical information or knowledge prior to 
making the change. For example, one respondent looked back on his decision to refocus 
his technology on the automotive industry as being somewhat uninformed and ultimately, 
problematic.  
―You can't go back on the broad decision of getting involved in 
automotive…but…We're not doing well financially.  We really have some serious 
problems to solve.  We're working diligently on that.  Nothing's more important to 
me and I'm bull headed enough to keep going.  But we're not doing really well…I 
should have thought harder about what I didn't know.  I didn't know what I didn't 





Another respondent recalled making changes to the design of his product based on 
customer input only to realize later that he had made a mistake in assuming that his end 
users (high school and college students) were also the buyers. In fact, it was parents who 
made purchasing decisions and who went through the purchasing process. In designing 
the product solely for the students, he included design and purchasing elements that 
alienated the parents. He recalls finally realizing who his customers were.  
―And like idiots, three years later, who‘s our customer?  It‘s not a kid.  It‘s his 
mother who can‘t understand what the h** the kid was looking at…We designed 
the product for who we thought was our customer, and it turned out that wasn‘t 
our customer.‖ 
 
Sometimes change does not disrupt. It is important to note also that not all 
changes were disruptive and time-consuming, particularly when respondents were able to 
make changes quickly and proactively. For example, one respondent recalled the change 
process to internalize manufacturing.  She faced a similar situation to that of the 
respondent discussed earlier. The external manufacturing company was proving 
inadequate, inflexible and too costly. Since she had no internal manufacturing capabilities 
at the time, the decision to start manufacturing on their own represented a big change for 
the venture. However, unlike the previous respondent‘s experience, the process of 
accomplishing this change went very smoothly. She recalls:  
―I called …an emergency board meeting, … did some financial modeling to show 
… it was actually viable for us to take [manufacturing] in house…and within 
three weeks I had terminated the relationship with the contract manager and hired 
a VP of manufacturing.‖ 
 
There were other instances of relatively efficient changes. For example, when the 
inventor described earlier created a new medical device just days before the board 




process that no significant disruptions occurred. Similarly, the respondent described 
earlier who heard from customers to ―forget $10‖ as a price point, learned this early and 
responded quickly with the result that he wasted little time investing in developing a 
product at the wrong end of the price scale.   
In summary, the data on change effects suggest that the change process has the 
potential to be time-consuming and highly disruptive to a young venture. In particular, 
when change occurs unexpectedly or late in the process, takes a long time to implement 
and/or is based on incorrect assumptions, the costs to a venture can be very high. On the 
other hand when changes are made fast, early and accurately, they tend to be less 
disruptive.   
Overall, the data suggest that the opportunity creation process is a change process. 
As entrepreneurs learn from experience, respond to feedback and advice and respond to 
unexpected events, they adjust and adapt their resources, their operations, and even their 
goals. From this continual re-organizing, the opportunity emerges and re-emerges over 
time. Experienced entrepreneurs in particular were well aware of this process and had 
come to expect a certain amount of change. As one respondent commented: 
―I‘ve never seen a company start and finish with the same idea.  When the 
company exits, gets acquired, IPOs, usually it‘s different than what the original 
business plan said.‖ 
 
Furthermore, while the change process has the potential to be extremely costly 
(i.e., disruptive and time-consuming) to a young venture, the extent to which 





Study 1 suggests that the process of entrepreneurship is one of simultaneous 
creation and adaptation. As founders build their new venture, they are constantly buffeted 
by two forces for change motivating them to adapt their creation efforts in real time. 
First, their own knowledge is evolving and with it the implications for their ongoing 
activities.  Entrepreneurs often start with a myopic view of the opportunity because they 
don‘t know yet how the market and the wider environment will respond to their actions 
(Alvarez & Barney, 2007a). By definition, they are engaged in something that is 
relatively novel
7
 and therefore not only is the outcome uncertain, but so is the process for 
achieving that outcome (Shepherd et al., 2000). For example, when trying to size a 
market that will only exist once their product or service is launched, information is scarce 
(Alvarez & Barney, 2005) and planning is difficult and unreliable (Vandeven & Polley, 
1992). The findings from Study 1 suggest that as entrepreneurs begin to build on their 
initial assumptions and goals, they learn from their experience and gather feedback and 
advice on their actions. This results in new and often different knowledge to which they 
must respond. For example, they may learn that customers require something different 
than they initially assumed or that a planned technological approach is not feasible. They 
may be advised to position themselves differently in the market or to seek different 
means of financing their venture. Thus, founders‘ evolving knowledge is one force for 
change.  
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 Of course the novelty of any particular venture varies from very new to ‗reinventing the wheel.‘ However, 
the sample deliberately excluded many types of non-novel ventures (e.g., franchising) and to the extent that 
any new venture involves creation, at least some aspects are novel. Further, given changing technological 
advancements and a dynamic economic environment, even less novel technologies have to be developed 
for a novel environment. That is, the venture itself may be innovative even when a technology is more 





The second force for change is unexpected events. These arise from the 
uncertainty of the environment itself. Much of the entrepreneurial activity we see today 
occurs in highly dynamic and uncertain industries such as information technology, 
pharmaceuticals and biomedical research and development (Timmons, 2008). Even in 
less dynamic industries, the environment for entrepreneurship is highly unstable 
(McMullen & Shepherd, 2006). Funding sources may come and go. Governmental 
policies are changing and difficult to predict. Technologies are novel and unreliable. 
Because the environment is uncertain and unstable, most entrepreneurs experience at 
least a few unexpected events arising from outside of their span of control. As the data 
show, sometimes, these present new and different opportunities. More often, they create 
new constraints and hurdles. In any case, they motivate change.  
Because the early stages of a new venture are characterized by changes in 
founders‘ evolving knowledge and shifting events, entrepreneurs must continually shape 
their actions to match the changing realities. As their situation changes, they also have to 
change and it is out of these changes – to their operations, their goals, their resources - 
that the opportunity emerges and re-emerges. Of course this is not a one-time shift. It is 
an ongoing process not unlike sculpting. Founders may start by recognizing a particular 
opportunity and gathering resources to enact it (Sarasvathy, 2001), but as they create their 
venture, they also add to, take away from and change the initial form. From this shaping 




Figure 3.1 The opportunity shaping process 
 
Shaping vs. Strategic Change Processes 
 The shaping process might also be considered a kind of strategic change process, 
though it appears to differ from many current models of strategic change. In the 
following section, I consider how this process compares to other strategic change 
processes.  
 Strategic change has been defined as ―an alteration in an organization‘s alignment 
with its external organization (Fiss & Zajac, 2006).  Moreover, while this may refer to changes in 
an organization‘s structure or processes, it can also reflect a cognitive reorientation or the 
―redefinition of the organization‘s mission and purpose or a substantial shift in overall priorities 
and goals‖ (Gioia, Thomas, Clark, & Chittipeddi, 1994:364). In this sense, any change to an 
organization‘s opportunity represents a strategic change (though of course, they also engage in 
other, more tactical changes along the way). The process by which these changes occur, however, 




 Strategists have long examined how organizations make strategic changes. While there 
have been many different typologies of change process offered over the years, they tend to reflect 
a fundamental categorization initially offered by Mintzberg (1973) who suggested that change 
processes tended to fall into three modes: Entrepreneurial, Planning or Adaptive.  
 In the entrepreneurial mode, the ―organization focuses on opportunities; problems are 
secondary.‖ Mintzberg‘s description of the entrepreneurial mode is characterized by an all-
powerful chief executive who ―rules by fiat, relying on personal power and sometimes charisma‖ 
and strategy-making is described as ―the taking of large, bold decisions‖ (Mintzberg, 1973: 45).  
While there is little mention of this mode of strategic change in the scholarly world today, it is 
somewhat reflected in work on transformational leadership (e.g., Bass, 1985; Howell & Avolio, 
1993; Tichy & Ulrich, 1984).  
Not surprisingly, Mintzberg (1973) suggests that the entrepreneurial mode of strategic 
change is most appropriate in the context of new ventures.  Empirically, however, there is little 
evidence to suggest that this mode is either widely used or appropriate in today‘s new ventures. 
For example, most new ventures (and in particular technology ventures) are started by teams 
rather than a single entrepreneur (Francis & Sandberg, 2000; Ruef, Aldrich, & Carter, 2003). 
Furthermore, given the increasingly important and powerful role of venture capitalists, corporate 
venture organizations and angel investors, the notion of an all-powerful chief executive who 
―rules by fiat‖ is outdated.  My data also suggest that while founders do occasionally make large, 
bold decisions, the shaping process is characterized by many small, incremental changes as well. 
Thus, as a model of strategic change, the ―entrepreneurial mode‖ does not appear to reflect the 
shaping process as described in this study.  
The next mode of strategic change offered by Mintzberg (1973) is the ―planning mode‖ 




strategies. Sometimes referred to as ―synoptic processes‖ this approach to change is based on a 
rational model in which information needed to make decisions is available (Fredrickson, 1984; 
Rajagopalan & Spreitzer, 1997). The planning mode is generally seen as appropriate when 
environments are stable and certain (Eisenhardt & Tabrizi, 1995). However, in more complex, 
unstable environments planned approaches to strategic change may be inadvisable or even 
impossible. Thus, the last mode of strategic change offered by Mintzberg is the ―adaptive mode‖ 
which is characterized by a lack of clear goals, reactive problem-solving, incremental steps of 
change, and disjointed decisions (1973). Despite this somewhat negative summary of the process, 
scholars have since built on and expanded our understanding of the benefits of this mode, 
drawing particularly on a learning perspective (Rajagopalan & Spreitzer, 1997). For example, in 
unstable environments, adaptive processes (also referred to as ―incremental processes‖) are 
generally associated with decision speed and flexibility allowing for the exploitation of changing 
opportunities and threats (Eisenhardt, 1989c; Fredrickson, 1984).  
At first glance, the shaping process appears to be more consistent with the adaptive mode 
of strategic change. Clearly shaping occurs in an environment that is neither stable nor certain and 
under these circumstances, most scholars agree that comprehensive planning is likely to be 
ineffective (Fredrickson & Mitchell, 1984). Rather, managers must make sense of and respond to 
constant changes in the environment. However, shaping is not entirely consistent with the 
activities thought to characterize the adaptive mode. For example, in their comparison of synoptic 
(i.e., planning) vs. incremental (i.e., adaptive) processes, Fredrickson and Mitchell (1984) suggest 
that incremental processes are initiated in response to a problem whereas synoptic processes are 
initiated in response to opportunities that appear during constant surveillance. The data from this 
study suggest that shaping is initiated by both problems and new knowledge. Furthermore, 
incremental processes are viewed as somewhat reactive or remedial, whereas synoptic processes 




simultaneously. As in incremental processes, entrepreneurs shaping their opportunity do tend to 
consider only a few alternatives rather than making an exhaustive search of goals and 
alternatives, but given the small size of the organizations, the integrative comprehensiveness of 
decisions (i.e., attempts to integrated decisions into an overall strategy) tend to be more 
characteristic of synoptic processes. In other words, the shaping process appears to be unique 
from both adaptive and planning processes, incorporating some elements of each.  
One reason that shaping appears to be unique from other strategic change processes may 
be due to context effects. Strategy making has largely been studied in the context of large 
organizations (Burgelman, 1983) and thus impose certain assumptions based on that context. For 
example, scholars tend to view strategy making as occurring either from the top down or the 
bottom up (Huy & Mintzberg, 2003). Furthermore, organic processes are generally viewed as 
occurring from the bottom up and top down processes are generally seen as being more 
―dramatic‖ or transformational (Huy & Mintzberg, 2003). Thus, when organic change occurs in 
large organizations it may be somewhat isolated or lead to splintering as different factions fight 
for resources or attempt to change in different directions. However, in very small organizations 
with perhaps no more than 2 or 3 people, distinctions of top-down or bottom-up have little 
meaning. Unlike CEO‘s managing large multidivisional organizations, an entrepreneurial founder 
can and must learn, adapt and experiment even as they plan and analyze.  Thus, process models of 
strategic change developed from studies of large organizations are unlikely to reflect the realities 
of change within a new venture. Rather, the shaping process appears to be unique to the specific 
constraints and pressures of new entrepreneurial ventures.  
Conclusion 
In summary, the data from Study 1 suggest that opportunities emerge as founders 




realities. This appears to be a real-time, experientially based process that differs from 
both adaptive and planning modes of strategic change as described in the literature on 
larger organizations. As founders learn from experience, receive feedback and advice and 
respond to unexpected events, they make changes to the venture. Through these changes, 
the opportunity takes form, but because change can be disruptive and time-consuming, 
the process can be very costly to the young venture.  Particularly when change comes 
unexpectedly, takes a long time to implement or is based on inaccurate information, 
ventures are more likely to experience significant disruption. On the other hand, the data 
suggest that changes made quickly, early and accurately tend to be far less disruptive and 
costly.  
In the next chapter I consider the second research question, what organizing 
practices facilitate or hinder the shaping process? Given the findings of the first study, it 
seems likely that facilitating practices will be those that allow entrepreneurs to avoid or 






CHAPTER 4. A THEORY OF OPPORTUNITY SHAPING PRACTICES 
 
―I think the success factor between the beginning and the end on these kinds of 
early stage companies are people who will listen to the trenches and adapt and 
come back and be able to both lead their investors and their team, not in a 
hundred and eighty degree shifts every day, but in two or three degree shifts.  
Steering it kind of through the land mine to get to the end, and usually, you end 
up a little bit different than the original road map said.  Or a lot different, 
depending upon the market, but usually a lot doesn‘t work out…‖ 
 
The results of Study 1 suggest that entrepreneurs create opportunities in a context 
of dynamic uncertainty.  On a daily basis, they are motivated to adapt and adjust as the 
realities of their situation shift. This occurs for two reasons. First, their own knowledge 
changes over time. Given the novelty of their endeavors, entrepreneurs‘ knowledge in the 
early stages of a venture is incomplete (Alvarez & Barney, 2005). As they learn (e.g., 
about their technology, their customers and their competitors), their perceptions of 
appropriate goals, strategies and tactics also shift, motivating them to adjust accordingly. 
Second, the industries and environments in which they work tend to be very dynamic 
with new competing entrants, new technologies and economic pressures (McMullen & 
Shepherd, 2006; Timmons, 2008), again often motivating them to adjust and adapt. As 
their knowledge changes and the environment changes, they engage in a continual cycle 
of experience, interpretation and adjustment in an effort to build an opportunity that fits 
the changing contingencies of their venture and environment.  However, adjustments 
come at a cost since they can be time-consuming and disruptive to the organization. How 
then can entrepreneurs manage the shaping process – a process of change – while 
avoiding or minimizing the costs of change?   
This brings me to my second research question: What organizing practices 




shaping process are likely those that allow entrepreneurs to adjust to changing or 
incomplete knowledge and dynamic environments while minimizing the costs of those 
changes.  
To address this second research question, I consider what previous theorizing 
suggests with respect to managing dynamic and uncertain situations. I then build on those 
theories, guided by evidence from the qualitative study, to suggest specific practices that 
may facilitate the shaping process.  
MANAGING DYNAMIC AND UNCERTAIN SITUATIONS 
As organizations become increasingly complex and the speed of technological advances 
accelerates, the organizational world appears to be moving faster, with less certainty and 
more surprises (D'Aveni, 1994; Eisenhardt & Bourgeois, 1988; Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007). 
Several streams of work have addressed how organizations can best manage dynamic and 
uncertain situations but in particular two broad streams seem most relevant for 
entrepreneurs.  
First, some scholars have considered how individuals and organizations can 
develop and maintain an awareness of dynamic events. The premise of this work is that 
when conditions are changing and uncertain, planning and predicting become less 
feasible and therefore high performing organizations are those that maintain a more fluid 
and heightened awareness of their ongoing experience (e.g., Endsley, 1995; Weick & 
Sutcliffe, 2007). Much of this work focuses on avoiding or managing unexpected events 
and crises (Perrow, 1999; Watkins & Bazerman, 2003; Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007; Weick, 
Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 1999) often drawing on studies from high-hazard organizational 




and chemical plants (Carroll, Rudolph, & Hatakenaka, 2002) or wildland firefighting 
(Barton & Sutcliffe, 2009). Given the preponderance and disruptiveness of unexpected 
events in the opportunity creation process, this body of work offers a useful basis for 
theorizing about entrepreneurial practice.  
The second stream of research focuses on how individuals and organizations can 
develop routines and practices for learning from experience. The premise of this work is 
that organizations that learn in real-time are more able to adjust and adapt rapidly, as 
conditions change (Baker et al., 2003; Brown & Eisenhardt, 1998; Eisenhardt, 1989c; 
Lei, Hitt, & Bettis, 1996). Much of this work focuses on managing dynamic and 
uncertain conditions in the context of innovation and new product development 
(Bhattacharya, Krishnan, & Mahajan, 1998; Eisenhardt & Tabrizi, 1995; Jiang, Klein, 
Wu, & Liang, 2009; MacCormack, Verganti, & Iansiti, 2001) and so is of particular value 
to entrepreneurial contexts. Also, given that learning from experience is a critical 
component of the opportunity shaping process, this stream of research offers useful 
insight for theorizing about entrepreneurial practice.  
In the following sections, I consider how each of these perspectives on managing 
uncertain and dynamic situations can inform a model of the practices that facilitate the 
opportunity creation process. More specifically, I suggest that the shaping process is 
facilitated when entrepreneurs 1) build and maintain a vigilant awareness of their ongoing 
experience through performance monitoring and environmental scanning and 2) 





When situations are dynamic and uncertain, organizations that build a rich 
awareness of their own activities and environment, are more likely to notice and quickly 
respond to signals that adjustments are necessary (e.g., Weick et al., 1999). This is akin to 
situation awareness in individuals. Endsley (1995) defines situation awareness informally 
as ―knowing what‘s going on‖ and more formally as a hightened  perception of the 
elements in the environment within a volume of time and space, comprehension of their 
meaning and projection of their status in the near future. Situation awareness is critical 
for military pilots, firefighters, and other individuals who must make sense of and 
respond to very dynamic and potentially dangerous situations (Endsley, Hansman, & 
Farley, 1999; Jones & Endsley, 1996; Riley, Endsley, Bolstad, & Cuevas, 2006).  
Likewise, scholars have recognized these same requirements for high-reliability 
organizations (HROs) – organizations that are continually exposed to potential crisis 
(e.g., nuclear power plants, aircraft carriers) and therefore must sustain high levels of 
attention and awareness to ongoing activities (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007).   For example, 
in their study of aircraft carriers, Weick and Roberts (1993) attributed the remarkable 
safety records in part to organizing practices that develop and maintain high levels of 
alertness. Furthermore, studies of crisis frequently cite lack of awareness as a 
contributing factor. That is, organizations or individuals failed to notice or incorporate 
signals that events were not unfolding as planned (Jones & Endsley, 1996; Reason, 2004; 
Starbuck & Milliken, 1988; Turner, 1976).  
Critically, what these studies show is that firms can organize to be more aware of 
changing situations. For example, Weick and Sutcliffe (2007) note that highly reliable 




to be happening, but actively monitor what is actually happening (Weick & Sutcliffe, 
2007: 61). By paying close attention to operations and performance, organizations are 
more likely to notice small anomalies or faint signals that   expectations or assumptions 
are not in line with the reality of operations. Similarly, in dynamic environments, 
regularly scanning the external environment helps firms notice events or trends that may 
affect their operations (Barringer & Bluedorn, 1999; Daft, Sormunen, & Parks, 1988; 
Garg, Walters, & Priem, 2003). Since many crises start small and then escalate through a 
system (Perrow, 1994; Sagan, 1993), catching indications of them early tends to prevent 
ripple effects and may even allow managers to solve problems before they get to be crises 
(Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007). Furthermore, noticing small deviances from expectations 
gives organizations an opportunity to detect and learn from little failures (Sitkin, 1992).  
Given the preceding arguments, it seems likely that building awareness is critical 
for entrepreneurial ventures as well. Organizing practices that create a heightened 
awareness of actual ongoing operations and current environmental trends may allow 
entrepreneurs to catch small signals that change is needed earlier and faster, before 
problems escalate. Recognizing the need for change early may also allow founders to 
respond in smaller, more incremental steps rather than having to make large shifts in 
direction (Eisenhardt & Tabrizi, 1995). Finally, even large shifts in direction may be less 
disruptive if they are completed quickly and before significant investments are made. For 
example, while the decision to outsource sales and distribution may be a significant 
change in strategy, it has few disruptive effects if no sales personnel have yet been hired. 
This is consistent with findings from Study 1 which suggested that changes made quickly 




was experiencing excellent sales. Their product appeared to be taking off and they were 
focusing primarily on building the business. However, they started to notice that 
customers, while still happy with the product, were balking at some of the sales terms. 
The CEO recalls:  
―It‘s really a low level discussion because the customer wants [the product], we are 
negotiating, they are advancing, but some term doesn‘t work for them.  OK, well 
that‘s a flag. I mean, if it‘s a term that is fundamental to the business model, then 
tell us then what‘s going on here?... obviously I was also looking a lot at the macro 
level… so the market is going down a bit.  I mean, big deal.  It took sometimes 
years for companies to understand, I think, that things are really going bad.  So 
these few inputs that came from customers and the dynamic of customers caused us 
actually to in some respects look up [from execution tasks]…So the essence here 
was to really … differentiate between acceptance of your product and the … macro 
level dynamics that essentially are changing your business model or changing the 
way the market works in some respect and affecting your business model.‖ 
 
The CEO not only paid attention to what were otherwise very weak signals but 
recognized that they were important indicators that their assumptions about internet 
revenue models were flawed. Recognizing this early allowed them realign their resources 
quickly before running out of money.  
―In retrospect, and that‘s what saved us, is that we managed to transition soon. It 
was literally within five, six months…we identified the issues and realigned.  So 
we didn‘t waste much money and we had enough resources to do it.‖ 
 
Some entrepreneurs appeared to be well aware of the need for vigilance. As one 
mentioned:  
―You need to keep your eyes always open.  Especially when everybody‘s 
executing so fast, that‘s exactly the time where you‘re in some respects 
blindsided.  And at that time, you need to look around and make sure that you‘re 
not rushing to the wrong direction.‖ 
 
But how do entrepreneurs make sure they are not rushing in the wrong direction? 
A sensitivity to operations means that organizations are paying attention to action – 




Furthermore, this means paying attention both to internal operations and to the external 
forces that act on those operations. Two practices that likely facilitate a heightened 
awareness of operations include performance monitoring and environmental scanning. I 
discuss each of these below. 
Performance monitoring 
One way for firms to build and maintain an awareness of operations is to monitor 
their performance (Eisenhardt, 1989c). That is, they set expectations – around milestones, 
benchmarks, budgets – and then regularly and frequently compare actual performance to 
expected performance. Performance monitoring is likely to reduce the size of change and 
disruptions from change in a couple ways. First, performance monitoring makes 
expectations explicit. This is critical because without explicit assumptions about what 
action should look like, it is easy to let small deviances go unchecked. For example, 
Vaughan suggested that the normalization of small failures was a contributing factor in 
the 1986 Space Shuttle Challenger disaster.  When burn marks appeared on the booster 
rockets‘ O-rings, the definition of acceptable performance was allowed to expand to 
include some gas leakage through the gaskets (Vaughan, 1996). When expectations are 
explicit, entrepreneurs are more likely to notice small (or large) anomalies and, as 
mentioned earlier, catch problems before they escalate. This may even prevent some 
unexpected events from occurring. For example, if entrepreneurs notice signs that a 
relationship is not going well, they may have time to adjust their interactions and 
potentially prevent a complete failure of the relationship.  
Second, performance monitoring also allows firms to notice and learn from small 




more opportunities to notice and learn from failures to meet interim rather than major 
deadlines or milestones. Learning from small failures is an essential means of figuring 
out what is working and what isn‘t (Edmondson, 2004; Ellis & Davidi, 2005; McGrath, 
1999; Sitkin, 1992). Furthermore, noticing small failures may point to larger, underlying 
problems that can be addressed before too many resources are lost. For example, by 
creating and monitoring a budget, a firm is more likely to realize it is running out of 
money before that actually happens. Conversely, without a budget, it may be difficult to 
notice that a few extra dollars spent here or there are adding up to a trend of over 
spending. This occurred to one venture in my sample. The founder recalls that they 
continued spending money to develop their technology, adding what he called ―bells & 
whistles‖ without restraint, only to discover that the technology didn‘t work.  
―We had a scramble. Investors, board meetings, employees, new software 
companies, the current one just yelling and screaming and trying to figure out 
what‘s going on...And in the end, the assessment was we had spent six hundred 
thousand dollars on junk… I [had been] convinced that the bells and the whistles 
…were what were going to differentiate us in the market rather than just saying, 
‗Hey.  Let‘s let our customer tell us what they want over time.  Let‘s not make 
these assumptions and build a monument here.‘‖ 
 
Conversely, another venture more closely tracked expected and actual costs and 
revenues.  When this entrepreneur realized that they were not meeting their numbers, he 
was able to develop a contingency plan in time to make up the shortfall.  
―So I had to find a way of making money to keep us going…and we have to do 
whatever we can do with what we have now to make money.  And one of those 
things was partnering up with the [small online auction site].‖ 
 
This interim plan allowed the founder to stay afloat long enough to start getting 
sales from his main product.  By regularly and frequently comparing actual performance 




adjust to small short-falls before they escalate. As a result, changes are likely to be 
smaller (less overall change). That is, ventures may be able to make small, mid-course 
adjustments earlier in the process. In addition, changes are likely to be less disruptive to 
the firm since smaller changes, made earlier in the process are likely to involve fewer 
resources. Conversely, when performance is meeting expectations, firms will be less 
likely to make unnecessary changes. As a result, firms who engage in frequent 
performance monitoring will also enjoy better performance overall. Please see Figure 4.1. 
This leads to my first set of hypotheses:  
Hypothesis 1: More frequent use of performance monitoring will be associated 
with smaller overall change in the venture.  
 
Hypothesis 2: More frequent use of performance monitoring will be associated 
with less disruption from change.  
 
Hypothesis 3: More frequent use of performance monitoring will be associated 
with higher levels of performance.  
 




 As with any organization, new firms must create opportunities that match or ‗fit‘ 
their environment (Burns & Stalker, 1961; Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967). When this 
environment is unstable and uncertain, it is particularly important that they maintain 




the environment and the extent to which current operations (e.g., structures, processes, 
decisions) are consistent with external contingencies (Thompson, 1967). Environmental 
scanning refers to the frequency and means by which top managers receive data about 
external events and trends (Daft et al., 1988). This may include gathering information and 
advice from a variety of sources (e.g., suppliers, competitors, investors) and through a 
variety of means (e.g., personal contacts, websites) (Aguilar, 1967). Environmental 
scanning provides the external information critical to strategy-formulation and decision-
making (Daft et al., 1988). Moreover, when environments are very uncertain, high 
performing firms engage in more frequent scanning (Daft et al., 1988) and pay attention 
to more kinds of real-time information (Eisenhardt, 1989c).  
Seeking information from a broad range of external sources may be particularly 
important to entrepreneurs‘ ability to build and maintain awareness. A variety of external 
sources provide a broad array of sensors in the environment.  Many studies have 
suggested that different network ties affect opportunity recognition (Ozgen & Baron, 
2007; Shane, 2000; Yli-Renko, Autio, & Sapienza, 2001). Similarly, different contacts 
and sources of information are likely to pinpoint different trends, signals or critical 
assumptions about the environment and the venture‘s fit with it.  
Many founding teams are very small often consisting of no more than 2 or 3 people 
(Shane, 2008). Therefore, they often lack the full breadth of expertise and functions found 
in more established top management teams.  This limited breadth of perspectives may 
inhibit awareness. Individuals with different backgrounds bring with them unique thought 
worlds through which they view and even define the current situation (Dougherty, 1992). 




Folta, & Woo, 1995; Fiet, 1995). Similarly, secondary sources such as websites, journals 
or other publications all provide different perspectives on the venture environment. In the 
absence of broad perspectives, ventures may be less likely to monitor and notice whole 
swaths of the environment. This argument is consistent with some of the experiences 
relayed by respondents in my sample. For example, one respondent describes how his 
lack of expertise in the automotive industry prevented him from even knowing what to 
watch out for: 
―I wasn't smart--I just wasn‘t thinking hard enough about the fact that I've 
got my MBA, I know how to run companies, I've been a banker. I've built a 
company in another industry.  But the auto industry is a special breed…and if I 
looked at my own experience and thought, Gee, what are all the things I'd know 
that other people don't know about the things I've been doing, I might have been a 
little bit more cautious about it.  And I looked at automotive product development 
…as too generic a management assignment.  And I've had to bump my head way 
too many times or get punched right in the face by the facts and circumstances of 
automotive that, even in good times, take greater savvy than I have, and greater 
savvy than any of us have in the company… I should have thought harder about 
what I didn't know.  I didn't know what I didn't know…‖ 
 
In contrast, some founders developed and maintained a very broad set of expert 
sources from whom to gather information and advice. For example, one CEO working to 
commercialize a medical device technology, sought advice from a regulatory expert to 
determine the specific FDA labeling requirements they would need to meet and how to 
meet them. He sought advice from a marketing expert on marketing strategies for the 
industry and another expert on sales. He also had a more general, strategy mentor to be ―a 
sounding board‖ and to help ―paint the picture‖ by asking critical strategic questions.  
Using a variety of scanning sources provides entrepreneurs with a broad set of 
environmental sensors and is likely to facilitate awareness of changing environmental 




broad environmental scanning may allow entrepreneurs to notice emerging problems or 
issues quickly, allowing them to adjust or adapt before crises occur. As a result, changes 
are likely to be smaller (less overall change) and less disruptive to the firm. In addition, 
seeking information from multiple external sources can complement or augment a 
venture team‘s pool of expertise. As a result, they may have access to broader repertoires 
of action that can be drawn upon when adjustments are needed (Sutcliffe & Vogus, 
2003), potentially in less disruptive and costly ways than might otherwise be considered. 
Therefore, firms who engage in frequent and broad environmental scanning are likely to 
enjoy better performance overall. Please see Figure 4.2. This leads to me to hypothesize:   
Hypothesis 4: Higher levels of environmental scanning will be associated with 
smaller overall change in the venture.  
 
Hypothesis 5: Higher levels of environmental scanning will be associated with 
less disruption from change.  
 
Hypothesis 6: Higher levels of environmental scanning will be associated with 
higher levels of performance.  
 




LEARNING FROM EXPERIENCE 
―The operating principles for an early stage company – parenthetically for which 
there is no book that tells you what‘s going to happen next – is you have to very 




stop doing it.  It actually is that simple to say and that is incredibly difficult to 
implement…‖ – Founder  
 
Scholars in the areas of innovation and new product development have suggested 
that when situations are dynamic and uncertain, organizations that can quickly learn from 
their experience may be better able to adjust and adapt (Baker et al., 2003; Brown & 
Eisenhardt, 1998; Eisenhardt, 1989c; Lei et al., 1996).  Since innovation often involves 
trying to answer questions that no one else has ever answered (e.g., sizing a market that 
will only exist once their product or service is launched), planning is difficult and 
unreliable (Vandeven & Polley, 1992) and there are very few models of success (Cope, 
2005; Corbett, 2005). Therefore, much of knowledge has to be developed through 
experience.  Furthermore, in a dynamic environment conditions change so rapidly that 
current experience may be the best guide to the market reality (Eisenhardt & Tabrizi, 
1995). For example, studies of large organizations competing in rapidly changing 
markets have suggested that while firms must learn from their past and shape the future, 
success hinges on their ability to focus strongly on the present (Brown & Eisenhardt, 
1998). By paying attention to current experience, innovators are better able to stay 
abreast of rapid market changes and their own development efforts, keeping change 
events to smaller, more incremental and less disruptive adjustments (Adner, 2006; 
Chhatpar, 2007; Eisenhardt & Tabrizi, 1995).  
The challenge of interpretation 
However, if firms are to be guided by experience, they must first make sense of 
their experience. That is, organizational actors do not simply respond to information and 
experience, they have to interpret it (Daft & Weick, 1984; Weick & Daft, 1982). In fact, 




1979). That is, ―managers literally must wade into the swarm of events that constitute and 
surround the organization and actively try to impose some order on them‖ (Weick & 
Daft, 1983: 75). Similarly, entrepreneurs must observe and reflect on their experience and 
impose on that set of events, some meaning. However, the process of interpretation is 
particularly challenging when conditions are uncertain or equivocal (Daft & Lengel, 
1984; Galbraith, 1972) – which are precisely the conditions surrounding the shaping 
process. As mentioned earlier, entrepreneurs face uncertainty in that outcomes and their 
probability are unknown (Duncan, 1972; Knight, 1921; Milliken, 1987). Perhaps even 
more challenging though, is the fact that many events are also highly equivocal. That is, 
data are unclear and suggest multiple interpretations (Weick, 2001: 251). For example, 
one founder in my sample was considering an expansion into Asia. He opened a very 
small trial office in Singapore, but when sales from that location failed to meet 
expectations, it was difficult to determine if the problem lay with the Asian market or 
with insufficient resources supplied to the project. As another respondent recalled: 
―For the first nine months of this company‘s history, the user trajectory was 
unbelievable.  That‘s how we were able to raise a bunch of money in non-dilutive 
ways early on in the company‘s history.  But since we kind of plateaued out at 
around month eight or nine, there was no clear plan.  First of all there was no 
clear reason or explanation of why we plateaued out and more importantly there 
was no clear set of objectives about what we were going to do next to continue 
growth.‖ 
 
For these entrepreneurs, it was clear that current efforts were not working, but 
beyond that they had very little unequivocal data to suggest why current efforts were not 
working or what changes might improve their outcomes. Their experience was difficult to 
interpret not just because outcomes were unknown (uncertainty) but because the 




ensure that it can be easily interpreted. As Weick and Daft put it, ―the organizational 
activity of interpreting the environment is an awesomely complex, fuzzy process‖ (Weick 
& Daft, 1983: 77).   
How then can entrepreneurs make sense of their experience in order to learn and 
adjust effectively? To address this question, I turn to the innovation and new product 
development literature. Within this arena, scholars have offered several approaches to 
engaging in and drawing upon experience in ways that allow developers to make sense of 
their experience and adjust effectively. As I will discuss, these approaches are also likely 
to benefit entrepreneurs. 
Experiential learning in new product development  
When organizations are developing new product in very innovative contexts (e.g., 
high tech), many of the challenges they face are similar to those of entrepreneurs. Even 
within large organizations, developers must contest with rapidly changing technological 
and economic conditions, uncertain and increasingly limited resources and incomplete 
knowledge (Andrew et al., 2007; Brown & Eisenhardt, 1995; Dougherty & Hardy, 1996; 
McGrath, 2001). One approach to managing this uncertainty is to deliberately incorporate 
learning plans into development efforts. By creating a learning plan, developers are 
forced to explicitly assess the state of their knowledge, pinpoint knowledge gaps and 
critically, propose ways of filling those gaps, for example, by developing tests of their 
assumptions or uncertainties (Rice, O'Connor, & Pierantozzi, 2008; Sykes & Dunham, 
1995). 
Another approach is to design frequent tests and feedback into development 




provide more opportunities for real-time learning than more logistical, planning-based 
strategies (Brown & Eisenhardt, 1997; Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000; Eisenhardt & Tabrizi, 
1995). Experiential strategies are strategies that involve ―rapidly building intuition and 
flexible options in order to learn quickly about and shift with uncertain environments‖ 
and include the use of rapid design iterations, frequent testing, and frequent milestones 
(Eisenhardt & Tabrizi, 1995: 91). Frequent testing allows developers to rapidly build 
knowledge about their technology and to ground that knowledge in factual and concrete 
data. Also, frequent testing often means frequent small failures. This not only helps 
clarify what is working and what is not, but it does so in a way that is incremental and 
less costly (Eisenhardt & Tabrizi, 1995). Similarly, several scholars have advocated for 
the use of experimentation in innovative efforts. For example, Thomke and colleagues 
suggest that ‗real-time‘ experimentation can help innovators fail early and often to 
increase learning (Thomke, 2001). Furthermore, while experimentation is often 
associated with technical development (e.g., Thomke, von Hippel, & Franke, 1998), it is 
increasingly seen as a approach for managing more strategic decisions and directions as 
well (Nicholls-Nixon, Cooper, & Woo, 2000; Thomke, 2003).   
Finally, many scholars have suggested that frequent, repeated interactions with 
real customers and stakeholders help firms make sense of the changing nuances of the 
market and the ecosystem and provide the data necessary to iterate on product designs in 
real-time (e.g., ―flexible design‖) (Adner, 2006; Beckman & Barry, 2007; Bhattacharya et 
al., 1998; Leonard & Rayport, 1997; MacCormack et al., 2001). For example, when 
product developers regularly test prototypes with potential users, the resulting data allows 




What all of the approaches above have in common is that they are deliberate (i.e., 
innovators proactively seek or design an opportunity to learn), they are analytical (i.e., 
innovators gather and analyze concrete data), and they are reality-based (i.e., innovators 
gather first-hand data from experiences with the actual technology or environment). 
Moreover, insofar as they involve creating and testing data, they appear to have potential 
for reducing the equivocality of experience.  They also all occur in ‗real-time.‘ That is, 
they are not off-line experiments or tests, but rather occur in the course daily operations. 
In this sense, they are somewhat improvisational (Eisenhardt & Tabrizi, 1995).  
Although there are many definitions of improvisation (Berliner, 1994; Kamoche 
& Cunha, 2001; Miner, Bassoff, & Moorman, 2001) most encompass the idea that 
activities are improvisational to the extent that their design and implementation are 
proximate in time (Moorman & Miner, 1998b). Improvisation can help organizations 
solve unexpected problems (e.g., Rerup, 2001; Weick, 1993) or leverage unexpected 
opportunities (e.g., Baker et al., 2003) and is often suggested to be an important 
capability for entrepreneurial ventures (Baker & Nelson, 2005; Hmieleski & Corbett, 
2008).  However, while improvisation can be viewed as a type of short-term, real-time 
learning, Miner and colleagues (1990) point out that improvisation involves little or no 
reflection and tends not to generate long-term knowledge. This is problematic for 
entrepreneurs since they must continually build their knowledge base, not just solve 
problems – and improvisation does not necessarily create good data for learning (Miner 
et al., 2001).    
For entrepreneurs, this suggests that while experiential strategies such as 




information into emerging offerings (Brown & Eisenhardt, 1997; Eisenhardt, 1989c; 
Eisenhardt & Tabrizi, 1995; Krishnan & Bhattacharya, 2002; MacCormack et al., 2001; 
Thomke, 1997), these practices are more likely to build knowledge when they are not 
entirely improvisational, but rather are deliberately designed to incorporate the more 
analytical elements of experimentation and testing (Thomke et al., 1998; Thomke, 1998). 
Collectively, I refer to these practices as ―experiential learning strategies‖ which I define 
as ―practices which incorporate the regular collection of real-time, real-world data with 
the use of explicit analytical processes to observe, interpret and assimilate those data into 
ongoing decisions.‖ For entrepreneurs, this means engaging with the real world in real-
time but doing so in a very deliberate and analytical way. As one very experienced 
entrepreneur commented: 
―You've got to jump in …get as much information as 
possible in as little time and for as little money as possible…In big 
companies you succeed by not making mistakes.  In a little company 
you succeed by getting through the mistakes as fast and as cheaply 
as possible…[You need to] set up some little goals that are only an 
arm's throw away and if you can't hit those, step back and say, "Am 
I doing something wrong?  Am I asking the wrong question? 
 
Entrepreneurs’ experiential learning strategies 
Insofar as experiential learning strategies are a means of imposing order on an 
equivocal world, they may be akin to enactment. That is, according to Weick, ―enacting 
involves shaping the world…as well as stirring the world so that it yields what we then 
treat as ‗answers‘‖ (Weick, 2006: 1729). Experiential learning strategies allow 
entrepreneurs to wade in and stir their world, creating ―answers‖ to which they can then 
respond and adjust. The findings of Study 1 suggest that some entrepreneurs may be 




situations in which they deliberately designed real-time experiences for learning with the 
explicit intention of producing data and ultimately, increasing their knowledge. For 




 was an expert at breaking the instrument …But that kind of 
feedback was critical, because …if [engineers] don‘t get it they will make 
assumptions that something works and it doesn‘t….They developed the software 
and they thought about how people would use it ... And then we sent them over to 
observe Sara using it and they were horrified. She wants to do what? …and Sara 
would merrily be collecting data at ten--five thousand events a second …which 
brought the software crashing to its knees because software developers never do 
that…But Sara would do what she wanted to do…. She is not an engineer. She is 
a scientist who wants to take data and turn it into new discoveries.  We had the 
same thing literally going on across the hall right now in manufacturing. I‘ve got 
one of my scientists … merrily breaking the things everybody thinks are done. 
And he‘ll be like, ―It‘s not meeting this spec.‖ And people will be like, ―No, no. 
It‘s gotta be meeting the spec,‖ and he‘s like, ―Look, it‘s not.‖ You know? And 
that‘s what I mean by accurate feedback and a week ago everybody was, ―Oh 
yeah, these are working really well,‖ except that we didn‘t have the right code in 
there and so there was some wiggle room in terms of how good it had to be met. 
So when people were looking at it making a judgment call everybody‘s giving 
themselves a little more grace than they actually have. So yesterday we were able 
to quantify exactly what it needed to do to pass. And lo and behold, there was a 
lot more work to be done.‖ 
 
I have suggested that one of the key sources of change is incomplete knowledge. 
(Because entrepreneurs start off with less than perfect knowledge (Alvarez & Barney, 
2005), as they learn, their understanding of the contingencies they face changes, 
motivating them to adjust their strategy, operations, goals, etc. (Sarasvathy, 2001).) 
Experiential learning strategies are likely to facilitate the shaping process by rapidly 
building knowledge, which in turn, can reduce the disruption associated with change. 
More specifically, I am suggesting that experiential learning strategies build certainty 
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about the organizational environment, allowing entrepreneurs to make fewer, smaller and 
more positive changes.  
Essentially, incomplete knowledge exists when there is uncertainty – when 
possible outcomes and their probability are unknown (Duncan, 1972; Knight, 1921; 
Milliken, 1987). Entrepreneurs experience a great deal of uncertainty (Alvarez & Barney, 
2005), arising from many different components of the environment (Bourgeois, 1985; 
Downey & Slocum, 1975; Milliken, 1987). For example, Duncan (1972) suggests that 
environmental uncertainty arises from internal components (e.g., personnel, unit 
interactions, goals) as well as external components (e.g., suppliers, customers, 
competitors).  Similarly entrepreneurs face uncertainty within their venture (e.g., 
uncertainty with respect to technical development, expertise required) as well as from the 




Experiential learning strategies build certainty and reduce the effects of change in 
(at least) three ways. First, by testing ideas, designs and approaches rapidly, 
entrepreneurs can build up knowledge about different components of their environment 
(e.g. their target market, suppliers, likely technical hurdles) early and fast, reducing 
uncertainty and potentially avoiding the need for large changes. That is, with increased 
certainty, the likelihood of needing to make adjustments is reduced (i.e., less overall 
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 This construction of uncertainty is somewhat similar to Milliken‘s ―state‖ uncertainty (Milliken, F. J. 
1987. 3 Types of Perceived Uncertainty About the Environment - State, Effect, and Response Uncertainty. 
Academy of Management Review, 12(1): 133-143.) in that it considers how certain organizational actors 
feel about the state of the environment. However, whereas state uncertainty corresponds to the inability to 
predict what the external environment will do, uncertainty about the environment as conceptualized here 
corresponds to lack of knowledge about the entire task environment (internal and external). In this sense, it 
is closer to ignorance, or ―a lack of knowledge, education or awareness‖ (Merriam-Webster dictionary, 
2010). Conversely, in this conceptualization knowledge refers to the creation of certainty about different 




change). Second, because experiential learning strategies involve frequent, rapid learning, 
any changes in knowledge are likely to be incremental and the resulting change efforts 
are likely to involve smaller, less disruptive adjustments (Eisenhardt & Tabrizi, 1995). 
Finally, because experiential learning strategies involve a deliberate and systematic 
approach to learning, entrepreneurs may be better able to interpret their experience 
accurately or with more certainty and have to make fewer risky decisions. In other words, 
by reducing equivocality, experiential learning strategies build certainty in ways that may 
improve the quality of change decisions. As a result, change decisions are more likely to 
result in expected (and presumably positive) rather than unexpected outcomes. This is 
consistent with anecdotal evidence from the first study, in which respondents associated 
―bad‖ changes with incomplete or equivocal information. Based on these arguments, I 
hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 7: More frequent use of experiential learning strategies will be 
associated with smaller overall change in the venture.  
 
Hypothesis 8: More frequent use of experiential learning strategies will be 
associated with less disruption from change.  
 
Hypothesis 9: More frequent use of experiential learning strategies will be 
associated with higher levels of performance.  
 
Furthermore, I have argued that experiential learning strategies reduce the effects 
of change and improve performance as a result of building more certainty (i.e., 
knowledge) about the venture‘s internal and external environment
10
. Thus, I hypothesize:  
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 Alternatively, this can be conceptualized as ―improving performance as a result of reducing uncertainty.‖ 
However, since theoretically I am referring to knowledge building and empirically this is tested using a 




Hypothesis 10: The relationship between experiential learning strategies and 
overall change in the venture will be mediated by certainty about the 
organizational environment.  
 
Hypothesis 11: The relationship between experiential learning strategies and 
disruption from change will be mediated by certainty about the organizational 
environment.  
 
Hypothesis 12: The relationship between experiential learning strategies and 
levels of performance will be mediated by certainty about the organizational 
environment.  
 
Finally, I have suggested that improvisational approaches may be beneficial to 
entrepreneurs insofar as they are a means of problem-solving. Therefore, I hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 13: More frequent use of improvisational approaches will be 
associated with higher levels of performance.  
 
 However, given that improvisation does not necessarily facilitate knowledge 
building, I would not expect improvisational approaches to reduce overall change or 
disruption from change efforts. Please see Figure 4.3 
Figure 4.3 The effects of experiential vs. improvisational strategies on change, 




Based on the findings of Study 1, I have suggested that the process by which 
opportunities are shaped is essentially a process of change. As entrepreneurs learn from 




That is, they may come to perceive the contingencies they face and the likely 
effectiveness of planned strategies and goals differently over time. Furthermore, given 
the dynamic and uncertain nature of the context in which innovative entrepreneurship 
occurs (McMullen & Shepherd, 2006; Shepherd et al., 2000), entrepreneurs are 
frequently confronted with unexpected events. As a result of both these forces for change, 
entrepreneurs may be motivated to change their operations and even the opportunity, 
multiple times throughout the early stages of a venture‘s emergence. However, the 
change process can be highly costly insofar as it tends to be disruptive and time-
consuming – costs that a new, resource-constrained firm can ill afford to pay. On the 
other hand, when conditions are uncertain and dynamic, the failure to adjust and adapt as 
needed is also costly (Alvarez & Barney, 2005; Barnett & Pratt, 2000; Bhattacharya et 
al., 1998; Shepherd et al., 2000). How then can entrepreneurs engage in a change process, 
while at the same time, limit the costs of change?  
The findings of the first study suggest that change effects are most disruptive 
when change comes unexpectedly, takes a long time to recognize and implement or is 
based on inaccurate information. Therefore, to the extent that entrepreneurs engage in 
practices that allow them to anticipate or prevent unexpected events, recognize the need 
for change early and make changes quickly and based on unequivocal information, they 
may be less likely to feel the disruptive effects of change – while still maintaining 
flexibility and adaptability.  
In this chapter I have suggested a model of practices that may facilitate the 
shaping process by managing the effects of change. In particular, I have suggested that 




monitoring) and environmental conditions (i.e., environmental scanning) may help 
entrepreneurs prevent unexpected events and recognize the need to change early, before 
problems escalate. As a result, change efforts may require smaller adjustments and fewer 
resources. Also, by regularly collecting real-world data and using analytical processes to 
observe, interpret and assimilate those data into ongoing decisions (i.e., experiential 
learning strategies), entrepreneurs may be better able to learn from experience. 
Experiential learning strategies reduce the disruption associated with change by reducing 
equivocality and thus improving the quality of change decisions. In addition, experiential 
learning strategies create opportunities for learning early and often, resulting in more 
frequent, but smaller, more incremental adaptations which are likely to be less disruptive 
than large shifts later in the process.  I have also suggested that because in order to 
manage change, entrepreneurs must build knowledge not just solve-problems, 
experiential learning practices are likely to be more effective in managing change effects 
than improvisational approaches.  
In summary, in order to successfully navigate the shaping process, entrepreneurs 
must both create and adapt to change while simultaneously managing its effects. I have 
suggested that their ability to do this arises from an emphasis on the present – on 
maintaining a vigilant awareness of real-time experience and developing means of 










CHAPTER 5. A SURVEY OF PRACTICES TO MANAGE CHANGE IN THE 
OPPORTUNITY SHAPING PROCESS (STUDY 2) 
 
The findings of Study 1 suggested that opportunities emerge as founders shape 
their ventures to match their evolving knowledge and changing environmental realities. 
Given these findings, in Chapter 4 I proposed that entrepreneurs who maintain a vigilant 
awareness of their operations and environment, and who utilize experiential learning 
strategies may experience less disruption from change efforts, ultimately, enjoying better 
performance. The purpose of Study 2 was to test these hypotheses. To that end, I 
designed and conducted a survey of entrepreneurs and a sample of their investors.  
METHODS 
Sample 
The sample for this study was drawn from a population of new technology-based 
firms. I defined ―new‖ as an entrepreneurial venture that was less than 10 years old and 
had not ―exited‖ (i.e., been sold, closed down, or made an initial public offering). The 10-
year  cutoff is consistent with other research on new ventures (Covin & Slevin, 1990) and 
by excluding firms that had existed, I ensured that firms were truly ‗startups.‘ There is no 
consistent definition of a technology based firm (Bollinger, Hope, & Utterback, 1983; 
Storey & Tether, 1998) but most definitions encompass the idea that such a firm is one 
that is reliant or based upon technology in exploiting business opportunities (Granstrand, 
1998). I focused on technology-based firms in an effort to eliminate from the population 
many other kinds of self-employment that would not fall into my definitions of 




proprietorship consultancies, etc.). This is not to say that all technology-based firms are 
innovative, but by limiting my population in this way, I‘ve eliminated many that are not.  
Three types of sources provided the population for this study: venture capital 
firms, angel investors, and incubators/economic development agencies. Venture 
capitalists are full-time professional investors who invest for a particular fund or set of 
funds (Hellmann & Puri, 2000). They provide to new firms increasing levels of capital 
over a limited time frame in exchange for some level of ownership and control of the 
business. Generally, the investment takes the form of private stock in the venture or a 
legal instrument which can be converted to stock. Angel investors are independently 
wealthy individuals who invest in new businesses in return for some level of ownership 
and/or control as well as expectations of a high rate of return on their investment 
(Hellmann & Puri, 2000). Finally, incubators are organizations that have been created ―to 
support and accelerate the development and success of affiliated ventures,‖ often with the 
help of local or national economic development agencies (Scillitoe & Chakrabarti, 2010: 
155). For example, incubators in this study included one affiliated with the University of 
Michigan and another was affiliated with the state of Michigan. Incubators provide a 
wide-range of support including small levels of financial assistance, advice and expertise, 
and office or plant space.  
I recruited entrepreneurs through these sources for several reasons. First, venture 
capitalists, angel investors, and other institutional investors often invest in technology 
based firms (GlobalInsight, 2005) and similarly, technology based firms are more likely 
to receive external funding than other types of firms (Reynolds, 2007b). Thus, by 




respondents involved in technology ventures. Second, by recruiting through investors, I 
was able to get performance data about a subsample of the firms from their investors in 
addition to the performance ratings provided by entrepreneurs directly. Third, because the 
investors provided me with a personal introduction to the respondents, I was able to 
maintain a relatively high response rate. This varied by source. Venture capitalists and 
angels tended to provide more limited lists but response rates were very high (often 75% 
-100%). Incubators provided much larger lists but as the relationships involved were far 
less personal, the response rates were lower.  
The final reason I worked through investors is more subjective. By developing a 
sample from investors, I was more confident that the firms involved were real, going 
concerns, which is one of the great difficulties of researching emerging firms. An 
individual can incorporate a venture with nothing more than a name and social security 
number, and many people do. Some so-called ‗new ventures‘ are nothing more than an 
individual‘s pet idea that he or she has been vaguely considering for many years. In fact, 
some studies suggest that one out of every five entrepreneurs is involved in the start up 
process forever (Shane, 2008)
11
.  On the other hand, even well-funded, full-time ventures 
may have little to show in terms of sales, products, etc for many years so limiting a 
sample to those with revenues, for example, would over constrain the sample.  By 
recruiting through investors, I was able to limit my sample to individuals who had at least 
passed the hurdle of discussing or presenting their ideas to investors. 
12
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 Although this data defined entrepreneurship very broadly to include ―self-employment‖ and others who 
were only involved in a venture part-time. 
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 My intention was not to recruit only entrepreneurs who received funding. Rather, the investors (angels, 
VCs, incubators) provided lists of entrepreneurs with whom they had had some association. For example, 




I sent the survey to 424 entrepreneurs and received 179 completed surveys, of 
which 139 were useable (see Screening, below). Thus, my final sample size was 139. 
Survey design and administration 
The surveys used in this study were designed to assess the constructs described in 
the model proposed earlier.  To accomplish this, I used two surveys. The first was a very 
small survey for Venture Capitalists and Angels in which they were asked to assess the 
performance of several of their ventures (Survey Instrument for Investors). The second 
was a larger survey in which entrepreneurs were asked to report on the practices and 
performance of their firm (Survey Instrument for Entrepreneurs). The full survey 
instruments are provided in Appendices D and E. Following recent trends in survey 
administration, the surveys were distributed via email and administered online 
(Thompson, Surface, Martin, & Sanders, 2003).  Upon completion, the data were 
automatically submitted to an electronic database. I used multiple-item 7 point Likert-like 
scales and when possible, used or modified existing scales that have been validated in 
previous literature (see description of measures below).  
Survey item development and testing. The surveys necessitated a fair amount of 
scale development. Many of the constructs in the surveys, though not new to the 
literature, have not been operationalized or developed into validated scales. For example, 
Eisenhardt and colleagues‘ work on experiential development strategies suggest specific 
practices (Eisenhardt & Tabrizi, 1995) but no scale has been developed. Similarly, 
Thomke and colleagues‘ work on experimentation (Thomke & Fujimoto, 2000; Thomke 
                                                                                                                                                              
entrepreneurs whom the investors were aware of and were following more informally. Thus, performance 




& Reinertsen, 1998) and Rice and colleagues‘ work on implementing a learning plan 
(Rice et al., 2008) all offer specific steps for work processes, but again, to my knowledge, 
there is no existing scale that captures experiential learning strategies as a whole. For 
other constructs, such as improvisation, some scales exist but are contextually 
inappropriate and thus had to be adapted.   
 As was discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, very few studies have explored 
entrepreneurial processes and survey studies are rare. Similarly, in their review of new 
product development research, Brown and Eisenhardt (1995) comment that the ―creative 
processes by which senior managers and others match firm competencies with market 
needs to create an effective product concept…has been virtually unexplored‖ (374). As a 
result scale development in these contexts is extremely limited. Therefore, to build scales 
for the seven primary constructs in my study (i.e., performance monitoring, 
environmental scanning, experiential learning strategies, improvisation, overall change to 
venture, disruption from change, and venture performance), I drew on both existing 
theory and inductive approaches, which, according to Hinkin (1998), are appropriate 
when existing literature does not include enough information to develop the basis for a 
construct. I discuss the specific approaches and sources for construct items below (see 
Measures).  
 Using established guidelines (Singleton & Straits, 1999; Warwick & Lininger, 
1975), I aimed to write items that were clear and concise. I pretested the items for the 
investor survey on one venture capitalist and two angel investors and pretested the items 
for the entrepreneur survey on 6 entrepreneurs. In both cases, I asked the respondents to 




any of the items was unclear and I asked them to identify items that were conceptually 
inconsistent with the constructs they were intended to measure (Hinkin, 1998). Based on 
their feedback, I made modifications to some items and dropped others. Given the small 
sample size, it was necessary to evaluate validity and reliability post-measurement 
(Nardi, 2003) (see below).  
 Participant recruitment. Respondents were recruited through investors, so there 
were two stages of recruiting. I used a snowball sampling approach to recruiting investors 
starting with lists of investors provided by the Zell Lurie Institute at the Ross School of 
Business and the Tucson Angels. I or a representative from Zell Lurie or the Tucson 
Angels sent an email to each of these investors explaining the study and requesting their 
participation (see Appendix F for a sample email). From these investors, I also solicited 
names of other investors or lists of other investors. In the second stage of recruiting, I 
sent emails to entrepreneurs requesting their participation in the survey (see Appendix G 
for a sample email).  
 I used several means to improve response rates. First, most investors sent a pre-
notice email to the entrepreneurs. Pre-notice letters tend to increase response rates 
(Dillman, 2000), perhaps because they increase the salience of the survey when it arrives. 
Also, since the pre-notice letters came from a known associate, the legitimacy and 
sponsorship of the study were highlighted. A sample of the pre-notice email is included 
in Appendix H. Second, the cover-letter email containing the survey was designed in 
accordance with Dillon‘s suggested approach (2000) in that the salutation was 
personalized and the usefulness and importance of respondents‘ participation was 




I sent a follow up reminder to non-respondents approximately two weeks after the initial 
email.  
MEASURES 
Throughout the survey, respondents were asked to report on the venture‘s 
activities in the past 12 months.  In my pretests I found that 12 months was a good time 
frame because it was recent enough that respondents had no difficulty remembering 
activities in that time, but long enough to allow for the possibility of changes to the 
venture and its operations. With a few exceptions (e.g., ‗age‘), all items were measured 
on a 7-point Likert type scale.  
Independent variables 
Performance monitoring was measured using a four-item scale designed to 
assess the extent to which venture teams set and monitored internal guidelines for 
performance. Respondents were asked to indicate how often in the past 12 months 
members of your executive team engaged in the following activities. Response options 
ranged from ―Less than quarterly‖ to ―almost daily‖ on a 7 point scale. The four items 
were ―We compared actual performance data to planned performance goals,‖ ―We 
reviewed the extent to which we were on track to accomplish planned milestones,‖ ―We 
compared actual costs to our expected burn rate (i.e., monthly operating expenses)‖ and 
―We benchmarked our process or offering against competitors.‖  
Environmental scanning was measured using a 7-item scale developed from the 
qualitative data from Study 1 and existing literature on environmental scanning. To 
develop this scale, I first searched the qualitative data for common external sources of 




the environment. As was mentioned in Chapter 3, these were both human sources (e.g., 
industry experts) and archival sources (e.g., websites, ―google-alerts,‖ journals). I then 
reviewed studies in which environmental scanning was measured (e.g., Daft et al., 1988; 
Danneels, 2002; Sutcliffe, 1994) to look for additional sources. Finally, I reviewed the 
list with entrepreneurs during the pre-testing and as a result of their feedback, added an 
additional source (―other entrepreneurs‖) and grouped several internet sources together 
(―weblogs, online communities or web alerts.‖) In addition to these two sources, the final 
list of 7 items included ―customers / potential customers,‖ ―individual industry experts or 
consultants,‖ ―industry associations, trade shows or conferences,‖ ―competitors, their 
websites, publications or offerings,‖ and ―business or trade journals.‖  
There are several methods of rating environmental scanning including frequency 
and interest in scanning different sources (Farh, Hoffman, & Hegarty, 1984; Hambrick, 
1982). Because my theorizing emphasizes scanning to maintain an awareness of a 
frequently changing environment, I used the frequency method (Hambrick, 1982). 
Therefore, respondents were asked to indicate ―how often in the past 12 months members 
of your executive team sought feedback, advice or information from the following 
sources.‖ Response options ranged from ―less than quarterly‖ to ―almost daily.‖  
Experiential learning strategies was measured using a 9-item scale developed 
for this study based on conceptual guidance from innovation and new product 
development literatures.  Recall that my definition of experiential learning strategies is 
―practices which incorporate the regular collection of real-time, real-world data with the 
use of explicit analytical processes to observe, interpret and assimilate those data into 




nature of experiential strategies as described by Eisenhardt and Tabrizi (1995). This 
resulted in three items: ―We had frequent development milestones,‖ ―We conduct tests of our 
technology or offering frequently during the development process,‖ and ―Our development 
process involves creating many, frequent iterations of our technology or offering.‖ However, I 
have suggested that experiential learning strategies are characterized not only by 
frequency and real-world interactions, as emphasized in Eisenhardt and colleagues‘ work 
(Brown & Eisenhardt, 1997; Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000; Eisenhardt & Tabrizi, 1995), but 
also by a very deliberate and analytical approach to learning. Drawing on the studies of 
learning plans in new product development, (Rice et al., 2008; Sykes & Dunham, 1995), I 
included three items to capture the idea of planned learning: ―Before trying something 
new, we discussed the criteria by which we would judge our results,‖ ―We carefully 
evaluated ideas before trying them‖ and ―After trying something new, we always 
carefully analyzed how it went.‖ Drawing on studies of real-time experimentation 
(Nicholls-Nixon et al., 2000; Thomke, 1998), I included two items to capture deliberate 
testing of alternatives: ―We deliberately created experiments to learn more about our 
market or operations‖ and  ―When we were unsure of the right approach, we 
methodically designed ways to test alternatives.‖ Finally, because it was a phrase 
commonly used by several entrepreneurs in my sample to emphasize their analytical 
approach to development, I included the item ―When deciding among different 
approaches or choices, we were very data driven.‖ Respondents were asked to indicate on 
a 7-point scale, the extent to which they engaged in these activities in the past 12 months. 




Improvisation was measured using a 5-item scale adapted from Moorman and Miner 
(1998a) with conceptual guidance from other improvisation scholars (Kamoche, Cunha, & da 
Cunha, 2003; Miner et al., 2001). These  items included: ―Our actions followed a strict plan 
(reverse coded),‖ ―When faced with uncertainty, we tended to jump in and try something,‖ ―We 
didn‘t spend a lot of time reflecting on why we have achieved the outcomes that we have,‖ ―We 
relied on trial-and-error learning, ‖ and ―Moving ahead quickly was often given precedence over 
detailed planning.‖ Respondents were asked to indicate on a 7-point scale, the extent to 
which they engaged in these activities in the past 12 months. Response options ranged 
from ―Not at all‖ to ―To a very great extent.‖ 
Mediating variable 
Certainty was measured using an 8-item scale adapted from scales developed by 
Duncan (1972) and Rice (2008). These scales were designed to assess respondents‘ 
certainty about different components of the internal and external organizational 
environment. The items were: ―We know who will be our target market(s),‖  ―We know 
what suppliers, if any, we will require in order to be successful,‖ ―We are aware of and 
fully understand any existing competitors‘ solutions,‖ ―The scientific/technical 
knowledge underlying our offering is complete and correct,‖ ―We have identified the 
most likely scientific/technical hurdles we will face,‖ ―We know what regulatory/legal 
issues we will need to address,‖ ―Our team has the skills needed to achieve our current 
goals‖ and ―We can get the funding we need.‖ Respondents were asked to indicate on a 
7-point scale, the extent to which they felt certain about these aspects of their venture. 





There were two sources for the dependent variables. First, I asked entrepreneurs 
to report on their overall change to the venture and disruption from that change. In 
addition, I included an index measure of their satisfaction with different aspects of their 
performance. Second, for a subset of the sample (60 respondents), I gathered data from 
an affiliated investor. These data included the investor‘s overall satisfaction with the 
venture‘s performance and an index measuring their satisfaction with different aspects of 
the venture‘s performance. Thus, for the theoretical construct of ―venture performance‖ I 
included three different empirical measures which are labeled ―perceived performance 
(reported by entrepreneurs),‖ ―overall performance (reported by investors),‖ and 
―satisfaction with performance (reported by investors).‖ I describe each of these 
dependent measures below.  
Overall change (reported by entrepreneur) to the venture was measured using 
a 5-item scale developed inductively for this study from the qualitative data. The five 
items included, ―We are moving ahead exactly as we planned (reverse coded),‖ ―We have 
taken this venture in a new direction,‖ ―Our approach to pursuing this venture has 
changed,‖ ―Our overall value proposition has changed‖ and ―We have changed our 
overall vision of the opportunity we are pursuing.‖  Respondents were asked to indicate 
on a 7-point scale, the ―extent to which you agree with the following statements about 
your activities in the past 12 months.‖ Response options ranged from ―Strongly disagree‖ 
to ―Strongly agree.‖ 
Disruptiveness of change (reported by entrepreneur) was measured using a 9-
item scale developed inductively for this study from the qualitative data. The nine items 




(timeliness and disruption to operations). The items included: ―The changes did not 
disrupt our timeline,‖ ―We should have figured out that changes were needed sooner,‖ ―It 
took us/is taking us a long time to implement these changes,‖ ―The need for these 
changes was unexpected,‖ ―We were able to make the changes very easily,‖ ―This change 
resulted/will result in significant changes to our operations,‖ ―These changes disrupted or 
delayed our financing,‖ ―We needed/will need a very different skill set to implement 
these changes‖ and ―These changes caused much disruption.‖ Respondents were given 
the instructions ―Consider the most significant changes you have made in the past 12 
months. Indicate the extent to which you agree with the following statements about those 
changes.‖ Response options ranged from ―Strongly disagree‖ to ―Strongly agree‖ on a 7-
point scale.  
Perceived performance (reported by entrepreneur) was measured using an 8-
item index of performance. In the early stages of a venture, financial criteria are generally 
poor indicators of performance since many firms have few if any sales and tend to be 
using rather than creating capital. Therefore, respondents were asked to rate their 
satisfaction with five aspects of performance (product development, market development, 
personnel development, efficient use of resources, harvest/exit readiness) drawn from 
Higashide & Birley‘s (2002) scale for non-financial performance criteria, which itself 
was modified from Sapienza (1992). The remaining three items (research/technical 
problem solving, investors‘ confidence, achieving milestones and goals) were developed 
from the qualitative study to include criteria more specific to the early stages of a start-
up. Respondents were instructed: ―Given where you are in the new venture process, how 




criteria].‖ Response options ranged from ―Very dissatisfied‖ to ―Very satisfied‖ on a 7-
point scale. 
Overall performance (reported by investor) was measured using a two-item 
scale developed for this study.  In an effort to control for the performance variance that 
naturally arises from ventures being at different stages of their development (i.e., very 
early start-ups vs. more mature startups) or on different types of growth paths (i.e., very 
high-growth potential vs. more modest-growth potential), investors were asked to rate the 
target venture with respect to the venture stage and their own expectations. The two items 
in this measure were: ―Compared to all the companies you have invested in, how 
successful would you say this venture is at this stage of development‖ (response options 
ranged from ―much less successful‖ to ―far more successful‖) and ―Compared to your 
initial expectations for this venture (when you first invested), how well has it done so far 
overall?‖ (response options ranged from ―fell far below expectations‖ to ―far exceeded 
expectations‖). Response options ranged along a 7-point scale.  
Satisfaction with performance (reported by investor) was measured using a 
10-item index of non-financial performance criteria. Five of the items were identical to 
items from the entrepreneurs‘ performance index (product development, market 
development, efficient use of resources, achieving milestones and goals, 
research/technical problem solving). The remaining five were developed for this study to 
capture elements of managing uncertainty (ability to manage unexpected events, ability to 
learn from feedback and experience, ability to avoid or prevent surprises, ability to adapt 




how satisfied they were with the venture‘s performance on each of these criteria. Response 
options ranged from ―Extremely dissatisfied‖ to ―Extremely satisfied‖ on a 7-point scale. 
Control variables 
Industry. Respondents were asked to indicate their primary industry choosing 
from the following list: Pharmaceuticals and medicine, Computer & Internet software, 
Medical devices, Finance & Insurance, Manufacturing, Professional, scientific or 
technical services, Computer hardware or electronics, Other (Please Specify). After all 
the data were collected, I analyzed the ―other‖ answers and assigned them to categories if 
sufficient information was available. In the analyses for hypothesis testing, I eliminated 
any ventures that were non-technical and then dichotomized the data so that respondents 
were categorized as medical (pharmaceuticals and medicine, medical devices) vs. other 
technical. I chose these categories because firms involved in medical industries, including 
medical devices, are more highly regulated than other types of firms. For example, they 
must get FDA approval and meet stringent Medicare reimbursement guidelines 
(Chatterji, 2009; Radinsky, 2004). Although all the firms in my final sample were 
technology-based and involved in dynamic and uncertain industries, regulated firms may 
be less able to engage in some of the more flexible shaping processes I‘ve discussed.  
Sources of funding. Respondents were asked to indicate the nature and extent of 
external funding they had received. According to Timmons…. Respondents were asked 
to indicate how many, if any, rounds of external funding they had received from 
Institutional Investors (e.g., VCs), Angel Investors, Grants, Bank Financing, 
Friends/family not included in other categories and Other sources (respondents were 




‗hands-on‘ involvement in shaping the venture than would other types of investors (e.g., 
banks) (Barry, 1994; Busenitz, Fiet, & Moesel, 2004; Hellmann & Puri, 2000), I 
controlled for this potential limitation to shaping process by dichotomizing the data so 
that respondents were categorized as having received VC or Angel funding or not. 
Total external capital. Respondents were also asked to indicate how much total 
external capital had been invested in the venture to date. Responses included 0, < $50K, 
$51-100K, $101K-250K, $251K - 500K, $501K - 750K, $751 - $1Million, > $1Million 
and <$3Million, > $3 and < $5Million, >$5Million and < $10 Million, > $10 Million and 
< $50Million, and > $50 Million.  
Age of firm. Respondents were asked to indicate in what year the venture was 
incorporated and age was calculated based on this year.  
Geographic location. Respondents were asked to choose the U.S. state in which 
their headquarters were located (or ―Outside U.S.‖). Any firms located outside the U.S. 
were dropped from the sample. I then categorized the data into Northeast, Southeast, 
Midwest, Southwest, and West.  
Size of executive team. Respondents were asked to indicate how many people 
(including themselves) were on the executive management team. Based on feedback from 
the pretest, the executive team was defined as ―individuals who are officers OR 
individuals who both own an equity stake in the venture and are actively involved in its 
strategic management.‖  
Age of respondent. Respondents were asked to indicate their age in years. 




Respondent’s title. Respondents were asked to indicate their current title. The 
choices provided were: Board Member, CEO, President, Other C-Suite Officer (please 
specify), Vice President or Sr. Vice President, Other. For hypotheses testing, the 
responses were dichotomized into two categories CEO/President or Other.  
 Screening 
To make sure that firms had not exited, respondents were asked to indicate if their 
firm had existed in any of the following ways: closed down, sold to another firm, IPO or 
other (please specify). Two ventures had been sold, one had had an IPO and 2 had other 
kinds of exits. These were all dropped from the sample. Respondents were asked if they 
were members of the executive management team (using the same definition of executive 
management team as above). Two respondents were not and these were dropped from the 
sample. In three cases I received surveys from more than one member of a venture. In 
these cases I dropped the survey from the lower ranking team member. 
In addition, 12 cases were dropped because the firms represented were more than 
10 years old. Thirteen cases were dropped because the firms were not technology-based. 
Three firms were dropped because they were not headquartered in the United States. This 




I began the analysis by checking for missing data. I then assessed the reliability of 
the scales using Cronbach‘s alpha and exploratory factor analysis (EFA). Cronbach‘s 
alpha assumes a unidimensional factor structure. Exploratory factor analysis is used to 
                                                     
13
 Several of the cases were dropped for multiple reasons (e.g., not technology-based and more than 10 
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determine if this assumption is valid or if a multidimensional structure better fits the data. 
I used principal axis factoring (PAF) because many of my scales have not been validated. 
Under these circumstances PAF is the appropriate approach because the researcher 
cannot assume that all of the variance of a measure is explained by the factors that 
emerge (Russell, 2003; Widaman, 1993). Since this study, as with most social science 
research, involves constructs that are unlikely to be truly orthogonal, it was appropriate to 
use an oblique rotation which allows factors to be correlated (Conway & Huffcutt, 2003). 
I used Promax rotation. I used hierarchical regression to test the hypotheses.  
RESULTS 
System-missing data and items in which respondents selected ―not applicable‖ 
were coded as missing for hypothesis testing. There was almost no missing data for the 
control variables. Age of respondent and age of firm were each missing one response. 
Performance monitoring, certainty, overall change and change effects had no missing 
data because these were required questions. Environmental scanning, experiential 
learning strategies, improvisation and satisfaction with performance all had less than 5% 
missing data. In the investor surveys, overall satisfaction with performance had no 
missing data and the performance index had less than 1% missing data. Having reviewed 
the pattern of missing data, I decided not to impute values. Imputing values can be risky 
in any case and given how little data was missing it did not seem necessary.  
I sent the survey to 424 entrepreneurs and received 179 completed surveys. This 
represents a 42% response rate which is much higher than the 27% average for surveys in 
entrepreneurship (Bartholomew & Smith, 2006).  However, the response rate varied 




completed representing an 84% response rate. The remaining 319 were sent through 
incubators. Of these 92 were completed, representing a response rate of 29%. I sent the 
investor survey to 22 investors and received 90 completed surveys from 20 investors. Not 
all investor surveys were matched with completed entrepreneurial surveys (i.e., some 
investors filled out surveys about ventures from whom I was never able to get an 
entrepreneur survey and vice versa). There were a total of 73 matches prior to screening. 
After dropping responses as described above, I was left with a sample of 139 surveys 
from entrepreneurs and 59 matching investor surveys.   
Because this was an online survey, the only information available about non-
responders was their email address and (in some cases) their name and the name of the 
venture. Thus, very little can be analyzed about non-responders.  
Reliability: Independent variables 
Performance Monitoring. The four items used to measure monitoring were correlated 
(ranging from .35 to .77). An exploratory factor analysis (using principal axis factoring and 
promax rotation) indicated that there is indeed one factor (eigenvalue 2.54) which explains 
63.5%. The factor loadings ranged from .46 to .87. The alpha for the scale was .79. However, the 
―Benchmarking‖ item had the lowest correlation and factor loading and dropping it created an 
alpha of .84.  An exploratory factor analysis of the three remaining items had an eignenvalue of 
2.27 which explained 75.7% of the variance. These results support the reliability of the 3-item 
performance monitoring scale. Therefore, for hypothesis testing, I dropped the benchmarking 
item and used the three-item measure of performance monitoring.   
 Environmental Scanning. The seven item scale used to measure environmental 
scanning was designed as an index of different sources for information and advice. As 




and in general they were not. For example, entrepreneurs may value other entrepreneurs 
as sources of insight and advice about the process of developing a new venture (Buttner, 
1993) and use journals and websites for industry data. My hypothesis suggests that those 
entrepreneurs who do make use of multiple sources are likely to benefit, but since the 
motivations underlying these behaviors can be quite different, there is no reason to 
believe entrepreneurs who use more of one, will also use more of the others. The data 
reflected this in that correlations were moderate to non-existent. Of these, the strongest 
correlations (.35 - .48) were between business or trade journals and industry associations, 
competitor sources, and websites. The alpha for all seven items was .71.  
Experiential Learning Strategies.  The 9 items used to measure experiential learning 
strategies were all correlated except for the item, ―Our development process involves creating 
many, frequent iterations of our technology or offering‖ which had low to no correlation with the 
other items. The remaining correlations ranged from .29 to .59 but most were above .40. An 
exploratory factor analysis (using principal axis factoring and promax rotation) of the 
remaining 8 items indicated that there is indeed one factor with an eigenvalue of 4.15 which 
explains 51.9% of the variance. Factor loadings ranged from .55 to .75.  The alpha for the 8-item 
scale was .86. These results support the reliability of the scale. Therefore, for hypothesis testing, I 
used the 8-item measure of experiential learning strategies. 
Improvisation. The five items used to measure improvisation were moderately 
correlated except for the item ―We didn‘t spend a lot of time reflecting on why we have 
achieved the outcomes that we have.‖  The remaining correlations ranged from .25 to .53. An 
exploratory factor analysis (using principal axis factoring and promax rotation) of the 
remaining 4 items indicated that there is indeed one factor, however the factor loading for the 




Cronbach‘s alpha indicated the scale was stronger without it. After dropping these two items, an 
exploratory factor analysis (using principal axis factoring and promax rotation) of the 
three remaining items indicated that there is still one factor with an eigenvalue of 1.93 which 
explains 64.5% of the variance. Factor loadings ranged from .58 to .89.  The alpha for the three-
item scale was .72. Since this indicates good reliability, for hypothesis testing I used the three-
item improvisation scale.  
Reliability: Mediating variable 
Certainty. The 8 items used to measure certainty about the internal and external 
environment were all moderately correlated except for the item, ―We can get the funding we 
need‖ which had low to no correlation with the other items. The remaining correlations ranged 
from .20 to .66 but most were above .35. An exploratory factor analysis (using principal axis 
factoring and promax rotation) of the remaining 7 items indicated that there is indeed one 
factor with an eigenvalue of 3.20 which explains 45.8% of the variance. Factor loadings ranged 
from .46 to .70.  The alpha for the 8-item scale was .80. These results support the reliability of the 
scale. Therefore, for hypothesis testing, I used the 7-item measure of certainty. 
Reliability: Dependent variables 
Overall change (reported by entrepreneur). The five items used to measure 
overall change in the venture were moderately correlated with correlations ranging from 
.28 to .73, but most were above .50. An exploratory factor analysis (using principal axis 
factoring and promax rotation) indicated that there is indeed one factor with an eigenvalue of 
3.20 which explains 64.0% of the variance. Factor loadings ranged from .48 to .85.  The alpha for 
scale was .86. These results support the reliability of the scale. 
Disruptiveness of change (reported by entrepreneur). The nine items used to 




correlations ranging from .18 to .48, but most were above .35. An exploratory factor 
analysis (using principal axis factoring and promax rotation) indicated that there is indeed 
one factor with an eigenvalue of 3.73 which explains 41.4% of the variance. Factor loadings 
ranged from .48 to .75.  The alpha for scale was .82. These results support the reliability of the 
scale. 
Perceived performance (reported by entrepreneur).  Entrepreneurs‘ 
satisfaction with their own performance was measured using an index of eight items. 
These items were meant to capture performance along a variety of dimension and 
therefore correlations were not expected to be high, which was the case. The items were 
all weakly to moderately correlated, with the exception of two pair-wise correlations 
between research/technical problem-solving and market readiness and research/technical 
problem-solving and investor confidence. The remaining correlations ranged from .19 to 
.54 but most were above .30. Although it was not anticipated that there would be a single 
underlying factor, an exploratory factor analysis (using principal axis factoring and 
promax rotation) supported a single-factor solution, with an eigenvalue of 3.32 which 
explains 41.5% of the variance. Factor loadings ranged from .42 to .67.  The alpha for scale was 
.80. These results support the reliability of the scale. 
Overall performance (reported by investor).  Because only two items were 
used to measure investor‘s satisfaction with venture performance, it is appropriate to use 
correlation as a measure of reliability. The two items were highly correlated (.87) which 
suggests good reliability for the scale.  
Satisfaction with Performance (reported by investor). Investor‘s satisfaction 
with the venture‘s performance was measured using an index of ten items. These items 




correlations were not expected to be high. As it turned out, they were quite strongly 
correlated. Although correlations ranged from .30 to .80, most were above .45. Although 
it was not anticipated that there would be a single underlying factor, an exploratory factor 
analysis (using principal axis factoring and promax rotation) supported a single-factor 
solution, with an eigenvalue of 5.71 which explains 57.1% of the variance. Factor loadings 
ranged from .53 to .90.  The alpha for scale was .91. These results support the reliability of the 
scale. 
Tests for discriminant validity 
 I conducted several exploratory factor analyses to determine if conceptually related 
constructs were empirically independent. First, I assessed the discriminant validity of 
performance monitoring and environmental scanning since both of these reflect attempts to build 
environmental awareness. Although I view environmental scanning as an index, rather than a 
scale, it is still important to determine whether or not the behaviors included are conceptually 
distinct from those of performance monitoring. An exploratory factor analysis (using 
principal axis factoring and promax rotation) resulted in a three-factor solution explaining 
61.9% of the variance. The first factor, with an eigenvalue of 2.94 loaded the 
performance monitoring items with factor loadings from .64 to .88. The second factor, 
with an eigenvalue of 1.99 loaded four of the environmental scanning items (―Individual 
industry experts or consultants,‖ ―Industry associations, trade shows or conferences,‖ 
―Other entrepreneurs‖ and ―Customers / potential customers.‖) Factor loadings ranged 
from .43 to .69. The third factor, with an eigenvalue of 1.26 loaded the remaining 
environmental scanning items (―Weblogs, online communities or web alerts,‖ 
―Competitors, their websites, publications or offerings‖ and ―Business or trade journals.‖) 




distinct from environmental scanning, but that there are two different approaches to 
environmental scanning. The first appears to reflect an emphasis on sources that are close 
to the venture‘s specific market or industry, whereas the second are more general or distal 
sources of information. The two environmental scanning items were moderately 
correlated (.486) but the neither was strongly correlated with performance monitoring 
(correlations were .11 and .26). Because the 7 items of environmental scanning are 
correlated with each other and conceptually and empirically distinct from those of 
performance monitoring, for the purposes of hypothesis testing, I retained all 7 items of 
environmental scanning as a single index. However, in the discussion section of this 
chapter I conduct a post hoc analysis to obtain a more fine-grained understanding of how 
these two different approaches to environmental scanning may affect the proposed model.  
I next assessed the discriminant validity of experiential learning strategies and 
improvisation since they both pertain to organizing in real-time. An exploratory factor analysis 
(using principal axis factoring and promax rotation) resulted in a two-factor solution 
explaining 58.1% of the variance. The first factor, with an eigenvalue of 3.97 loaded the 
experiential learning strategies items with factor loadings from .58 to .74. The second 
factor, with an eigenvalue of 1.84 loaded the improvisation items with factor loadings 
from .59 to .90.  These results suggest that experiential learning strategies and 
improvisation are indeed distinct factors. Moreover, the factor correlation matrix suggests 
that they are not highly correlated (-.288).
14
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 Although the four behaviors are not conceptually similar, I did conduct an exploratory factor analysis of 
all four variables as well, in case there were similarities I had not considered. The EFA came out precisely 
the same way as the two separate EFAs. Performance monitoring, two approaches to environmental 




 Finally, I assessed the discriminant validity of overall change to the venture and 
disruptiveness of change since they both pertain to change efforts. An exploratory factor 
analysis (using principal axis factoring and promax rotation) supported a two-factor 
solution explaining 50.5% of the variance.  The first factor, with an eigenvalue of 5.29 
loaded the disruptiveness of change items and one item from overall change (―we are 
moving ahead exactly as planned (reverse coded)‖) with factor loadings from .37 to .83. 
The second factor, with an eigenvalue of 1.78 loaded all the overall change items with 
factor loadings from .28 to .86. The factor correlation matrix suggests the two factors are 
moderately correlated (.54). These results suggest that overall change and disruption from 
change are indeed distinct factors however, because they are correlated and one item 
cross-loaded, for hypothesis testing I did not use both variables in any one regression.  
Descriptive statistics 
Table 5.1 contains the means, standard deviations, and reliabilities (Cronbach‘s 
alpha) for the variables created from the survey. I concluded, based on my analysis of the 
means, standard deviations and histograms that these data had sufficient variance for 
analysis and were approximately multivariate normal.  
Several observations about the descriptive data are noteworthy. Most of the firms 
(73%) had received venture capital or angel funding. This finding is not surprising given 
my sampling strategy which drew much of the sample directly from venture capitalists 
and angel investors (though not all had invested in the firms they provided). The figure 
listed for total external capital refers to a scale not a total amount of funding. On average, 
respondents reported obtaining between $500K and $1Million from external sources. The 




approximately 24% received between $1M and $5M, approximately 13% received 
between $5M and $10M and the remaining approximately 21% received over $10M. The 
age of the firms ranged from less than 1 year to 10 years with an average of 4.76 years. 
The size of the executive team ranged from 1 to 11 with an average of 3.79. The vast 
majority of the respondents (93%) were male which is consistent with the field 






Table 5.1 Means, standard deviations and reliabilities for survey variables 





Performance Monitoring 139 4.47 1.34 0.84 
Environmental Scanning 139 3.48 1.06 0.71 
Experiential Learning Strategies 138 5.22 1.05 0.86 
Improvisation 139 4.53 1.45 0.72 
Certainty 139 5.75 0.78 0.80 
Overall Change  139 3.77 1.55 0.86 
Disruptiveness of Change 139 3.58 1.12 0.82 
Perceived performance (reported by 
entrepreneurs) 
139 5.12 0.99 0.80 
Overall Performance (reported by investors) 59 4.17 1.61 0.87 
Satisfaction with performance (reported by 
investors 
59 5.08 1.17 0.91 
Industry (1 = medical, 0 = other) 139 0.36 0.48  
Received VC or Angel funding (1 = yes, 0 = 
no)  
139 0.73 0.45  
Total external capital 139 6.37 3.22  
Age of firm  138 4.76 2.57  
Size of executive team 139 3.79 1.84  
Age of respondent 138 48.75 9.96  
Gender of respondent 139 0.93 0.26  
CEO or President (1=yes, 0=no) 139 0.81 0.40  
Location Midwest (1=yes, 0=no) 139 0.54 0.50  
Location Northeast  (1=yes, 0=no) 139 0.11 0.31  
Location Southwest  (1=yes, 0=no) 139 0.12 0.33  
Location West  (1=yes, 0=no) 139 0.20 0.40  
Location Southeast  (1=yes, 0=no) 139 0.03 0.17  
 
Another pattern of note is that on average, respondents did not report that their 
ventures had undergone large amounts of change or disruption from change (although 
this varied quite a bit). It may be that change is not as common as I suggest. However, 
another possibility is that entrepreneurs are so accustomed to change as a normal part of 
the venturing process that their responses are anchored in an already highly dynamic 
context. Thus, relative to what they perceive as the ‗norm‘ they have experienced only 




is not as important as the variance in that change and change disruption, which is 
significant.   
In the scales used for performance monitoring and environmental scanning, ―4‖ 
represents a frequency of once/month. Thus respondents reported that on average they 
engaged in performance monitoring a little more often than once/month and on average 
engaged in environmental scanning a little less often than once/month. 
Another pattern of note is that on average, respondents tended to be more 
analytical (use experiential learning strategies) than improvisational. This is somewhat 
counter to the popular notion of entrepreneurs as being highly improvisational, intuitive, 
and risk-taking (Shane, 2008). Rather, on average, they appear to engage more in very 
deliberate, systematic approaches to managing the uncertainties they face. This may also 
explain why, on average, they feel quite certain about their venture environment.  
Finally, it is risky to compare the investors‘ ratings of performance with the 
entrepreneurs‘ ratings of performance in this table since the former is based on only 59 
cases and the latter represents the average for all 139 entrepreneurs. That said, while 
investors appear to be slightly less pleased with performance than entrepreneurs, overall 
they are more pleased than not.  
I also grouped the data into the 59 cases for whom I was able to collect 
performance data from investors and the 80 cases that did not include investor data and 
compared their means on the independent, mediating and dependent variables. The only 
variable that differed significantly was performance monitoring. Investor-evaluated 
entrepreneurs tended to engage in slightly more performance monitoring (m=4.8) than 




the fact that all of the investor-rated entrepreneurs were involved with venture capitalists 
or angels whereas some of the other entrepreneurs were not. In other words, 
entrepreneurs who are externally funded are likely to have more stringent performance 
monitoring requirements and thus engage in monitoring more often.  
Table 5.2 contains the correlation matrix of all variables.  Most correlations are quite 
low with a few exceptions. Investor‘s overall ratings of performance and their satisfaction with 
performance are highly correlated (.696) which is to be expected since they are essentially two 
measures of the same thing (venture performance). Overall change to the venture and 
disruptiveness of change are moderately correlated (.526) which is in line with my theorizing. 
Organizations that experience a great deal of change are more likely to be disrupted by that 
change. Interestingly, entrepreneurs‘ perceived performance is negatively correlated with 
disruption from change (-.474) but less so with overall change (-.273) which also supports the 
idea that while change can be detrimental to performance, it is the disruption that arises from it 
that is most problematic.  Finally, investors overall performance ratings for ventures are 
negatively associated with change (-.328) and disruptiveness from change (-.274) suggesting that 



























Environmental Scanning .229**         
Experiential Learning 
Strategies 
.248** .069        
Improvisation .012 .067 -.196*       
Certainty .076 -.014 .256** -.294**      
Overall Change -.275** .034 -.252** .121 -.201*     
Disruptiveness of 
Change 
-.190* -.067 -.296** .128 -.311** .526**    
Perceived Performance 
(Ent‘s) 
.231** .259** .424** -.093 .322** -.283** -.474**   
Overall Performance 
(Investors) 
-.045 .061 .035 .118 .092 -.328* -.274* .362**  
Satisfaction with 
Performance (Investors) 
-.343** -.160 -.101 .003 .084 -.243 -.332* .161 .696** 
Industry .049 -.028 .219** -.198* -.116 -.090 -.027 .053 .010 
VC/Angel funding  .234** .010 -.035 .146 -.081 -.017 .030 .074 .196 
External Capital .198* .037 .086 .044 -.137 -.177* -.044 .053 .254 
Age of firm  .096 .028 -.074 .032 .087 .116 .140 -.218* -.085 
Exec Team Size (log) .207* .118 .037 -.062 .121 .045 -.073 .156 .180 
Age of Respondent .044 -.090 .223** -.235** .188* -.128 -.180* .066 .090 
Gender .007 -.198* .041 .044 -.038 .028 -.040 .029 -.096 
CEO or President .180* .245** .089 -.010 .211* -.039 -.042 .200* -.182 
Midwest -.233** -.140 -.010 .028 -.086 -.070 .076 -.184* -.085 
Northeast .093 -.003 .034 -.170* .026 .060 .061 .001 -.071 
Southwest .012 .003 -.025 -.045 -.034 .057 -.015 .010 .025 
West .196* .175* .026 .069 .079 .006 -.118 .171* -.001 





























Industry .040         
VC/Angel funding  .242 .023        
External Capital .184 .165 .484**       
Age of firm  -.086 -.012 .158 .242**      
Exec Team Size (log) -.191 .015 .187* .369** .211*     
Age of Respondent .098 .364** .033 .074 .100 .122    
Gender .059 -.023 .017 -.037 -.151 .018 .041   
CEO or President -.039 -.087 .107 .063 .040 -.075 .021 .004  
Midwest .237 .121 -.178* -.239** -.125 -.455** .001 .022 .021 
Northeast -.198 -.019 .161 .270** .060 .191* .016 .097 -.064 
Southwest -.050 .086 -.116 -.112 -.063 -.010 .114 -.151 -.150 
West -.157 -.190* .147 .137 .125 .364** -.135 .001 .156 
Southeast .132 -.039 .106 .101 .084 .149 .061 .048 -.024 
 
Table 5.2 Continued 
 Midwest Northeast Southwest West 
Northeast -.377**    
Southwest -.404** -.130   
West -.544** -.175* -.187*  
Southeast -.186* -.060 -.064 -.086 




Hypothesis testing: hierarchical regressions 
I began by conducting regressions of the independent, mediating and dependent 
variables on the control variables.  Table 5.3 presents these results. Being in a medical 
industry positively predicted the use of experiential learning strategies. There are three 
possible reasons for this. First, many of the entrepreneurs who go into the medical 
industries are scientists and therefore familiar with and accustomed to using more 
analytical methodologies for research and development. Second, and related, ventures in 
the medical industries are often research and development oriented, for example, many 
are started for the purpose of developing and commercializing inventions arising from 
basic research. Development efforts therefore are an offshoot of research efforts, with the 
corresponding emphasis on empirical approaches to learning. Finally, because these 
industries are regulated, entrepreneurs are required to more closely track and measure 
their development efforts.  
 Ventures that had received VC or Angel funding tended to have higher 
performance ratings from investors. This finding is likely an artifact of the sampling 
strategy. Investors were only rating ventures that had received funding. In theory, 
however, there may be other explanations. First, there may be some reverse causality at 
play. Angels and VCs tend to invest in better performing ventures. However, the reverse 
argument can also be made. Ventures who receive funding from VCs and Angels acquire 
additional benefits that contribute to their ability to perform well. For example, VCs and 
Angels provide access to expertise, network connections and of course, capital. It is 




entrepreneurs‘ own ratings of performance, which suggests another possible explanation 
for the relationship between funding and VC‘s performance ratings – cognitive 
dissonance. VCs were rating firms in which they had invested and might conceivably be 
overly optimistic about the performance of those firms.  
 External capital negatively predicted certainty and overall change. The effect on 
certainty is so small as to be possibly meaningless. However, it was interesting to note 
that several of the respondents in my sample commented on the pressure of receiving 
money from investors and the great responsibility it implied. It is conceivable that as 
entrepreneurs receive more money, they become less cocky and more careful about the 
certainty of their ventures. The relationship between external capital and change is more 
easily explained, though as with VC funding, the causality likely runs both ways. 
Investors tend to invest in stages. As ventures develop and pass certain milestones, 
investors are willing to put in more capital. Thus, as ventures become more stable, they 
are also likely to attract more investments. On the other hand, more capital implies more 
slack resources. My qualitative data suggested that entrepreneurs often made changes 
when they faced unexpected events. In those cases, they often had to redirect their limited 
resources in order to respond and adapt. For example, when a partnership failed, one 
respondent had to make up the resources internally and as a result had to shut down 
development on a new product line. He simply ran out of money and had to choose 
between the two projects. Higher levels of funding may make such choices unnecessary, 
allowing entrepreneurs the ability to ride out some of the ups and downs of changing 




 The age of the firm positively predicted overall change and disruption from 
change and negatively predicted performance. Age of firm may predict overall change for 
a couple reasons. First, it may be that in the early stages, ventures have not yet committed 
enough to a particular direction for change to be very salient. As they get older, it 
becomes clearer what was planned versus what is happening. Also, as I suggested in my 
theorizing, the longer firms wait to make changes, the bigger those changes tend to be. 
Small tweaks in strategy or partnerships early on may prevent the need for large changes 
later. The relationship between age of firm and disruptiveness of change emerges directly 
from this line of reasoning. As firms develop, they invest resources in a particular 
direction or strategy. If that direction is changed early on, it may cause little disruption, 
but the older the firm, the more disruption is likely to result from change efforts
15
. 
Finally, it is difficult to say from this regression if age of firm is responsible for the lower 
performance ratings or whether change is the common underlying factor causing both 
disruption and poorer perceived performance. However, a direct reason that age of firm 
may predict poorer performance arises from the statistics of new ventures. Most fail. The 
older the firm is, the closer its founders may be to realizing that it is not going to succeed. 
As firms get closer to that 10-year cut off, many founders may be realizing that their 
initial optimism was not well founded.  
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 Please recall that the measure for ‗disruptiveness of change‘ asked respondents to report on changes 
made in the past year and how disruptive those changes were. In other words, this is not a cumulative 
measure (e.g., older firms have had more time to accumulate disruptions). Rather, it is a measure of how 
disruptive were changes made in the past year.  For older firms, changes were more disruptive than they 




 The age of the respondent positively predicted experiential learning strategies 
(albeit in a tiny way) and negatively predicted improvisation. This may suggest that 
mature entrepreneurs are more likely than young ones to lead their venture in more 
systematic and analytical ways, perhaps as a result of previous experience. Age of 
respondent also positively predicted certainty and investors‘ satisfaction with 
performance and negatively predicted disruptiveness of change. All of these may indicate 
the tendency of more mature entrepreneurs to perform better as leaders.  
 Gender negatively predicted environmental scanning, indicating that women-led 
ventures engage in more scanning than male-led ventures. However, given how few 
women were in the sample, I would be cautious about generalizing this.  
 Being the CEO or President (as opposed to another member of the top 
management team) positively predicted performance monitoring and environmental 
scanning. Recall that the questions refer to the team behaviors not personal behaviors so 
this finding indicates that respondents who were CEOs or Presidents viewed their 
ventures as engaging in more monitoring type behaviors than respondents who were not 
CEOs or Presidents. Top managers may simply be more aware of the kind of monitoring 
behavior going on. It is also possible that they, themselves, engage in more of this 
behavior and thus perceive the overall level of monitoring as being higher. Being the 
CEO or President also positively predicted certainty which may reflect the fact that top 
managers likely have a better understanding of the overall venture than other individuals. 




entrepreneur) which may simply be an indication of greater pride and investment in the 
venture.  
 Finally, ventures located in the northeast were less likely to engage in 
improvisational behaviors. This may be an artifact of the small sample size, reflecting a 
random decrease in improvisation in the few New England ventures in my sample. It is 
also conceivable that the New England culture is less congenial to improvisational 
approaches.  Control variables that were significant in predicting at least one variable were kept 













Strategies Improvisation Certainty 
(Constant) 3.16** 4.25** 3.80** 6.71** 5.26** 
 (1.12) (.88) (.89) 6.71 (.63) 
Industry .27 .13 .40* -.43 -.22 
 (.26) (.21) (.21) (.28) (.15) 
VC or Angel 
Funding 
.48 -.07 -.25 .50 -.12 
 (.29) (.23) (.23) (.31) (.17) 
External Capital .00 -.02 .03 .03 -.06* 
 (.04) (.04) (.04) (.05) (.03) 
Age of Firm .01 -.01 -.05 .02 .02 
 (.05) (.04) (.04) (.05) (.03) 
Size of Team (log) .64 .60 -.05 -.56 .54 
 (.64) (.50) (.50) (.68) (.36) 
Age of Respondent .00 -.01 .02* -.03* .02** 
 (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) 
Gender .03 -.89* .14 .36 -.24 
 (.46) (.37) (.37) (.50) (.26) 
CEO or President .60* .71* .24 -.20 .44** 
 (.29) (.23) (.23) (.31) (.17) 
Midwest -.21 -.21 .17 -1.12 -.41 
 (.70) (.55) (.55) (.75) (.40) 
Northeast .22 .01 .34 -2.07* -.17 
 (.74) (.58) (.58) (.79) (.42) 
Southwest .22 -.03 .04 -1.10 -.46 
 (.76) (.60) (.60) (.81) (.43) 
West .37 .13 .46 -1.14 -.33 
  (.71) (.56) (.56) (.76) (.40) 
R-square .146 .147 .122 .165 .184 
Adj r-square .063 .065 .036 .084 .105 
F-values 1.767 1.787 1.421 2.045* 2.330** 
Sample size 137 
137 136 137 137 
Unstandardized regression coefficients are shown with standard errors in parentheses 






















(Constant) 4.67** 4.47** 5.41** 3.15 2.81 
 (1.30) (.96) (.80) (2.19) (1.56) 
Industry -.09 .08 .19 .14 .05 
 (.31) (.23) (.19) (.47) (.33) 
VC or Angel 
Funding 
.26 .20 .09 3.76** 2.41* 
 (.34) (.25) (.21) (1.43) (1.02) 
External Capital -.13* -.04 -.01 .12 .13 
 (.05) (.04) (.03) (.09) (.07) 
Age of Firm .12* .09* -.11** -.14 -.06 
 (.05) (.04) (.03) (.08) (.06) 
Size of Team (log) -.19 -.07 .59 .55 -1.71 
 (.74) (.54) (.46) (1.33) (.95) 
Age of Respondent -.02 -.03* .01 .03 .04* 
 (.01) (.01) (.01) (.03) (.02) 
Gender .21 -.08 -.09 -1.81 -.67 
 (.54) (.40) (.33) (1.08) (.77) 
CEO or President -.09 -.06 .54** -2.08 -.90 
 (.34) (.25) (.21) (1.13) (.81) 
Midwest .03 .22 -.89 -.79 -.33 
 (.82) (.60) (.50) (.94) (.67) 
Northeast .66 .37 -.69 -1.47 -1.34 
 (.86) (.63) (.53) (1.03) (.74) 
Southwest .50 .19 -.70 -1.00 -.72 
 (.88) (.65) (.54) (1.13) (.80) 
West .05 -.22 -.42 -.83 -.40 
  (.82) (.61) (.51) (.89) (.63) 
R-square .109 .099 .187 .299 .323 
Adj r-square .023 .012 .109 .116 .147 
F-values 1.267 1.138 2.383** 1.634 1.831 
Sample size 
137 137 137 59 59 
Unstandardized regression coefficients are shown with standard errors in parentheses 





Hypotheses 1 – 9 concerned the effects of performance monitoring, environmental 
scanning, and experiential learning on overall change to the venture, disruptiveness of change and 
venture performance. Hypotheses 10-12 concerned the mediating effects of certainty on the 
relationship between experiential learning and overall change to the venture, disruptiveness of 
change and venture performance. Hypothesis 13 concerned the effects of improvisation on 
performance. Please see Table. 5.4 for a summary of the Hypotheses.  
Table 5.4 Summary of hypotheses 
Hypothesis 1: More frequent use of performance monitoring will be associated 
with smaller overall change in the venture. 
Hypothesis 2:  More frequent use of performance monitoring will be associated 
with less disruption from change.  
Hypothesis 3:  More frequent use of performance monitoring will be associated 
with higher levels of performance. 
Hypothesis 4:  Higher levels of environmental scanning will be associated with 
smaller overall change in the venture.  
Hypothesis 5:  Higher levels of environmental scanning will be associated with less 
disruption from change. 
Hypothesis 6:  Higher levels of environmental scanning will be associated with 
higher levels of performance.  
Hypothesis 7:  More frequent use of experiential learning strategies will be 
associated with smaller overall change in the venture. 
Hypothesis 8:  More frequent use of experiential learning strategies will be 
associated with less disruption from change.  
Hypothesis 9:  More frequent use of experiential learning strategies will be 
associated with higher levels of performance.  
Hypothesis 10:  The relationship between experiential learning strategies and overall 
change in the venture will be mediated by certainty about the 
organizational environment.  
Hypothesis 11:  The relationship between experiential learning strategies and 
disruption from change will be mediated by certainty about the 
organizational environment.  
Hypothesis 12:  The relationship between experiential learning strategies and levels 
of performance will be mediated by certainty about the 
organizational environment.  
Hypothesis 13:  More frequent use of improvisational approaches will be associated 





 Hypotheses 1 – 9 were tested through a series of regressions. In the first model, I 
regressed each of the dependent variables (overall change, disruptiveness of change, 
perceived performance, overall performance (rated by investors) and satisfaction with 
performance (rated by investors)) on the controls. In the second model, I added 
Performance Monitoring. In the third model, I replaced Performance Monitoring with 
Environmental Scanning. In the fourth model, I replace Environmental Scanning with 
Experiential Learning Strategies. The fifth model included the controls and all three 
practices. Please see Table 5.5.  
The investor data are not strictly independent since each investor provided 
performance data for multiple entrepreneurs. To evaluate how this might affect the 
outcomes, I conducted ANOVA tests of overall performance and satisfaction with 
performance (the two investor rated variables). The between group variance for overall 
performance was not statistically different from the within group variance, which 
suggests that these data can be treated as independent. There was a small group effect for 
satisfaction with performance (F=1.928, p<.05). Therefore, in all hypotheses involving 
satisfaction with performance (including post hoc tests), I repeated the analyses using a 
mixed model including a random effect for investor grouping. In all cases, the outcomes 





Table 5.5 Regression results for hypotheses 1 - 9 
 Overall Change 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
(Constant) 4.58*** 5.75*** 4.30** 5.54*** 5.75*** 
 (1.26) (1.26) (1.40) (1.33) (1.39) 
Industry -.09 .00 -.10 -.01 .02 
 (.31) (.29) (.31) (.31) (.29) 
VC or Angel Funding .27 .42 .27 .24 .45 
 (.34) (.33) (.34) (.33) (.33) 
External Capital -.13* -.13* -.13* -.13* -.13** 
 (.05) (.05) (.05) (.05) (.05) 
Age of Firm .12* .12* .12* .11* .12* 
 (.05) (.05) (.05) (.05) (.05) 
Age of Respondent -.02 -.02 -.02 -.02 -.02 
 (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) 
Gender .21 .22 .26 .27 .39 
 (.54) (.52) (.55) (.53) (.52) 
CEO or President -.08 .11 -.12 .00 .09 
 (.34) (.33) (.35) (.33) (.33) 
Midwest .07 -.05 .09 .17 .09 
 (.80) (.77) (.80) (.78) (.76) 
Northeast .67 .73 .68 .78 .82 
 (.86) (.82) (.86) (.84) (.81) 
Southwest .53 .57 .54 .57 .63 
 (.87) (.84) (.87) (.86) (.83) 
West .05 .18 .04 .18 .25 
 (.82) (.79) (.82) (.81) (.78) 
Performance Monitoring  -.34***   -.35*** 
  (.10)   (.10) 
Environmental Scanning   .06  .13 
   (.13)  (.13) 
Experiential Learning Strategies    -.28* -.18 
    (.13) (.13) 
R
2
 .109 .185 .110 .147 .221 
Adjusted R2 .030 .106 .024 .064 .131 
F 1.387 2.348** 1.283 1.771 2.458** 
Δ R
2
  .076 .002 .031 .105 
F for Δ R
2
  11.629*** .234 4.486* 5.450** 
Sample Size 137 137 137 136 136 
Unstandardized regression coefficients are shown with standard errors in parentheses 
Changes in R
2
 are from model 1.  






Table 5.5 continued 
 Disruptiveness of Change 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
(Constant) 4.44*** 4.99*** 4.77*** 5.47*** 5.85*** 
 (.92) (.95) (1.02) (.97) (1.05) 
Industry .08 .12 .09 .19 .21 
 (.22) (.22) (.22) (.22) (.22) 
VC or Angel Funding .20 .28 .20 .13 .20 
 (.25) (.25) (.25) (.24) (.25) 
External Capital -.04 -.03 -.04 -.03 -.03 
 (.04) (.04) (.04) (.04) (.04) 
Age of Firm .09* .09* .08* .07 .08 
 (.04) (.04) (.04) (.04) (.04) 
Age of Respondent -.03* -.03* -.03* -.02* -.02* 
 (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) 
Gender -.08 -.08 -.15 -.05 -.07 
 (.40) (.39) (.40) (.39) (.39) 
CEO or President -.05 .04 .00 .01 .09 
 (.25) (.25) (.26) (.24) (.25) 
Midwest .24 .18 .21 .29 .23 
 (.59) (.58) (.59) (.57) (.57) 
Northeast .37 .40 .37 .46 .47 
 (.63) (.62) (.63) (.61) (.61) 
Southwest .20 .22 .20 .22 .23 
 (.64) (.63) (.64) (.62) (.62) 
West -.22 -.16 -.21 -.10 -.07 
 (.60) (.60) (.60) (.59) (.59) 
Performance Monitoring  -.16*   -.11 
  (.08)   (.08) 
Environmental Scanning   -.07  -.03 
   (.10)  (.10) 
Experiential Learning Strategies    -.27** -.23* 
    (.09) (.10) 
R
2
 .099 .130 .103 .154 .170 
Adjusted R2 .020 .046 .016 .071 .074 
F 1.250 1.548 1.118 1.863* 1.770* 
Δ R
2
  .031 .004 .056 .072 
F for Δ R
2
  4.440* .550 8.078** 3.488** 
Sample Size 137 137 137 136 136 
Unstandardized regression coefficients are shown with standard errors in parentheses 
Changes in R
2
 are from model 1.  






Table 5.5 continued 
 Perceived Performance (entrepreneurs) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
(Constant) 5.66*** 5.24*** 4.78*** 4.21*** 3.47*** 
 (.78) (.80) (.85) (.77) (.83) 
Industry .19 .16 .17 .03 .01 
 (.19) (.19) (.19) (.18) (.17) 
VC or Angel Funding .07 .02 .09 .18 .17 
 (.21) (.21) (.21) (.19) (.19) 
External Capital .00 .00 .00 -.01 -.01 
 (.03) (.03) (.03) (.03) (.03) 
Age of Firm -.11** -.11** -.11** -.09** -.09** 
 (.03) (.03) (.03) (.03) (.03) 
Age of Respondent .01 .01 .01 .00 .00 
 (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) 
Gender -.08 -.08 .09 -.12 .02 
 (.33) (.33) (.34) (.31) (.31) 
CEO or President .49* .43* .36 .41* .29 
 (.21) (.21) (.21) (.19) (.20) 
Midwest -1.01* -.97* -.95* -1.07* -1.01* 
 (.50) (.49) (.49) (.45) (.45) 
Northeast -.73 -.76 -.73 -.86 -.85 
 (.53) (.53) (.52) (.49) (.48) 
Southwest -.78 -.80 -.76 -.79 -.78 
 (.54) (.54) (.53) (.50) (.49) 
West -.40 -.45 -.43 -.58 -.60 
 (.51) (.51) (.50) (.47) (.46) 
Performance Monitoring  .12
16
   .03 
  (.06)   (.06) 
Environmental Scanning   .19*  .16* 
   (.08)  (.08) 
Experiential Learning 
Strategies 
   .38*** .36*** 
    (.08) (.08) 
R
2
 .177 .200 .214 .313 .341 
Adjusted R2 .104 .123 .138 .246 .265 
F 2.436 2.582** 2.814** 4.667*** 4.474*** 
Δ R
2
  .023 .037 .140 .168 
  3.632
17
 5.915* 25.091*** 10.308*** 
Sample size 137 137 137 136 136 
Unstandardized regression coefficients are shown with standard errors in parentheses 
Changes in R
2
 are from model 1.  
*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001     










Table 5.5 continued 
 Overall Performance 
(Investors) 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
(Constant) 3.18 3.29 3.01 2.73 2.92 
  (2.17) (2.38) (2.45) (2.24) (2.58) 
Industry .14 .15 .14 .07 .09 
  (.46) (.47) (.47) (.47) (.48) 
VC or Angel Funding 3.76* 3.79* 3.76* 3.91** 3.98** 
  (1.41) (1.44) (1.43) (1.43) (1.48) 
External Capital .13 .13 .13 .14 .13 
  (.09) (.09) (.09) (.09) (.09) 
Age of Firm -.13 -.13 -.13 -.13 -.13 
  (.08) (.08) (.08) (.08) (.08) 
Age of Respondent .03 .03 .03 .03 .03 
  (.03) (.03) (.03) (.03) (.03) 
Gender -1.89 -1.91 -1.85 -1.91 -1.94 
  (1.05) (1.08) (1.10) (1.05) (1.12) 
CEO or President -2.09 -2.05 -2.09 -2.42* -2.34 
  (1.12) (1.18) (1.13) (1.19) (1.25) 
Midwest -.92 -.94 -.91 -.87 -.91 
  (.87) (.90) (.89) (.88) (.91) 
Northeast -1.50 -1.49 -1.50 -1.46 -1.45 
  (1.02) (1.03) (1.03) (1.02) (1.05) 
Southwest -1.08 -1.06 -1.09 -1.20 -1.15 
  (1.10) (1.13) (1.11) (1.11) (1.15) 
West -.79 -.79 -.81 -.79 -.79 
  (.88) (.89) (.89) (.88) (.90) 
Performance Monitoring  -.03   -.07 
   (.23)   (.25) 
Environmental Scanning   .03  .01 
    (.19)  (.21) 
Experiential Learning 
Strategies 
   .16 .17 
        (.19) (.20) 
R
2
 .296 .296 .297 .307 .309 
Adjusted R2 .131 .113 .113 .127 .089 
F 1.798 1.615 1.616 1.700 1.403 
Δ R
2
  .000 .000 .011 .012 
F for Δ R
2
  .014 .024 .733 .264 
Sample size 59 59 59 59 59 
Unstandardized regression coefficients are shown with standard errors in parentheses 
Changes in R
2
 are from Model 1. 






Table 5.5 continued 
 
 
Satisfaction with Performance  
(Investors) 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
(Constant) 2.70 4.06* 3.24 2.92 4.16* 
  (1.60) (1.68) (1.80) (1.66) (1.83) 
Industry .08 .18 .08 .11 .18 
  (.34) (.33) (.34) (.35) (.34) 
VC or Angel Funding 2.41* 2.70* 2.41* 2.34* 2.68* 
  (1.04) (1.02) (1.05) (1.06) (1.05) 
External Capital .09 .07 .09 .09 .07 
  (.06) (.06) (.06) (.06) (.07) 
Age of Firm -.07 -.07 -.08 -.08 -.08 
  (.06) (.06) (.06) (.06) (.06) 
Age of Respondent .02 .03 .02 .03 .03 
  (.02) (.02) (.02) (.02) (.02) 
Gender -.43 -.69 -.57 -.42 -.71 
  (.78) (.76) (.81) (.78) (.80) 
CEO or President -.85 -.38 -.86 -.69 -.35 
  (.83) (.83) (.83) (.88) (.89) 
Midwest .09 -.15 .06 .07 -.16 
  (.65) (.63) (.65) (.65) (.65) 
Northeast -1.27 -1.21 -1.26 -1.29 -1.22 
  (.75) (.73) (.76) (.76) (.74) 
Southwest -.49 -.23 -.46 -.43 -.21 
  (.81) (.80) (.82) (.83) (.82) 
West -.50 -.45 -.45 -.50 -.45 
  (.65) (.62) (.65) (.65) (.64) 
Performance Monitoring  -.35*   -.34 
   (.17)   (.18) 
Environmental Scanning   -.09  -.01 
    (.14)  (.15) 
Experiential Learning Strategies    -.08 -.02 
        (.14) (.14) 
R
2
 .276 .338 .282 .280 .339 
Adjusted R2 .106 .166 .095 .093 .128 
F 1.626 1.959* 1.509 1.493 1.610 
Δ R
2
  .063 .007 .005 .063 
F for Δ R
2
  4.355* .441 .300 1.400 
Sample size 59 59 59 59 59 
Unstandardized regression coefficients are shown with standard errors in parentheses 
Changes in R
2
 are from Model 1. 





Hypothesis 1 predicted that performance monitoring would be negatively 
associated with overall change to the venture. As can be seen in models 2 and 5 in the 
overall change column of Table 5.5, this hypothesis was supported. Hypothesis 2 
predicted that performance monitoring would be negatively associated with disruption 
from change. This hypothesis was supported in model 2 of the disruptiveness of change 
column but not in model 5 (when the other practices were added in). Hypothesis 3 
predicted that performance monitoring would be associated with higher levels of 
performance. As can be seen in model 2 of the perceived performance column, although 
there was a positive association, the effect was not significant at the .05 level (p=.06). 
Furthermore, this effect disappeared in the full model. Similarly, with respect to 
investors‘ satisfaction with performance, hypothesis 3 was supported in model 2 but not 
in model 5 (when all practices were included). There was no significant association 
between performance monitoring and investors‘ ratings of overall performance. Thus, 
Hypothesis 3 is not supported.  
Hypothesis 4 predicted that environmental scanning would be negatively 
associated with overall change to the venture. As can be seen in models 3 and 5 in the 
overall change column of Table 5.5, this hypothesis was not supported. Similarly, there 
was no support for Hypothesis 5 predicting that environmental scanning would be 
negatively associated with disruption from change (models 3 and 5 in the disruptiveness 
of change column). Hypothesis 6 predicted that environmental scanning would be 
positively associated with venture performance. As can be seen in models 3 and 5 of the 
perceived performance column, this hypothesis was supported with respect to 




no effect on investors‘ ratings of performance (models 3 and 5 in the two investor ratings 
of performance). Thus, hypothesis 6 was partially supported.  
Hypothesis 7 predicted that experiential learning strategies would be negatively 
associated with overall change to the venture. As can be seen in the overall change 
column, this hypothesis was supported in model 4 but not 5 (when all practices were 
included). Hypothesis 8 predicted that experiential learning strategies would be 
negatively associated with disruption from change. As can be seen in models 4 and 5 of 
the disruptiveness of change column, this hypothesis was supported. Finally, Hypothesis 
9 predicted that experiential learning strategies would be positively associated with 
performance. As can be seen in models 4 and 5 of the perceived performance column, 
this hypothesis was supported with respect to entrepreneurs‘ own perceptions of 
performance. However, experiential learning strategies had no effect on investors‘ ratings 
of performance (models 4 and 5 in the two investor ratings of performance). Thus, 
hypothesis 9 was partially supported.  
In summary, these regressions suggest that performance monitoring predicts less 
overall change, environmental scanning predicts better performance and experiential 
learning predicts both less disruption from change and better performance.  
It is also interesting to note that the age of the firm was positively associated with 
disruptiveness of change but that this effect went away when experiential learning 
strategies were included in the model. Again, recall that disruptiveness of change is not 
cumulative over the course of a firm‘s lifetime (which might otherwise explain why older 
firms reported more disruption). Rather, this measure asked respondents to report on 




support my theorizing that change is more disruptive for older firms. Furthermore, it 
appears that experiential learning strategies may alleviate that effect. 
 Hypotheses 10-12 were tested through a series of regressions based on the 
guidelines set by Baron and Kenny (1986). According to these guidelines, mediation 
occurs when four criteria are met: 1) the independent variable (in this case experiential 
learning strategies) significantly predicts the dependent variable (in this case overall 
change, disruptiveness of change and performance), 2) the independent variable predicts 
the mediator (in this case certainty), 3) the mediator predicts the dependent variable 
(overall change, disruptiveness of change and performance) controlling for the 
independent variable and 4) the independent variable does not predict the dependent 
variable, controlling for the mediator. Partial mediation is supported if the first three 
conditions are met, but not the last condition.  
Since experiential learning strategies did not predict either of the investors‘ 
ratings of performance, criterion 1 was not met for those aspects of performance and I did 
not include them in the mediation tests. Thus, the mediation tests included three 
regressions for each dependent variable. Please see Table 5.6 for the mediation tests.  
Model 1 in each of the dependent variable columns (overall change, 
disruptiveness of change, performance) included experiential learning strategies as the 
predictor variable. Model 2 included the mediator (certainty) as the predictor variable and 
controlled for the independent variable (experiential learning strategies). In the last 





Table 5.6 Mediation tests 
 
Overall Change Disruptiveness of 
Change 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
(Constant) 5.54*** 7.71*** 5.47*** 7.43*** 
 (1.33) (1.57) (.97) (1.13) 
Industry -.01 -.14 .19 .07 
 (.31) (.30) (.22) (.22) 
VC or Angel Funding .24 .20 .13 .09 
 (.33) (.33) (.24) (.24) 
External Capital -.13* -.15** -.03 -.05 
 (.05) (.05) (.04) (.04) 
Age of Firm .11* .12* .07 .08* 
 (.05) (.05) (.04) (.04) 
Age of Respondent -.02 -.01 -.02* -.01 
 (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) 
Gender .27 .14 -.05 -.16 
 (.53) (.52) (.39) (.38) 
CEO or President .00 .16 .01 .15 
 (.33) (.33) (.24) (.24) 
Midwest .17 -.10 .29 .05 
 (.78) (.78) (.57) (.56) 
Northeast .78 .65 .46 .35 
 (.84) (.83) (.61) (.60) 
Southwest .57 .32 .22 -.01 
 (.86) (.85) (.62) (.61) 
West .18 -.01 -.10 -.27 
 (.81) (.80) (.59) (.57) 
 Experiential Learning Strategies -.28* -.19 -.27** -.19* 
 (.13) (.13) (.09) (.10) 
Certainty  -.45*  -.41** 
   (.18)  (.13) 
R
2
 .147 .188 .154 .215 
Adjusted R
2
 .064 .101 .071 .132 
F 1.771 2.167* 1.863* 2.577** 
Sample size 136 136 136 136 
Unstandardized regression coefficients are shown with standard errors in parentheses 





Table 5.6 continued 
 
 Perceived Performance Certainty 
  Model 1 Model 2  
(Constant) 4.21*** 2.69 4.79*** 
 (.77) (.90) (.64) 
Industry .03 .12 -.29 
 (.18) (.17) (.15) 
VC or Angel Funding .18 .21 -.10 
 (.19) (.19) (.16) 
External Capital -.01 .00 -.05* 
 (.03) (.03) (.02) 
Age of Firm -.09** -.10*** .03 
 (.03) (.03) (.03) 
Age of Respondent .00 -.01 .02* 
 (.01) (.01) (.01) 
Gender -.12 -.04 -.27 
 (.31) (.30) (.25) 
CEO or President .41* .30 .35* 
 (.19) (.19) (.16) 
Midwest -1.07* -.88* -.58 
 (.45) (.44) (.38) 
Northeast -.86 -.77 -.29 
 (.49) (.47) (.41) 
Southwest -.79 -.62 -.56 
 (.50) (.48) (.41) 
West -.58 -.45 -.41 
 (.47) (.46) (.39) 
 Experiential Learning Strategies .38*** .31*** .20** 
 (.08) (.08) (.06) 
Certainty  .32**  
   (.11)  
R
2
 .313 .361 .229 
Adjusted R
2
 .426 .292 .153 
F 4.667*** 5.292*** 3.040*** 
Sample size 136 136 137 
Unstandardized regression coefficients are shown with standard errors in parentheses 





The first condition of the Baron and Kenny method was met as can be seen in 
each Model 1 of Table 5.6. Experiential learning strategies significantly predicted overall 
change, disruptiveness of change and perceived performance. Condition 2 was met when 
experiential learning predicted certainty, as can be seen in the last column of Table 5.6. 
Condition 3 was also met as can be seen in Model 2 in each of the columns. Certainty 
predicted overall change, disruptiveness of change and perceived performance controlling 
for experiential learning strategies. The last condition of Baron and Kenny‘s method was 
also assessed in Model 2 of each of the columns. Full mediation is supported if in these 
models experiential learning was no longer a significant predictor of the outcome 
variables.  
 The set of regressions for experiential learning strategies and overall change 
suggest that all four conditions of the Baron and Kenny method were met. Sobel‘s test 
confirmed that certainty mediated the effect of experiential learning on overall change 
(Z=-2.00, p<.05). Thus, Hypothesis 10 was supported. The set of regressions for 
experiential learning and disruptiveness of change suggest that only the first three 
conditions of the Baron and Kenny method were met. As can be seen in Model 2 of the 
disruptiveness of change column, experiential learning strategies continued to be a 
predictor of disruptiveness of change, although as can be seen in the smaller beta 
coefficient, the effect was reduced. These findings suggest that certainty partially 
mediates the effects of experiential learning strategies on disruptiveness of change. This 
was also confirmed with Sobel‘s test (Z=2.29, p<.05). Thus, Hypothesis 11 was partially 
supported. Finally, the set of regressions for experiential learning strategies and perceived 




fully met. As can be seen in Model 2 of the perceived performance column, experiential 
learning strategies continued to be a predictor of disruptiveness of change, although 
again, the beta coefficient was reduced. These findings suggest that certainty partially 
mediates the effects of experiential learning strategies on perceived performance. This 
was also confirmed with Sobel‘s test (Z=2.19, p<.05). Thus, Hypothesis 12 was partially 
supported. 
 Hypothesis 13 concerned the effects of improvisation on performance and was 
tested through a series of regressions. In the first model, I regressed each of the 
performance measures (perceived performance - entrepreneurs, overall performance – 
investors, and satisfaction with performance - investors) on the controls. In the second 
model, I added Improvisation. In the third model, I added the other three practices 
(Performance Monitoring, Environmental Scanning and Experiential Learning 
Strategies). Based on these analyses, there was no support for Hypothesis 13. 
Improvisation does not predict any of the performance measures. Please see Table 5.7.  
Although it was not hypothesized, I also assessed whether improvisation had an effect on 
overall change or disruption from change, since my theorizing implied that it should not. 
Indeed, there was no relationship between improvisation and either of these outcomes. 








Table 5.7 Test of hypothesis 13 
 
Perceived Performance 
(rated by entrepreneurs) 
Overall Performance  
(rated by investors) 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
(Constant) 5.66*** 6.08*** 3.74*** 3.18 2.43 1.84 
  (.78) (.87) (.90) (2.17) (2.62) (3.08) 
Industry .19 .16 .00 .14 .15 .10 
  (.19) (.19) (.18) (.46) (.47) (.49) 
VC or Angel Funding .07 .11 .19 3.76* 3.65* 3.84* 
  (.21) (.21) (.20) (1.41) (1.44) (1.50) 
External Capital .00 .00 -.01 .13 .13 .13 
  (.03) (.03) (.03) (.09) (.09) (.09) 
Age of Firm -.11*** -.11*** -.09** -.13 -.14 -.13 
  (.03) (.03) (.03) (.08) (.08) (.08) 
Age of Respondent .01 .00 .00 .03 .04 .04 
  (.01) (.01) (.01) (.03) (.03) (.03) 
Gender -.08 -.05 .04 -1.89 -1.95 -2.02 
  (.33) (.33) (.31) (1.05) (1.07) (1.14) 
CEO or President .49* .48* .28 -2.09 -1.99 -2.26 
  (.21) (.21) (.20) (1.12) (1.15) (1.26) 
Midwest -1.01* -1.08* -1.05* -.92 -.80 -.74 
  (.50) (.50) (.45) (.87) (.91) (.96) 
Northeast -.73 -.87 -.93 -1.50 -1.39 -1.31 
  (.53) (.55) (.50) (1.02) (1.05) (1.07) 
Southwest -.78 -.85 -.82 -1.08 -.87 -.91 
  (.54) (.54) (.49) (1.10) (1.18) (1.22) 
West -.40 -.48 -.65 -.79 -.71 -.68 
  (.51) (.51) (.47) (.88) (.90) (.92) 
Improvisation  -.06 -.04  .09 .12 
   (.06) (.06)  (.17) (.18) 
Performance Monitoring   .03   -.06 
    (.06)   (.25) 
Environmental Scanning   .17*   .01 
    (.08)   (.21) 
Experiential Learning 




      (.08)     (.20) 
R
2
 0.177 0.184 .344 0.296 .300 .315 
Adjusted R2 0.104 0.105 .262 0.131 .118 .077 
F 2.436** 2.329** 4.198*** 1.798 1.645 1.321 
Δ R
2
  0.007 .171  .004 .019 
F for Δ R
2
  1.129 7.844***  .270 .302 
Sample size 137 137 136 137 137 136 
Unstandardized regression coefficients are shown with standard errors in parentheses 
Changes in R
2







Table 5.7 continued 
 
Satisfaction with Performance 
 (rated by investors) 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
(Constant) 2.70 2.86 4.61 
  (1.60) (1.94) (2.20) 
Industry .08 .07 .18 
  (.34) (.35) (.35) 
VC or Angel Funding 2.41* 2.44* 2.74* 
  (1.04) (1.07) (1.07) 
External Capital .09 .09 .07 
  (.06) (.07) (.07) 
Age of Firm -.07 -.07 -.07 
  (.06) (.06) (.06) 
Age of Respondent .02 .02 .02 
  (.02) (.02) (.02) 
Gender -.43 -.42 -.67 
  (.78) (.79) (.81) 
CEO or President -.85 -.87 -.38 
  (.83) (.85) (.90) 
Midwest .09 .06 -.23 
  (.65) (.67) (.68) 
Northeast -1.27 -1.29 -1.28 
  (.75) (.77) (.77) 
Southwest -.49 -.53 -.32 
  (.81) (.87) (.87) 
West -.50 -.52 -.49 
  (.65) (.66) (.66) 
Improvisation  -.02 -.05 
   (.13) (.13) 
Performance Monitoring   -.34 
    (.18) 
Environmental Scanning   -.01 
    (.15) 
Experiential Learning Strategies   -.03 
      (.15) 
R
2
 .276 .276 .341 
Adjusted R2 .106 .087 .111 
F 1.626 1.461 1.483 
Δ R
2
  .000 .065 
F for Δ R
2
  .021 1.066 
Sample size 137 137 136 
Unstandardized regression coefficients are shown with standard errors in parentheses 
Changes in R
2





Table 5.8 Summary of findings 
Hypothesis Regression findings 
Hypothesis 1: Performance monitoring 
negatively associated with overall 
change.  
Yes 
Hypothesis 2: Performance monitoring 
negatively associated with 
disruptiveness of change. 
No (significant in reduced model but not in 
full model) 
 
Hypothesis 3: Performance monitoring 
positively associated with performance. 
No  (positive association with investors‘ 
satisfaction with performance but only in 
the reduced model, not the full model) 
 
Hypothesis 4: Environmental scanning 
negatively associated with overall 
change. 
No (no significant association with overall 
change) 
Hypothesis 5: Environmental scanning 
negatively associated with 
disruptiveness of change. 
No (no significant association with 
disruptiveness of change) 
Hypothesis 6: Environmental scanning 
positively associated with performance. 
Partial support (positive association with 
entrepreneurs‘ perceived performance) 
 
Hypothesis 7: Experiential learning 
negatively associated with overall 
change. 
No (significant in reduced model but not in 
full model) 
 
Hypothesis 8: Experiential learning 
negatively associated with 
disruptiveness of change. 
Yes 
Hypothesis 9: Experiential learning 
positively associated with performance. 
Partial support (positive association with 
entrepreneurs‘ perceived performance) 
 
Hypothesis 10: Certainty mediates the 
relationship between experiential 
learning strategies and overall change.  
Yes 
Hypothesis 11: Certainty mediates the 
relationship between experiential 
learning strategies and disruptiveness of 
change. 
Partial mediation (the effect of experiential 
learning strategies on disruptiveness of 
change is reduced but does not become 
insignificant) 
Hypothesis 12: Certainty mediates the 
relationship between experiential 
learning strategies and performance. 
Partial mediation (the effect of experiential 
learning strategies on performance is 
reduced but does not become insignificant) 
Hypothesis 13: Improvisation positively 
associated with performance.  
No (no significant association with any 








This purpose of this study was to explore how four different entrepreneurial 
practices affected change, disruption from change and overall performance in new 
ventures. In Chapter 4, I argued that the opportunity shaping process is essentially a 
change process but while change is a necessary outcome of learning and adaptation, it 
can be very disruptive to new ventures. Therefore, ventures that organize to manage 
change and its effects may be better able to shape opportunities and ultimately, enjoy 
better performance.  In particular, I suggested that because the shaping process occurs in 
a dynamic and uncertain context, ventures that develop a vigilant awareness of changing 
conditions, both inside and outside their venture, may be more able to catch the need for 
change early before problems can escalate. Similarly, because an uncertain and dynamic 
context requires constant learning, entrepreneurs who purposefully design learning into 
their development processes may be better able to rapidly build certainty about their 
venture, allowing them to engage in smaller, more incremental (and therefore less 
disruptive) change efforts.  Furthermore, because entrepreneurs must often learn from 
experience and experience tends to be highly equivocal, learning strategies are likely to 
be more effective when they are systematic and analytical rather than improvisational.  
Overall, the findings of Study 2 support this argument although they also suggest 
a more refined set of relationships between the practices and outcomes. The full model 
(when all practices were included in the regressions) suggests that each of these practices 
has a unique role to play with respect to different outcomes. For example, performance 
monitoring negatively predicted overall change. This suggests that a vigilance of actual 




monitoring may not help ventures reduce the disruption of change once it occurs. 
Environmental scanning was associated with better performance, but not necessarily as a 
result of reducing change or the disruption of change. Thus, the mechanisms by which 
scanning might influence performance are not clear and warrant further investigation. In 
the full model experiential learning strategies were negatively associated with disruption 
from change and positively associated with performance but had no effect on overall 
change. Given that many changes occur as a result of learning (as shown in the first 
study) this finding seems sensible. Experiential learning strategies may provide 
entrepreneurs with the knowledge and certainty they need to make better change 
decisions and to engage in change efforts in more systematic, predictable (less disruptive) 
ways. Thus, while entrepreneurs may learn that change is needed, those changes are more 
readily implemented when they are based on concrete analysis and learning. This 
argument is further supported by the mediation tests which suggest that certainty 
mediates the relationship between experiential learning and outcomes. Finally, 
improvisation did not seem to benefit entrepreneurs with respect to these outcomes.  
The analyses also raised several questions. First, as mentioned above, the role of 
environmental scanning is not totally clear. Second, while I have analyzed change, 
disruption and performance as separate outcome variables, I have not explored their 
relationship to one another. This may be of particular interest with respect to the 
investors‘ ratings of performance. Based on my analysis to this point, investors seemed to 
be moved by very little that entrepreneurs actually did. That is, in the full model none of 
the entrepreneurial practices had an effect on investors‘ ratings of performance. It is 




and more with their outcomes. Finally, the role of improvisation, if any, is not yet clear. 
In the following sections I address each of these questions. Then, based on the findings of 
this study, I propose and discuss a refined model.   
Post hoc analysis of environmental scanning 
 Earlier I hypothesized that because a variety of information sources provide a 
variety of environmental sensors, scanning a broad set of external sources may be 
particularly important to entrepreneurs‘ ability to build and maintain awareness. This 
argument is consistent with a ―requisite variety‖ approach to managing complex 
situations. That is, the law of requisite variety asserts that the variety of a system such as 
an organization, team, or individual, must be as great as the variety of the environment 
that it is trying to regulate (Ashby, 1956).  For entrepreneurs, this would suggest that they 
need access to a broad enough spectrum of information and expertise to allow them to 
meet the demands of their particular venture and venture environment. Thus, it is not 
surprising that frequent environmental scanning (as averaged across a wide variety of 
sources) was associated with better perceived performance.  
However, while it is often assumed that random variety is ―requisite,‖ in fact, the 
type of variety that is brought to bear is also critical (see Dimov, Shepherd, & Sutcliffe, 
2007). Requisite variety is that which provides insight into an organization‘s particular 
environment and ongoing activities. In other words, requisite variety is not just any 
variety, but also relevant variety. Broader is not always better. For example, while talking 
to marine biologists would broaden the environmental scanning activities of a software 




The data reported earlier suggest that more environmental scanning (across a broad 
variety of sources) is associated with better performance. I now consider those sources 
more closely to determine if certain types of sources are more useful than others. For 
example, previous research suggests that while most CEOs seek advice from similar 
others, especially friends or people within their social network (McDonald & Westphal, 
2003), seeking advice from dissimilar others is associated with better performance 
(McDonald, Khanna, & Westphal, 2008). One reason given for these performance effects 
is that dissimilar others are more likely to challenge a CEO‘s assumptions and provide 
alternate perspectives which can be valuable to problem-solving. However, it may also be 
that when seeking advice from outsiders, CEOs are more selective about the specific kind 
of expertise they need (rather than simply making due with whatever expertise their 
friends have to offer). In other words, they seek out and access just the right (or requisite) 
expertise. For example, Eisenhardt (1989c) found that in gathering information about 
their operations and environment, higher performing managers gathered advice from 
many sources but focused their attention on the most experienced executives.  
When managers seek out sources of information that have insight into their firm‘s 
specific context or operations, they may receive more useful information. Sources that 
have direct knowledge of an organization (e.g., customers or suppliers) may be better 
able than more distal sources to recognize the implications of environmental trends for 
the firm. Also, sources that have specific expertise with respect to a venture‘s industry, 
operating environment or competitive situation, may be more likely than generic sources 
to notice or provide information about critical trends or events likely to impact the firm.  




feedback from sources more closely tied to the venture will provide more benefits than 
would more distal ties.  
I tested this argument in two ways. First, in addition to asking entrepreneurs to rate 
how frequently they used different sources of information, the survey also asked them to 
rate how useful each source was. This data did not play a part in my central theorizing 
(and so was not analyzed as part of hypothesis testing) but if offers some descriptive 
evidence for the requisite variety argument. On average, respondents reported that the 
most useful external source of information and advice was customers, followed by 
industry experts, competitors, other entrepreneurs, associations and tradeshows, journals 
and finally weblogs and other internet sources. See Table 5.9 for a list of sources and 
mean ratings of usefulness.  
Table 5.9 Average “usefulness” ratings for external sources of expertise 
 N Mean Std. Deviation 
Customers 124 5.61 1.430 
Industry experts 120 4.62 1.661 
Competitors 119 4.04 1.543 
Other entrepreneurs 119 3.76 1.745 
Associations/Trade shows 117 3.55 1.658 
Business and trade journals 115 3.36 1.618 
Weblogs, online sources 114 3.08 1.689 
 
This data suggests that sources more closely tied to the venture and their specific industry 
were perceived as more useful that more distal or generic sources.  
I next looked at the frequency ratings again. This time, rather than treating these 
ratings as an index, I used an exploratory factor analysis to consider whether there were 
underlying differences in the usage of these different sources. An exploratory factor 
analysis (using principal axis factoring and promax rotation) indicated a two-factor 




loaded four items: customers, industry experts, other entrepreneurs, and industry 
associations. Factor loadings ranged from .43 to .70. The second factor, with an 
eigenvalue of 1.27 loaded the remaining three items: weblogs, online communities or 
web alerts, competitors, their websites, publications or offerings, and business or trade 
journals. Factor loadings ranged from .62 to .72. Again, the pattern suggests that there is 
a distinction in usage between sources more closely tied to a venture and more distal 
sources. That is, customers, industry experts, other entrepreneurs and industry 
associations and tradeshows are all very closely tied to a venture‘s specific industry and 
context. Moreover, because these are all sources with whom an entrepreneur can interact 
directly, it is more likely that entrepreneurs can specify and retrieve the specific 
information they need rather than simply receiving whatever is broadcast. In contrast, 
journals and web sources tend to be more general sources of information, less closely tied 
to a particular venture or industry. Similarly, competitors, while more specifically tied to 
a venture, tend to be inaccessible by means other than publically available channels (e.g., 
websites), which are generally less informative.  
Thus, my analyses suggest that sources of expertise and information differ along (at 
least) one dimension. Some sources appear to be more specific and closely tied to a 
venture while others are more distal. To determine if this distinction matters with respect 
to the outcomes of my theorizing, I reran the regressions for hypotheses 4, 5 and 6 (the 
effects of environmental scanning on the outcome variables) but this time split the 
environmental scanning variable into two constructs: direct ties (average frequency 
ratings for customers, industry experts, other entrepreneurs and industry associations) and 




Although the findings were similar to those of the earlier regressions, they offered 
an important refinement. That is, as before the only outcome variable predicted by 
environmental scanning was perceived performance. Interestingly, however, it was only 
the direct ties that predicted better performance. Distal ties had no effect. Table 5.10 
presents the findings for this one outcome variable. As before, model 1 includes the 
control variables as predictors. In model 2, I add the two new constructs (direct ties and 
distal ties). In model 3, I add in the remaining practices (performance monitoring and 





Table 5.10 Direct and distal sources for environmental scanning 
 Perceived Performance 
 Model 1 Model  2 Model 3 
(Constant) 5.66*** 4.64*** 3.38*** 
 (.78) (.86) (.85) 
Industry .19 .16 .02 
 (.19) (.19) (.18) 
VC or Angel Funding .07 .09 .17 
 (.21) (.21) (.20) 
External Capital .00 .00 -.01 
 (.03) (.03) (.03) 
Age of Firm -.11*** -.10** -.09** 
 (.03) (.03) (.03) 
Age of Respondent .01 .01 .00 
 (.01) (.01) (.01) 
Gender -.08 .12 .04 
 (.33) (.33) (.31) 
CEO or President .49* .30 .25 
 (.21) (.21) (.20) 
Midwest -1.01* -.91 -.97* 
 (.50) (.48) (.45) 
Northeast -.73 -.66 -.80 
 (.53) (.52) (.49) 
Southwest -.78 -.70 -.73 
 (.54) (.53) (.49) 
West -.40 -.39 -.56 
 (.51) (.50) (.46) 
Scanning direct ties  .24** .19* 
  (.09) (.08) 
Scanning distal ties  .00 .01 
  (.06) (.05) 
Performance Monitoring   .03 
   (.06) 
Experiential Learning Strategies   .34*** 
   (.08) 
R
2
 .18 .22 .33 
Adjusted R
2
 .10 .14 .25 
F 2.44** 2.62** 3.95*** 
Δ R
2
  .06 .18 
F for Δ R
2
  4.37* 7.76*** 
Sample size 137 136 136 
Unstandardized regression coefficients are shown with standard errors in parentheses 
Changes in R
2
 are from Model 1 
*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 
 
These results suggest entrepreneurs who make frequent use of sources of 




better able to acquire the kind of nuanced and deep expertise necessary to manage an 
emerging venture.  
This argument is consistent with data from the Qualitative Study. For example, 
there were several examples of entrepreneurs who, by turning to only one or two 
generalists for advice, were not able to tap into the specific industry or functional 
expertise they needed. Sometimes this happened because the entrepreneurs were young 
and inexperienced and so had few ties to deep experts. Rather, they turned to the people 
they happened to know – their college advisors, a family friend in the industry or a 
classmate. As one founder recalls,  
―We had some sort of informal advisors... [My University] doesn‘t have a business 
school, but we essentially have a series of three… business and entrepreneurial 
related [courses] so a faculty member from there, a faculty member from my 
department just sort of who I was familiar with, just someone who I really respected 
and then a third faculty member who who‘s actually also involved in some angel 
investment groups in the area…‖ 
 
In other cases, entrepreneurs attempted to find advisors who had more industry 
expertise, but failed to recognize that experience in an industry does not necessarily 
equate with expertise in starting a business in that industry. For example, one founder 
working to create record-keeping software for a medical specialty area, turned to a doctor 
in that area as his main source of advice and feedback. The founder saw this doctor as a 
―successful businessman‖ because he had bought and turned around several medical 
practices.   
―He‘s a big time [medical specialist]…He is one of the best businessmen I 
know around.  He‘s kind of made a living now of purchasing old practices or 
practices that aren‘t doing so hot, kind of wrapping up his formula, if you will, for 
success and re-branding that practice…so we went out to his house on a Saturday 
morning and spent probably two hours just getting his brain dump on what the 
industry looked like, what [medical specialists] want, what their needs were.  And 




specialist], somebody who knows what business is like, somebody who makes a lot 
of money, and he thinks he can make more money doing it this way.  And that‘s 
why we can make money on this.‖  
 
The specialist was an excellent source of information about customer needs, but 
the founders also used him as their primary business advisor. As they later discovered, 
starting a software company is nothing like running a medical practice. This advisor 
simply did not have the requisite expertise the firm needed, nor did they seek a variety of 
other experts. Ultimately, the business failed.  
In contrast, some entrepreneurs were much more careful and selective about their 
sources of information and advice. Not only did they seek out a variety of perspectives, 
but these tended to be more specialized sources. For example, in Chapter 4, I described a 
CEO who had developed a broad set of expert sources (i.e., FDA expert, marketing 
expert, sales expert, etc.). It may be that those were beneficial to him, not just because 
they provided a wide range of expertise, but because they each provided a deep expertise 
into their particular area. In other words, they could provide information about the 
nuances and specific trends critical to each aspect of his business. Similarly, several 
respondents reported that they often turned for advice to other entrepreneurs who could 
help them understand the nuances of starting a new business.  
Given that managers have limited time and capacity (Cyert & March, 1963) to 
seek out and process information, they must balance what and how much they scan with 
other responsibilities. Therefore, it may be that certain sources are more useful than 
others for accessing the requisite information and expertise needed. In particular sources 
that are more directly tied to a specific venture provide entrepreneurs with better access 




with these sources directly, they are more able to specify their informational needs. This 
is consistent with research suggesting that more direct channels (e.g., face to face) 
provide richer, more nuanced data (Daft & Lengel, 1984; Daft & Lengel, 1986). Second, 
sources more directly tied to a venture or its context are likely to have more relevant data 
for that venture than might be found from  more generic sources. Thus, while it still 
remains unclear what are the specific mechanisms through which environmental scanning 
improves performance, it seems likely that part of the answer lies in the way that 
informational needs are met. That is, performance is affected by entrepreneurs‘ ability to 
garner information that is directly relevant to their specific situation.  
Post hoc analysis of outcome variables 
 The findings reported above suggest that investors‘ ratings of performance were 
unrelated to the entrepreneurial practices examined in this study. Yet, there was variance 
in investors‘ ratings. Clearly, some ventures appeared to investors to be doing better than 
others. One reason for this finding may be that investors simply aren‘t that aware of 
entrepreneurs‘ practices. Rather, what concerns them most is simply performance. In fact, 
while in theory venture capitalists provide advice and expertise to new ventures many 
studies suggest that there is a lot less handholding going on than expected (Busenitz et 
al., 2004; Gifford, 1997; Sahlman, 1990). This is often a simple matter of opportunity 
cost for VCs. Since most VCs oversee many different ventures, they must allocate their 
time across them. In addition, not all entrepreneurs look to VCs for operational and 
business advice, particularly in the case of technology ventures (Barney, Busenitz, Fiet, 
& Moesel, 1996). Thus, levels of communication between entrepreneurs and their VCs 




behaviors, at least not to the extent that they could distinguish between teams‘ behaviors. 
On the other hand, we do know that VCs pay attention to broader aspects of performance, 
especially with respect to their expectations (Parhankangas & Landstrom, 2006). 
Therefore, it seems likely that while entrepreneurial behaviors have not predicted 
investors‘ ratings of performance, entrepreneurial outcomes may.  
To better understand how the outcome variables may affect investor ratings, I first 
considered how they may affect one another. I have suggested that change is necessary 
for new ventures to adapt and shape an opportunity to fit their shifting requirements. On 
the other hand, it can also be very disruptive. Thus, it is not change itself that is 
necessarily problematic, but rather its effects. This suggests that change is likely to 
predict poorer performance only insofar as it is disruptive. In other words, disruption 
mediates the relationship between change and performance. To test this argument, I 
conducted an additional set of regressions following the Baron and Kenny (1986) 
approach to mediation tests. I conducted mediation tests for each of the three 
performance measures: perceived performance (rated by entrepreneurs), overall 
performance (rated by investors) and satisfaction with performance (rated by investors). 
Please see Table 5.11 for the mediation results.  
Model 1 in each of the dependent variable columns (perceived performance, 
overall performance and satisfaction with performance) included overall change to the 
venture as the predictor variable. Model 2 included the mediator (disruptiveness of 
change) as the predictor variable and controlled for overall change. In the last column of 




The first condition of the Baron and Kenny method states that the independent 
variable must significantly predict the dependent variable. This was assessed in Model 1 
for the dependent variable columns of Table 5.11 (perceived performance, overall 
performance and satisfaction with performance). This condition was met with respect to 
perceived performance and overall performance but not with satisfaction with 
performance. This means that mediation is no longer possible with respect to satisfaction 
with performance. The second condition states that the independent variable must predict 
the mediating variable. This was assessed in the final column of Table 5.11 which 
showed that indeed, overall change significantly predicted disruptiveness of change. The 
third condition of the Baron and Kenny method states that the mediating variable must 
predict the dependent variable, controlling for the independent variable. This condition 
was assessed in the second model of the regressions. This condition is only met for the 
first dependent variable, perceived performance. Finally, full mediation is said to occur if 
the independent variable (overall change) no longer has a significant effect on the 
dependent variable (perceived performance) when controlling for the mediating variable. 
As can be seen in the second model of the Perceived Performance column this was the 
case. Sobel‘s test confirmed that disruptiveness of change mediated the effect of overall 





















 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2  
(Constant) 6.41*** 7.37*** 4.70* 5.29* 3.34* 4.51** 2.72*** 
 (.80) (.77) (2.19) (2.31) (1.67) (1.69) (.84) 
Industry .18 .22 -.08 -.07 -.01 -.01 .11 
 (.18) (.17) (.46) (.46) (.35) (.33) (.19) 
VC/Angel Funding .12 .15 3.30* 3.25* 2.22* 2.11* .10 
 (.20) (.19) (1.37) (1.38) (1.05) (1.01) (.21) 
External Capital -.02 -.02 .13 .14 .09 .11 .01 
 (.03) (.03) (.08) (.08) (.06) (.06) (.03) 
Age of Firm -.09** -.08* -.08 -.07 -.05 -.04 .04 
 (.03) (.03) (.08) (.08) (.06) (.06) (.03) 
Age of Respondent .00 .00 .03 .02 .02 .01 -.02 
 (.01) (.01) (.03) (.03) (.02) (.02) (.01) 
Gender -.04 -.10 -1.51 -1.57 -.27 -.38 -.16 
 (.32) (.30) (1.02) (1.03) (.78) (.75) (.34) 
CEO or President .48* .47* -2.55* -2.48* -1.04 -.91 -.02 
 (.20) (.19) (1.09) (1.10) (.84) (.80) (.21) 
Midwest -1.00* -.93* -.70 -.69 .18 .21 .21 
 (.48) (.45) (.85) (.85) (.65) (.62) (.50) 
Northeast -.62 -.58 -.98 -1.01 -1.05 -1.12 .12 
 (.52) (.48) (1.01) (1.01) (.77) (.74) (.54) 
Southwest -.70 -.70 -1.12 -1.08 -.51 -.42 .01 
 (.52) (.49) (1.06) (1.06) (.81) (.78) (.55) 
West -.40 -.48 -.65 -.71 -.44 -.57 -.24 
 (.49) (.46) (.84) (.85) (.64) (.62) (.52) 
Overall Change -.16** -.03 -.31* -.24 -.13 .01 .38*** 












 .233 .340 .365 .375 .299 .369 .335 
Adjusted R2 .159 .271 .200 .194 .116 .187 .271 
F 3.142 4.881*** 2.208* 2.074* 1.632 2.024* 5.212*** 
Sample size 137 137 59 59 59 59 137 
Unstandardized regression coefficients are shown with standard errors in parentheses 





These findings suggest that change in the venture is not necessarily problematic 
for entrepreneurs, but rather insofar as that change causes disruptions to operations, 
performance is significantly affected. Disruption from change did not mediate the effect 
of change on investors‘ ratings of performance. However, it is noteworthy that overall 
change had a direct negative effect on investors‘ ratings of overall performance and the 
significance of this effect disappeared when disruptiveness from change was included in 
the model. Furthermore, disruptiveness from change had a direct negative effect on 
investors‘ satisfaction with performance even controlling for overall change. While these 
findings do not support the mediation explanation, they do lend credence to the idea that 
investors‘ ratings, while unaffected by entrepreneurs‘ behaviors, are affected by 
organizational change and disruption.  
It may be that significant changes in a venture are a negative signal to investors. 
As with any firm, new ventures work to develop a structure to match their environment 
and operating requirements (Donaldson, 1995). The failure to stabilize that structure, as 
signaled by changes in core aspects of the organization (i.e., technology, goals, market), 
suggests a failure to achieve reliable operations (Hannan & Freeman, 1984b). Moreover, 
changes may also undermine a new firm‘s legitimacy (Delmar & Shane, 2004; Martens, 
Jennings, & Jennings, 2007). Finally, significant changes to a venture represent a 
departure from expectations, which again, may result in lower performance ratings by 
investors (Parhankangas & Landstrom, 2006). Similarly, given that disruptions from 
change include things like delayed milestones, operational changes and financial 
problems, it is likely that investors will notice these as deviations from expectations and 




change impacts their own perceptions of performance only insofar as it causes disruptions 
to operations. For investors, who may be less aware of the nuances of change efforts, 
change itself has some negative connotations and disruptions to operations are similarly 
important indicators of poor performance.  
Post hoc analysis of improvisation 
The last construct that warranted further analysis was improvisation. Several 
studies have suggested that the ability to improvise is a critical for entrepreneurs and 
others involved in innovation (Baker et al., 2003; Hmieleski & Corbett, 2008; Moorman 
& Miner, 1998a). However, for the most part, these studies reference the benefits of 
improvisation to problem-solving, creativity and briccolage (Baker & Nelson, 2005; Vera 
& Crossan, 2005) rather than to learning (Miner et al., 2001). For this reason, I suggested 
that improvisation might benefit performance, but not reduce overall change or disruption 
from change. However, since I found no relationships at all, I was unable to conclude 
how improvisation affected the shaping process, if at all. To address this, I took a closer 
look at improvisations‘ role in the model. If, as I hypothesized, improvisation was not 
beneficial to learning, there should be either a null effect or negative effect on certainty. 
In a post hoc analysis I considered this relationship and found that indeed, there was a 
negative relationship between improvisation and certainty (beta = -.155,  s.e. = .046, 
p=.001). In other words, improvisation appears to be negatively associated with 
entrepreneurs‘ certainty about their venture‘s internal and external environment.  
There are two ways to interpret these findings. First, as my theorizing suggested, 
improvisation may be a poor means of building knowledge. In fact, by ―jumping in‖ and 




this sense, improvisation is in direct contrast with the more systematic and analytical 
experiential learning strategies. A second interpretation is that causality runs the other 
way. It may be that when entrepreneurs are uncertain about their venture, they are more 
likely to try random approaches. This is consistent with a problem noted by some 
investors who suggested that as entrepreneurs begin to have performance problems, they 
can become increasingly desperate and start jumping from one strategy to the next. In a 
sense, they are ―thrashing
18
‖ – taking a great deal of action but building very little 
knowledge. In any case, it is clear that not only does improvisation fail to facilitate 
performance, but it is associated with less, not more, certainty about the venture. Whether 
entrepreneurs improvise as a result of uncertainty or become more uncertain as they 
improvise more, at least with respect to the results of this study improvisation does not 
help entrepreneurs build knowledge.   
Revised model 
The findings of this study suggest a slightly refined model from that which was 
proposed in the previous chapter. Based on this analysis, it appears that ventures that 
engage in regular performance monitoring experience less overall change in their 
ventures. Moreover, the frequent use of direct sources of information and advice about 
the external environment is associated with better perceived performance. In addition, 
ventures that engage in experiential learning strategies build more certainty about their 
venture and as a result, experience less disruption from change and perceive their 
performance as better overall. In contrast, improvisational approaches are associated with 
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less certainty about the venture. Finally, while entrepreneurial behaviors do not appear to 
affect investors‘ ratings of performance, change to the venture is associated with lower 
investors‘ ratings of overall performance and disruptiveness of change is associated with 
lower satisfaction with performance. Please see Figure 5.1 for a revised model.  
Figure 5.1 Revised model of entrepreneurial behavior and outcomes 
 
 
 In summary, the findings of this study suggest that change is both a 
normal and, at times, disruptive aspect of the new venturing process. Moreover, ventures 
vary in their ability to manage both the overall amount of change they experience and the 
disruptiveness of that change. In particular, performance monitoring, environmental 
scanning (of direct sources of information) and experiential learning strategies allow 
entrepreneurs to maintain an awareness of changing events and an ability to learn and 
adapt efficiently.  
There are several limitations to this study which qualify the conclusions. First, 
this study is drawn from a relatively small sample size (though it is not atypical for 
studies of entrepreneurship (Bartholomew & Smith, 2006)) which presents limitations to 
statistical power. Furthermore, given the sample size, generalizations to other 




sample size may have been limited by the length of the survey. Since the survey was very 
exploratory, it was quite long and respondents may have been unwilling to invest their 
time. Future research will include much shorter, more focused surveys, based on the 
findings of this initial exploration. This should facilitate response rates.  
 A second limitation has to do with the potential for single-source bias. Each 
respondent was acting as an informant for team-level behaviors. Single-source bias may 
be mitigated by the fact that 1) respondents were generally representing a very small team 
(median size = 3) and so were not attempting to aggregate the behavior of many people, 
2) respondents were reporting on explicit activities rather than beliefs or less salient 
aspects of the venture‘s organization and 3) respondents were limited to members of the 
top management team (mostly CEOs and Presidents) and so were in an organizational 
position to have good knowledge of team‘s activities. Nevertheless, it is possible that 
they were not accurately representing team actions. Future work should collect data from 
multiple team members to more cohesively capture organizational activities.  
 A third limitation is the use of a single survey to capture information at one point 
in time. Therefore, it is not possible to say for certain that the organizing practices studied 
(i.e., performance monitoring, environmental scanning, experiential learning, 
improvisation) are causally related to the outcome measures. Future research should 
measure these practices longitudinally. 
 A fourth limitation has to do with the interpretation of the regression findings. 
These findings suggest that certain organizational practices (i.e., performance monitoring, 
environmental scanning and experiential learning strategies) facilitate the shaping process 




also possible that these relationships are an artifact of variation in unmeasured attributes 
of the environment, such as environmental dynamism or turbulence. In other words, 
change disruption and performance may be affected by turbulence in the environment and 
at the same time, it may be the case that the more turbulent the environment, the less 
monitoring and scanning is possible. One counter-argument for this alternative 
explanation arises from the work of Eisenhardt (1989a) who found that in more dynamic, 
fast-paced environments, better performance was associated with more, not less, 
scanning.  
Furthermore, in both the qualitative and quantitative studies, there was variance in 
the degree to which firms engaged in monitoring and scanning even among those firms 
experiencing high levels of turbulence. Moreover, lack of monitoring was not associated 
with less turbulent markets. In other words, there did not appear to be a pattern of 
monitoring that mirrored environmental turbulence. For example, one of the respondents 
who engaged in the most critical and regular performance monitoring worked in the 
highly dynamic life-sciences tools industry and had to contend with changes in 
technology and markets. On the other hand, one of the least well-monitored firms focused 
on web-sales of apparel…a relatively stable and less complex industry.  Furthermore, the 
qualitative study included several examples of founders who learned to be more vigilant 
over time, even though the turbulence of their environment had not changed (i.e., 
decreased). As one respondent recalled, after experiencing the surprise effects of changes 





―… and that was a big lesson for me … you‘re a start-up but you have to look at 
the macro as well.  You cannot disregard the macro dynamics and you need to understand 
and keep your eye always open...‖ 
 
For several respondents, monitoring appeared to improve over time as they learned how 
external factors or internal performance could easily escape their notice. This suggests 
that monitoring is not entirely determined by environmental issues (e.g., turbulence) but 
is a skill that can be learned, regardless of the environment. However, to fully test for 
endogeneity, future work would need to include more specific measures of environmental 
dynamism or turbulence. 
In addition, it is likely that as environments become increasingly dynamic, 
managers must selectively focus on some indicators over others when monitoring 
performance or the environment. For example, in software development, as the pace of 
development increases, it can be critical for managers to seek out and select appropriate 
diagnostic measures (e.g., # of new software defect or ‗bugs‘) to use as indicators of 
performance rather than monitoring all possible indicators
19
. Future work might consider 
whether some indicators or metrics are more critical than others and the extent to which 
knowledge of these affects new product development performance.  
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CHAPTER 6. GENERAL DISCUSSION AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
 
The purpose of this dissertation was to address the questions ―What is the process 
by which entrepreneurs shape their emerging opportunities?‖ and ―What organizing 
practices facilitate that process?‖ By exploring and explicating the process of opportunity 
creation in a theory-building, qualitative study, I have suggested that opportunities 
emerge and are shaped as entrepreneurs learn from experience, seek out and respond to 
feedback and advice and manage unexpected events. Moreover, I have suggested that this 
shaping process is facilitated by organizing practices that build awareness of the changing 
organizational environment and that build knowledge through systematic and analytical 
approaches to experiential learning. A quantitative, survey study of high-tech 
entrepreneurial ventures largely supported this theoretical framework.  
This research makes several contributions to the field of entrepreneurship. First, it 
provides some insight into the process of opportunity creation. Much of the previous 
research in entrepreneurship has focused on inputs and outcomes of the new venturing 
process, while the process itself remains a black box. In other words, we know that some 
entrepreneurs are more apt than others to create successful opportunities, but we know 
very little about what it is that entrepreneurs actually do. In much of the research, action 
is missing. Yet, ―understanding is enhanced by making explicit the underlying generative 
mechanisms that link one state or event to another, and in the social sciences, actions 
constitute this link‖ (Hedstrom & Swedberg, 1998: 12). By focusing on the actions of 
entrepreneurs, this dissertation attempts to shed some light on the behavioral mechanisms 
through which opportunities emerge. Furthermore, the opportunity creation process as 




much of the existing research. Rather than assuming that opportunities are designed and 
then executed (Gartner, 1985; Shane & Venkataraman, 2000), this dissertation suggests 
that opportunities emerge from a process of simultaneous creation and adaptation.  
This work also contributes to the entrepreneurship field by highlighting and 
examining the paradoxical nature of change within the opportunity creation process. My 
findings suggest that while change is critical for adaptation to dynamic internal and 
external forces (e.g., new knowledge, new environmental constraints), it can also be 
detrimental to performance insofar as it causes delays and disruption. These two faces of 
change are generally addressed separately in the existing literature. On the one hand, 
many studies embrace change as a means of adaptation. For example, some studies argue 
that entrepreneurs adjust their goals in response to available resources (Sarasvathy, 
2001). Studies of entrepreneurial improvisation and briccolage also emphasize the 
benefits of flexibility and adaptation (Baker et al., 2003; Baker & Nelson, 2005; 
Hmieleski & Corbett, 2008).  Underlying these studies is an assumption that in order to 
manage the dynamic uncertainties of a new venture, entrepreneurs must be able to adjust 
quickly and adroitly. The emphasis therefore, is on adapting to uncertainty rather than 
reducing it. On the other hand, many other studies explore strategies and tactics that 
would allow entrepreneurs to avoid change, often through better planning (Delmar & 
Shane, 2003; Sykes & Dunham, 1995) or better information gathering and knowledge 
building (Cooper et al., 1995; Ozgen & Baron, 2007; Yli-Renko et al., 2001). This 
perspective is most evident in the dozens of texts on writing an effective business plan. 
Underlying these studies is the assumption that ventures can be designed, structured and 




This study brings these two perspectives together to suggest that while change is 
integral to the shaping process, it can be actively managed in such a way as to reduce its 
negative effects. Specifically, the findings of Study 1 suggest that the shaping process is a 
cycle of change. Change occurs when entrepreneurs learn from experience, feedback or 
advice and when they respond to unexpected events. These experiences lead to shifts in 
knowledge as well as shifts in the constraints and options entrepreneurs face and as a 
result, they are motivated to make changes to their operations and opportunities. 
However, the extent to which this cycle of change is disruptive, varies depending on how 
quickly, early and accurately entrepreneurs make changes.  
The findings of Study 2 suggest that certain behaviors or practices may make this 
cycle faster, smaller (more incremental) and less disruptive. That is, while learning from 
experience, gathering feedback and advice and responding to unexpected events appear to 
drive change, there are more and less effective ways of managing these drivers of change. 
For example, experiential learning strategies allow entrepreneurs to learn from their 
experience sooner, faster and more accurately. Feedback and advice is likely to be more 
helpful and less disruptive if entrepreneurs acquire it frequently and from more direct 
sources. Finally, unexpected events may be limited or caught earlier if entrepreneurs 
vigilantly monitor their performance and environment. Overall, these organizing 
practices appear to reduce change and its negative effects in the shaping cycle. In other 





Figure 6.1 Practices that facilitate the shaping process 
 
This research also contributes more broadly to research on managing uncertainty 
and unexpected events. By focusing on real-time organizing, it goes beyond efforts to 
reduce risk or eliminate error a priori, to suggest that certain practices allow 
organizational actors to manage uncertain events as they unfold. In particular, this 
research suggests that when organizational actors develop a vigilant awareness of their 
ongoing experience they acquire a more accurate view of a given situation, and are better 
equipped to adjust and adapt their understanding as events shift.  This approach to 
managing uncertainty in-the-moment is akin to what other scholars have referred to as 
mindful organizing. These are organizational practices intended to develop ―a rich 
awareness of discriminatory detail and a capacity for action‖ (Weick et al., 1999, p. 88).  
The effects of mindful organizing have been well-documented in high-reliability 
organizations – organizations that are continually exposed to potential crisis (e.g., nuclear 
power plants, aircraft carriers) and therefore must sustain high levels of attention and 
awareness to ongoing activities (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007). Interestingly, theories of 




organizing which allows firms to maintain flexibility and the capability to respond in real 
time by reorganizing resources and actions as needed (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007). 
Empirically, however, most of the research on mindful organizing focuses on reliability 
and the prevention or minimizing of error in complex systems. For example, scholars 
have argued that mindful organizing practices may reduce crisis in wildland firefighting 
(Barton & Sutcliffe, 2009), healthcare (Vogus & Sutcliffe, 2007a; Vogus & Sutcliffe, 
2007b) and airline cockpits (Krieger, 2005). However, while reliability is clearly an 
important outcome, it is not the only benefit of mindful organizing.  
This study contributes to the literature on mindful organizing in two ways. First, 
the findings suggest that building vigilance and awareness of real-time events may not 
only prevent problems, but may also contribute to overall performance outcomes. Thus, 
there is empirical evidence that at least some of the behaviors associated with mindful 
organizing are critical to outcomes other than reliability. Second, while this study does 
not address mindful organizing directly, it does suggest that the benefits of mindful 
organizing practices likely extend into the realm of innovation and entrepreneurship.  
Although new high tech ventures may seem to be far from the highly structured world of 
air-craft carriers and nuclear power plants, this study suggests that there may be 
underlying similarities. In particular, while new ventures may not perceive themselves as 
striving for reliability, entrepreneurs, like wild land firefighters, must achieve reliable 
functioning in the face of great uncertainty and dynamic conditions. Future work should 
consider more directly if and how mindful organizing practices contribute to 




Finally, this dissertation may contribute to the practice of entrepreneurship, which now, 
more than ever is an issue of significant economic importance. In particular, venture capital and 
angel backed firms tend to be the most innovative and have the highest growth potential of all 
entrepreneurial firms. Firms that received VC funding account for 12% of the total private sector 
workforce (Shane, 2008) and over 16% of US GDP (GlobalInsight, 2005). More importantly, 
these percentages are growing, suggesting that increasingly our economic growth will rely on the 
continued success of VC-backed firms. In many ways these are the seedlings of our economic 
future. However, like seedlings, these same firms have a very high mortality rate, with the 
majority failing within 7 years (Shane, 2008). In other words, the tremendous growth is coming 
from only a fraction of the firms – those that succeed. With this dissertation, I do not claim to 
explain or predict overall venture performance. However, the ability to manage deep uncertainty 
and equivocality is one critical aspect of their success.  Moreover, a deeper understanding of the 
organizing practices that facilitate the shaping process may allow venture capitalists and other 
investors to determine earlier in the process if new ventures are heading in the right direction. In 
other words, rather than waiting for a venture to either run out of money or successfully exit, both 
entrepreneurs and investors may be able to take stock of their actions, not just their outcomes, and 
make adjustments to their practices before conclusions are foregone. 
FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS 
This dissertation has taken an exploratory and inductive approach to 
understanding the opportunity creation process. While the current study furthers our 
understanding of what has previously been a ―black box‖ in the literature, it also raises 
several questions. In particular, future research should strive to both refine and continue 
to test the current model as well as to expand that model to include an examination of the 




Refining the model 
The two studies of this dissertation, in combination, suggest a cyclical shaping 
process model, enhanced or hindered by the organizing practices of the entrepreneurs 
involved. One goal of future work is to further refine and test this model using 
longitudinal data. To do this, I will continue to use both qualitative and quantitative 
methods. Many of the ventures studied in these studies have volunteered to continue to 
participate in research. Regular interviews combined with much shorter, more focused, 
surveys may provide an even clearer picture of the shaping process and the specific 
practices that facilitate that process over time. Experiential learning strategies appear to 
be particularly important to this process and future studies should refine and strengthen 
this construct to be used as an index of entrepreneurial behaviors.  
Another piece of the model that warrants closer attention is the type and 
magnitude of change that new ventures experience. In this study, change has been 
categorized quite roughly as either a change to opportunity or a change to operations. 
Yet, as was discussed in the coding process, these changes can also be further broken 
down into changes to the market, product, pricing model, commercialization model, 
partnerships, etc. By collecting additional data over time, it may be possible to consider 
how the different practices affect entrepreneurs‘ ability to manage different kinds of 
change.  
Similarly, magnitude of change was measured using a variety of statements such 
as ―Our overall value proposition has changed.‖ What is less clear is how that value 
proposition differed from the initial proposition and to what extent. This may be a critical 




That is, change generally represents some combination or overlap of old and new
20
.  
Monitoring performance, scanning and experiential learning strategies may all help 
entrepreneurs manage the magnitude of this overlap. For example, if scanning and 
performance monitoring allow entrepreneurs to calibrate how well an approach is 
working and experiential strategies help them pinpoint exactly how an approach is 
affecting certain outcomes, they may be better able to craft changes that address specific 
performance gaps while still retaining the benefits of the old approach. On the other hand, 
if they have no sense of why an approach is not working, any new approach may be 
closer to a ‗stab in the dark‘ – not a carefully crafted combination of old and new. 
William James suggests ―the maximum of attention may then be said to be found 
whenever we have a systematic harmony or unification between the novel and the old. It 
is an odd circumstance that neither the old nor the new, by itself, is interesting: the 
absolutely old is insipid; the absolutely new makes no appeal at all. The old in the new is 
what claims attention- the old with a slightly new turn‖ (James, 1906: 108). 
Similarly, it may be that for entrepreneurs, the ―absolutely old‖ (or no change) 
precludes adaptation and the absolutely new (or complete change) change disconnects 
from all that is working. Thus, it may be that change is most effective for entrepreneurs 
when they are able to achieve a ―systematic harmony‖ between the novel and the old. A 
closer examination of change efforts over time, using both quantitative and qualitative 
data, may provide more insight into how entrepreneurs manage the overlap between old 
and new.   
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Antecedents to the model 
Another set of questions raised by this research has to do with the likely 
antecedents to the practices explored here. This study suggests that performance 
monitoring, environmental scanning and experiential learning strategies are all important 
to the management of uncertainty but as of yet, I‘ve said little about what drives these 
behaviors. Future research should address this. In particular, the qualitative and 
quantitative findings point to two potentially generative avenues of research – the role of 
team expertise and the role of situated humility. I describe each of these below. 
Requisite variety of team expertise. Earlier I argued that many entrepreneurial 
teams suffer from a lack of sufficient expertise (which is one reason it is so critical to 
seek it externally). However, teams vary with respect to the amount and type of expertise 
they have. Moreover, requisite variety of expertise is likely to be just as important within 
a team as it is externally, particularly with respect to the practices described in this study. 
First, because it takes knowledge to build knowledge, teams with more expertise overall 
and more kinds of expertise may be more likely to engage in experiential learning 
strategies. In their study of absorptive capacity, Cohen and Levinthal (1990) suggest that 
a firm‘s ability to absorb and build upon new information is constrained or facilitated by 
existing knowledge, routines and structures. Moreover, groups composed of individuals 
possessing diverse knowledge sets and perspectives have access to more cognitive 
elements than homogenous groups (e.g., Amabile, Barsade, Mueller, & Staw, 2005; 
Haragon & Sutton, 1997; Leonard & Swap, 1999). Thus, teams with a requisite variety of 
expertise are more likely to have the cognitive tools necessary to engage in experiential 




ability to engage in vigilant monitoring. In the presence of diverse perspectives, people 
are more likely to challenge one another to think more divergently and challenge 
assumptions (Leonard & Swap, 1999; Nemeth, Connell, Rogers, & Brown, 2001). 
Similarly, differing sets of expertise and world-views may provide broader and deeper 
sensors for changes in performance and the environment. Finally, a broader set of 
worldviews and functional expertise may increase teams‘ likelihood and ability to seek 
external feedback.  A variety of experts are likely to have very different information 
networks thus increasing the overall set of informational sources for a team. Future work 
should consider what constitutes a requisite variety of expertise on a venture team and 
how this affects the practices associated with the shaping process. 
Situated humility. Another factor that may facilitate the opportunity shaping 
process arises from how entrepreneurs view themselves in relation to the emerging 
situation. When individuals view a situation as inherently unpredictable, recognizing that 
they cannot  have a complete understanding of ongoing events, they are more likely to 
seek out opportunities to learn about the situation as it unfolds (Barton & Sutcliffe, 2009). 
I refer to this attitude as ―situated humility.‖ It arises not out of personal insecurities, but 
rather from the acceptance that, however confident they are in their own skills and 
abilities, the venture is so uncertain that no-one can be fully knowledgeable under the 
circumstances.  
Humility, in this case, does not mean to be meek or feel inferior any more than 
―brave‖ means to feel no fear. Rather, I draw on a Kantian view of humility in which, as 
Grenberg (2005:17) puts it, one views oneself as ―a dependent and corrupt but dignified 




while still recognizing the fundamental limits of those. In this case, however, I make no 
claims as to personality or trait but rather view this humility as a situated cognition in that 
it represents an interaction of cognitive schemas with an organizational context (Lant, 
2002).  Individuals who embody situated humility may be cocky or arrogant in other 
situations. However, with respect to their new venture, they are careful about their 
limitations and their limited knowledge. Importantly, because it is not a personality trait, 
situated humility can exist alongside optimism and efficacy. In fact, many founders spoke 
of confidence or lack of fear in the same breath as letting go of ego or the belief that you 
know best. 
―These are folks that are not egomaniacs…[they] are very sound, very confident 
in their abilities on one hand, but are very willing to cooperate … rather than 
enforce or convey a message that they know best.‖ 
 
 ―You‘ve got to pay attention to everything and not be afraid….If you check your 
ego at the door I think you get a lot farther.‖  
 
This combination of humility about the situation but confidence in one‘s own 
abilities may help explain one of the paradoxes of entrepreneurship – that of perseverance 
vs. flexibility. On one hand, in order to persevere in the face of great odds entrepreneurs 
must have high levels of confidence in themselves and their ideas. Indeed, empirical 
studies suggest that entrepreneurs, like most individuals, tend to be overly optimistic 
about the likelihood of success when that success is based on their own skills (Camerer & 
Lovallo, 1999; Cooper et al., 1988). Some studies even suggest that entrepreneurs have 
higher than average risk propensities (Stewart & Roth, 2001) (though see Brockhaus, 
1980 for an exception). Such confidence and optimism might be required to maintain the 
persistence and resilience necessary to see a venture through. On the other hand, the 




unexpected challenges and problems. The ability to adapt and adjust their direction is 
critical. Too much confidence in a particular direction, strategy or idea could result in 
fixation errors or even the failure to notice emerging problems. Studies of very uncertain 
situations suggest that flexibility and adaptiveness require an emphasis on failure (e.g., 
constant vigilance for likely problems, considering worst-case scenarios) (Weick & 
Sutcliffe, 2007). How then, are entrepreneurs to maintain optimism and confidence 
without becoming blind to the possibility of failure and unable to adjust their plans?  
The answer does not appear to lie in moderating confidence levels alone. That is, 
we might think that successful entrepreneurs are confident but not overconfident. 
Unfortunately, empirical studies do not support this idea. Rather, it appears that 
overconfidence is characteristic of all entrepreneurs (and, indeed, all people) regardless 
of their likely success (Cooper et al., 1988; Stewart & Roth, 2001)
 21
.  However, this 
research generally focuses on entrepreneurs‘ perceptions of risky circumstances and 
likely outcomes rather than considering their ability to manage the process. It may be, 
therefore that a humble view of the situation together with a confidence in one‘s ability to 
find ways to manage it provide the most benefits. By acknowledging that there is much 
that they don‘t know, while maintaining confidence in their ability to learn their way 
forward, entrepreneurs may be able to generate the benefits of both sides of the paradox. 
As one founder explained:  
Are we optimistic or not optimistic? That is almost like the wrong question at this 
point in time. We know it is fraught with risk. In terms of the technology we 
really don‘t know. But what we are committed to is that for a period of time we 
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really believe that what we do know and the processes that we can bring to bear 
…can potentially ferret out a few markers that can allow us to secure an 
SBIR
22
…So we need some basic data. So that‘s what we feel comfortable about. 
 
Those who recognize a situation as unknowable do not necessarily disbelieve 
their own assumptions and experiences. Situated humility is not simply doubt. Rather, 
they accept that the situation is unfolding and changing. This recognition may be a driver 
of experiential learning strategies in that it sets up the need for action – for trying things, 
testing assumptions, conducting experiments. Weick
23
 has suggested that managing 
uncertainty requires more than sensemaking and sense-discrediting. Action is necessary.  
Situated humility, with its recognition of uncertainty and ambiguity, creates a call to 
learning through action. Situated humility may also drive performance monitoring and 
environmental scanning insofar as founders who view a situation as unstable and 
dynamic are more likely to be vigilant for changing conditions and assumptions.  
 Future research should consider how to measure situated humility in 
entrepreneurs. There is no existing scale to measure situated humility as this is a new 
construct. However, studies of personal humility offer excellent guidelines. For example, 
personal humility appears to consist of several different components all founded on the 
belief that an individual can change (Owens, 2009). Similarly, situated humility likely 
encompasses the view that a situation can change – that events are not stable and 
predictable. Similarly, personal humility includes a willingness to view oneself accurately,  
an appreciation of others‘ strengths and contributions, teachability, and a low self-focus (Owens, 
2009). All of these components likely have parallels in situated humility. In addition, however, 
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situated humility appears to include a sense of efficacy and confidence. Thus, however it is 
operationalized, it is likely to include an index of different factors rather than a single 
characteristic.  
 Data from the quantitative study not reported here attempted to capture some aspects of 
situated humility, including the desire to view a situation accurately and the tendency to seek out 
alternative perspectives on a situation. In general, these behaviors were associated with the 
tendency to check assumptions more frequently, which was, in turn, associated with better 
perceived performance. However, the effects of checking assumptions became insignificant when 
experiential learning strategies were included in the model. Furthermore, the operationalization of 
situated humility included measures of belief and behavior, making it difficult to untangle the 
effects of one from the other. Future studies should attempt to isolate and refine this construct 
prior to analyzing its effects on behavior. Based on anecdotal evidence, however, it seems likely 
that entrepreneurs who approach the shaping process with situated humility are more likely to 
engage in behaviors that facilitate that process, such as performance monitoring, environmental 
scanning and experiential learning strategies.  
CLOSING REMARKS 
To understand entrepreneurship, we must view it not just as an outcome of discovery, but 
as an emergent process of creativity and adaptation. To address this gap, I examined the process 
by which opportunities are created and the organizing practices that facilitate that process. While 
popular views of entrepreneurship tend to portray entrepreneurs as intuitive, improvisational and 
passionate and business schools teach fledgling entrepreneurs to plan and analyze, this research 
suggests that the practice of entrepreneurship falls somewhere in between. The two studies offer a 
novel theory of opportunity creation as a shaping process, facilitated by organizing practices that 
contribute to experiential awareness and learning. That is, my findings suggest that entrepreneurs 




disciplined eagerness to view the situation as it really is, not just as they want it to be. 
Furthermore, while they must act in the moment, they must also structure the moment so that 
action leads to learning.  
Schumpeter referred to entrepreneurship as the ―gales of creative destruction‖ (1942). 
While that may accurately reflect new ventures‘ economic effect, the process of entrepreneurship 
could more accurately be called simply gales of creation. It blows this way and that, following not 
the rigid, planned process of business development as we are taught in business schools (Gartner, 
1985; Kotler, 1991), but rather an emergent and enacted route, pushed and pulled by internal and 
external forces for change. Entrepreneurs who thrive in these gales are those who can harness the 







APPENDIX A.  




I am working with a Ross Business School, University of Michigan doctoral student, Michelle 
Barton, who is conducting her dissertation research on the strategies that entrepreneurs use for 
responding to uncertainty. She focuses on how founders adjust and adapt their emerging 
ventures in response to unexpected major events such as new knowledge, technological 
requirements or market situations.  I am wondering if you would be willing to be interviewed by 
her about your experiences.  In my experience working with early stage companies, I have found 
that almost every company had a major surprise in the first couple of years that caused it to 
change its direction and or its approach to what it was doing.  I think Michelle‘s research would 
be very useful in helping us to better understand the management of early stage companies. 
 
Michelle is very careful about confidentiality and anonymity. If you agree to be interviewed, she 
will send you a consent form that details how she manages and protects the data she collects. 
  
I appreciate any help you might be able to give her.  Please let me know if you are willing to talk 












Interview protocol for qualitative study 
 
Fill in in advance:  
a. Name of company:  
b. Name of respondent: 
c. Respondent‘s position (e.g., CEO, etc.):  
 
Biggest goal for next six months:  
 
II. Background 
1. Please tell me your elevator speech on what your organization does right now and where 
you plan to go. 
2. How big is your organization currently? 
a.  number of employees 
b.  TMT (describe) 
c. Sales/Revenues 
d. Capital invested to date and by whom if possible 
3. Who is on the top management team? 
4. What date (month/year) was the company first incorporated? 
5. When did you first become involved in the company? 
6. What did you do previous to this? 
7. Have you founded or been involved in other entrepreneurial ventures before?  
 
III. Please tell me how the company got started… 
1. What was the original goal/strategy of the organization when you first incorporated it? 
Probe for: 
I. Who else was involved in the first 6 months of the organization? In what 
capacity? 
II. Who was the original target market and audience? 
III. What was the initial strategy for development? Sales and distribution? 
IV. How was the venture originally organized? 
V. What was the original plan (if any)? 
 
2. How did you develop the venture from there? Probe for: 
I. How was the technology/offering developed? In what stages? 
II. When and how did you seek funding? 
III. Who else became involved and in what capacity 
IV. What stakeholders became involved and how (e.g., customers, distributors) 
V. What advisors did you use and how? 
 
3. Continue to ask ―then what‖ until arrive at present day 
 
4. When respondents mention a change event, probe for: 
I. When did you first start thinking about the need/desire for this change?  
II. What instigated the change? (Probe for actions, experiments, experiences) 
III. Had you expected to be in this situation?  
IV. What was most unexpected or unplanned about it? 




VI. What other stakeholders were involved at that time (e.g., VC, incubators, 
other investors, family members)? 
VII. What were your primary concerns and goals before and after the change? 
VIII. Did you consider alternative changes? 
IX. Before deciding to make the change, what did you do?  
X. Did you consult with anyone about this change? Who? 
XI. How did you carry out making the change? 
XII. How could you tell if it was working or not? 
XIII. What was your source of funding at that time? 
XIV. What has been the result (so far) of this change? 
XV. What was most challenging about this process? 
XVI. Was there anything you could have done differently that might have made 
this go even more smoothly? 
XVII. What, if anything, did you learn from this experience? 
5. [If time permits]  
I. What is the most uncertain aspect of your business right now? How are you 
managing that? 
II. While developing this venture, did you ever have to respond to something 










Sample of coded data 
 
Change events  Type of change 
(analytical codes in 
parentheses) 
Triggers of change   Triggers of change  
(analytical codes in 
parentheses)  
Change effects  
Developed surgical product A 
for sale to medical device 
distributor  develops and 
focuses on different kind of 
surgical product B for sales 
directly to hospitals 




After evaluating prototype 
of original product A, 
distributor decides not to 
buy because market isn‘t 
big enough 
  
 (Learning from deliberate 
experience)  
Learning from experience 
 
Time consuming delay but since 
distributor paid to evaluate, 
financial resources were not lost 
Temporal - delay 
Not very disruptive to 
operations 
Hire sales force to sell surgical 
product B to hospitals for use 
by general surgeons fire sales 
force and incur $3M cost 
 (personnel change) 
Operations 
General surgeons had liked 
the product B but upon 
trying to sell it, discovered 
that buyers (hospitals) 
wouldn‘t pay for it. 
 (Learning from t-and-e 
experience) 
Learning from experience 
 
$3 Million wasted 
Fired sales force and VP of sales 
Disruptive to operations 
Licensed product B to a partner 
to sell to cardiac surgeons 
rather than general surgeons  





Partner acquired by Firm 
X who won‘t sell but 
doesn‘t want to give up 
license 




Sales of product delayed but 
acquiring firm pays $2M to hold 
license 
Temporal - delay 
Not very disruptive to 
operations 
Venture focused on 
(unsuccessful) product B  
develops new product C and 
prepares plan around this  
 (product change) 
Opportunity 
 
Realize product B is not 
selling 
 
 (Learning from t-and-e 
experience) 
Learning from experience 
 
No disruption associated with 
change 
Not very disruptive to 
operations 
Temporal - unclear 
Board meeting called to see 
newly developed surgical 
product C  Founder quickly 
invents different product D (a 
few days before meeting) 
 (product change) 
Opportunity 
Product C passes initial 
tests but unexpectedly fails 
second round of testing (so 
inventor feels pressure to 
come up with something in 
time for meeting)  




Almost no difficulty.  
Made this change in 3 days 
Not very disruptive to 
operations 









Appendix C - continued 
 
Change events  Type of change 
(analytical codes in 
parentheses) 
Triggers of change   Triggers of change  
(analytical codes in 
parentheses)  
Change effects  
Enter contracting VC firms for 
$5M to finance growth of 
venture  loss of VC funding 
 (funding change) 
Operations  
 
VCs pull out suddenly 
 
 (Unexpected event – 
partnership failure) 
Unexpected event 
Loss of funding ($5M) 
Disruptive to operations 
Renegotiate contract with Firm 
X to distribute 10,000 
units/month of product B and 
hire 52 manufacturing positions 
 Firm X refuses to purchase 
product B and manufacturing 
resources are let go 
 (personnel change) 
(distribution change) 
Operations 
First mass produced 
products B don‘t work as 
expected. (Respondent 
notes that they were not 
field tested) 
 
 (Learning from t-and-e 
experience/ unexpected event 
– tech failure) 
Learning from experience 
Unexpected event 
 
Fire 52 people, enter litigation, 
 Also lose additional contract  
Disruptive to operations 







Survey instrument for investors 
 
1. How many companies have you invested in personally or in your capacity as a 
venture capitalist/angel investor? 
(Please circle one.) 
 
1 2-5 6-10 11-15 16-20 21-25 >25 
 
2. Compared to all the companies you have invested in, how successful would you 




  About 
average 
  Far more 
successful 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
3. Compared to your initial expectations for this venture (when you first invested), 





  About as 
expected 
  Far 
exceeded 
expectations 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
















1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Product development 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Market development 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Efficient use of resources 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Achieving milestones and goals 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Ability to manage unexpected 
events 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Ability to learn from feedback 
and experience 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Ability to avoid or prevent 
surprises 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Ability to adapt operations or 
strategy when necessary 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 




















































































Sample recruiting email to investors 
 
Dear xyz,  
I am writing to ask if you might be able to invest a half hour of your time to participate in 
a research study of entrepreneurial ventures. I am a doctoral candidate at the Ross School 
of Business, University of Michigan, investigating how entrepreneurs anticipate, monitor 
and manage the inevitable need for adaptation in very early stage tech ventures. I believe 
that this study will yield practical insights of use to both entrepreneurs and their investors 
and I would very much appreciate your help. This should take even less than a half hour 
of your time if I can work with your assistant.  
  
I am hoping that you will be willing to put me in touch with one executive at each of your 
recent early-stage ventures so that I might request their participation in a 20 minute, 
online survey about their management practices. (I have received very positive feedback 
from entrepreneurs about the content of the survey and about the thinking that it 
provoked.) I would also ask you to very briefly rate these ventures so that I can capture 
your perspective on their performance so far. The responses take no more than 1 minute 
per company. I am very vigilant about confidentiality and follow strict guidelines for 
maintaining anonymity. At the conclusion of the study, I will provide a report on my 
findings across all the ventures studied, as well as their implications for both investors 
and entrepreneurs.  
  
I am dedicated to conducting research that is relevant to the real world, but of course that 
means working with real investors and entrepreneurs rather than theories, and as you well 
know, you are a difficult bunch to get hold of. So I greatly appreciate any help you can 
provide. This research is professionally conducted, free, timely (focuses on how ventures 
are adapting in this economic context) and oriented on practice not theory. It honestly 
takes no more than 30 minutes of your time and the findings will be aggregated and 
reported back to you. Other participants include venture capitalists and professional angel 
associations all over the U.S.  
  
Please let me know if you can help with this study and if you would like me to follow up 










Sample recruiting email to entrepreneurs 
Dear Mr…., 
 
I understand that … gave you a heads up that I would be contacting you.  I am a doctoral student 
at the Ross School of Business, University of Michigan. I am conducting research on the 
management of new ventures and … suggested that your experiences would be particularly 
helpful.  I am hoping you might be willing to participate in a short, totally confidential, survey. 
This would take no more than about 20 minutes.  
 
I sincerely believe the best way to improve the understanding and practice of entrepreneurship is 
to learn from those who are engaged in it, but as you can imagine, you are not an easy bunch to 
get to. So I would be very grateful if you would be willing to contribute your experience to this 
survey. Your responses will remain entirely confidential though I will be happy to share with you 
the aggregated findings of the study. If you have any questions please feel free to contact me at 
mibarton@umich.edu. Please click the link below or copy it into your browser to go to the 
survey.   
 















I am helping Michelle Barton, a doctoral student at the University of Michigan, Ross School of 
Business who is conducting research on the management of early stage entrepreneurial ventures. I 
believe that her study may yield practical insights of use to all of us and I would very much 
appreciate your responding to an online survey that she will be sending (via email) to you. The 
survey should take no more than 20 minutes and is completely confidential.  
We have a great deal of collective wisdom within our entrepreneurial community and 
studies such as this one can help us capture and disseminate important knowledge about 
the management of entrepreneurial ventures. If you can, please spare a few minutes for 




                                                     
24
 I provided investors with the basic email but they tailored it to be more personal and to include 
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